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SUMMARY
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the 
reform-process undertaken by the present Soviet leadership in 
order to expand the foreign trade with Western Europe. The 
economic, political and bureaucratic aspects are treated 
separately.
A broad outline of functionalist writings on 
East-West trade is given, and special reference is made to 
David Mitrany's emphasis on the interplay between politics 
and economics, and the confidence-building and peace-keeping 
role of trade.
The composition of Soviet imports and exports is 
focused upon in chapter 2. The growing problems of the 
Soviet economy are reflected in the export of little 
else than energy, and the large imports of capital intensive 
goods. The effects of the short-term improvements in terms- 
of-trade resulting from the temporary increase in oi1-prices 
are judged negatively, as the influx of hard currency was 
used to cover deficiencies in the domestic production. The 
pecularities of Soviet trade transactions, i.e. seeking to 
avoid the use of money, are discussed and the problems this 
creates are pointed out.
In chapter 3 the political aspects of Soviet-West 
European trade are analysed. The attempts to create a 
socialist foreign trade based on the paradox of Lenin's 
insistence on continued trade with the capitalist West while 
at the same time use trade politically are described. Apart 
from a few isolated events where the Soviet Union threatened 
to deploy trade as a political weapon, politically motivated 
initiatives could not be found.
In the final chapter of part I, the policy-making 
process in the foreign trade sector of the state 
administration is analysed. The problems resulting from 
inadequate communication network and the absence of any 
integrative force in addition to the systematic avoidance of 
complicated transactions are discussed.
Part II commences with a discussion of 
Gorbachev’s economic policy and the role given to foreign 
trade both as a growth factor, and as a bridge-builder to 
Europe.
In chapter 6, the Soviet attempt to become member 
of GATT, and the new policy towards the Common Market are 
analysed. The reasons for GATT's refusal are explained with 
special reference to the acceptance of Hungary as a member at 
the beginning of the seventies. The changes in the Soviet 
policy towards the Common Market are interpreted as 
expressions of the present Soviet leadership's pragmatic 
approach both towards foreign trade and Western Europe.
Chapter 7 is devoted to the the Soviet joint 
ventures initiative. The inadequacies of the legislative
6
basis are discussed, and the prospects for joint ventures 
with Western Europe are described.
In chapter 9, the reform endeavours in the foreign 
trade bureaucracy are discussed, and the decisive importance 
of their outcome for the policy of expanding the right to 
engage in foreign trade is underlined. The role of the 
plans, prices, and the lack of expertise are discussed.
In the concluding chapter,a reference is made to 
the attempts of enhancing autonomous decision-making at 
enterprise-level as a method of combatting the power of the 
foreign trade bureaucracy. Despite the numerous obstacles 
confronting the reforms, the leadership's will to reconsider 
entrenched dogmas allows us to draw a cautiously optimistic 
conclusion.
7
PART I
1.1. INTRODUCTION
The Soviet Union plays a growing role in the world
economy. The country possesses a large economic potential in
terms of raw materials and productive capacity. If opened 
for foreign companies, the Soviet domestic market will prove 
to be a large untapped reserve. Soviet foreign trade has been 
the most rapidly growing part of the Soviet economy
since the sixties. According to some analyses, the quota of
foreign trade, as measured against national income has grown 
from 12*/. in 1960, to 15*/. in 1970 and reaching 27*/. in 1980, 
whereas the 1980 comparable figures for the United States 
were 3V/.. x The importance of foreign trade in the Soviet , 
economy is perhaps better understood, when we know that most 
of the equipment used in the chemical industry, in metallurgy 
and various other industrial branches have been imported.
For successive years, the Soviet Union has purchased a 
large part of its grain and fodder abroad. In addition to 
these examples, imports have played an important part in the 
development and excavation of raw materials in Siberia.
Soviet economic intercourse with the western 
capitalist countries make up only a minor part of world trade. 
The commodities exchanged and their value,
as well as the importance of this trade for the countries
8
involved, vary greatly from year to year. One is, 
therefore, tempted to repeat a question posed by an expert in 
the field of east-west economics, Professor Marie Lavigne:
"Why take an interest in east-west trade?".5 This is, as 
Professor Lavigne poignantly states, a quantitative question 
which does not pay respect to the complexity of the problems 
surrounding this sector of international trade. Indeed, if 
one should look at the trade relations between the Soviet Union 
and the West, from a purely economic point of view, one would 
have to overlook the impressive amounts of writing published 
in all the countries involved, as well as the number of 
conferences, studies and seminars devoted to this topic.
What justifies this attention from politicians, businessmen 
and academics? Many answers can, and have been given. Here, 
a few will be outlined.
Economic intercourse between a planned economy and 
a market economy is a direct confrontation between two 
systems based on different political and economic principles. 
The former maintaining a strict central control, only 
allowing the market forces a very limited scope, whereas the 
latter tries to restrict political control and intervention 
to the minimum required to mute some of the harmful effects 
of the market forces. In a market economy, foreign trade is 
encouraged by the government and only limited by the demand 
on the world markets. The competitiveness internationa11y is 
taken as a measure of economic development. Foreign
9
investments and companies are welcomed, the government's 
role in international trade is limited to little 
more than co-ordinating the activities. In a 
centrally planned economy, the state monopoly has ensured 
a total separation of the domestic market from the foreign 
economic activities. This has been justified politically as 
a measure necessary to shield the country from the recurrent 
crisis of the market, e.g. inflation, bankruptcy and 
unemployment. The cost has been the absence of the 
"invisible boot of the market", outdated and wasteful methods 
of production have not been reformed as rapidly as in the 
West, and without the pressures of a market, the enterprises 
have little interest in changes or improvements. As a 
result, the Soviet Union, being the largest of the centrally 
planned economies, and traditionally the least prone to 
changes, has become technologically backward in comparison 
with West. The foreign trade activities have been limited by 
availability of competitive goods. As we shall see later, the 
goods offered by the Soviet Union on the world market are 
mostly raw-material and goods of low capital intensity, on the 
whole not differing very much from the developing countries 
in the Third World. Thus, East-West trade involves 
partners at different levels of economic development. Bearing 
in mind that whereas the Third World countries are 
strategically and militarily clearly inferior to the West, 
trade between the West and the Soviet Union entails problems
10
that are quite unique because of the political parity.
As mentioned above, Western governments have 
largely refrained from mixing politics and economics, their 
abstention has been less equivocal in their relations with 
the Soviet Union. Trade between them cannot be analysed 
without reference to the political interests inherent in it.
The political controversy linked to East-West trade 
emerged soon after the end of World War II. When the "Cold 
War" permeated the relations between East and West, trade 
assumed an importance it had not enjoyed prior to 1939. 
Economic warfare was introduced on a large scale. Already in 
1945, the US State Department assembled a lists of goods not 
to be exported to Soviet controlled areas of Europe. This 
control became institutionalised when the Co-Ordinating 
Committee for Multi-Lateral Export Controls was set up in 
Paris in 1948 (COCOM). Since US aid to the reconstruction 
of Europe was far more important than trade with the Soviet 
Union and her allies; the embargo on any commodity that could 
have strategic relevance was efficient. Trade between the 
two blocs remained negligible.
It would be an error to blame this state of 
relations on the Americans. Soviet policy in the post-war 
years aimed for the alignement of the East European economies 
to Soviet needs and requirements. This did not only reduce 
trade between Eastern and Western Europe to a level lower 
than before the war, but practically excluded any policy for
11
its expansion.
Two events paved the way for a new thinking. In 
the Soviet Union, the 22nd Party Congress with the criticism 
and subsequent abandonment of the doctrine of the 
inevitability of war between the socialist and the capitalist 
part of the world, played down the political antagonisms. In
the West, although at a much later date, the West German 
Chancellor Willy Brandt's "Ostpolitik" was a break with the 
hitherto Western approach. In retrospect, this was not 
unexpected, the division of Europe is probably felt most 
painfully in the two Germanies. Chancellor Brandt's opening 
to the East renewed the debate on the political implications 
of trade. The calls for a harmonization of Western countries' 
trade policies were repeated, and have been voiced strongly 
whenever political tension between East and West has 
increased. In recent years, the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979, and the introduction of martial law in 
Poland two years later, focused on the possibility of using 
trade as a means to further political aims.
The relationship between trade and politics as 
seen from a Soviet viewpoint will be dealt with in greater 
detail later, let it suffice here to mention the two 
strategies possible in East-West trade. One can 
impose an embargo on certain goods to force the opponent 
to change his policy. The embargo will then 
be lifted when the desired change has emerged. Or it
12
will end because the embargo has proved too costly in terms 
of lost trade. The opposite strategy, initiated in the West 
by Chancellor Brandt, was to use trade as a 
confidence-building measure. This policy was formally 
acknowledged in the so-called "Second Basket" of the Helsinki 
Declaration on Co-Operation and Security in Europe, signed in 
1975. The Declaration has been portrayed quite differently 
in Western Europe and in the Soviet Union. Whereas the 
liberal democracies in the West have underlined its 
implications for individual rights, the USSR with the support 
of her allies, have emphasised the relevance of trade, 
exchange of know-how and industrial co-operation for peace and 
the lessening of political tensions. This line has been 
frequently repeated by Soviet trade officials and politicians 
on numerous occasions, especially in connection with COCOM 
and when accusing the West for doing nothing to encourage trade 
Soviet claims for a "normalisation of trade", as 
well as Western writers' frequently used expression "natural 
level of trade", deserve some comments in this connection.
A "normalisation" is meant as the removal of all politically 
imposed trade barriers, ranging from embargoes and sanctions 
to protectionist customs and anti-dumping legislation. The 
widely held belief among Soviet officials, that these measures 
primarily are aimed at her, is clearly an exaggeration.
There is , for instance, an embargo on the export of the 
equipment to produce nuclear weapons which has been supported
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by the USSR. Concerning protective measures in the West, 
Soviet complaints are mostly directed at the EEC's quotas 
for agricultural produce. However, they apply to other 
non-EEC countries, some of whom are situated in Western 
Europe. On the other hand, from a Western viewpoint, a 
“normalisation of trade" would mean a removal of the state 
monopoly, a topic which until very recently has been even 
more utopian than any expansion of the EEC's food quotas. 
Apart from Western protective measures and the state 
monopoly in the Soviet union, there are a number of obstacles 
preventing any large-scale expansion of trade. The most 
important being the generally inferior quality of Soviet 
goods, the inconvertibi1ity of the ruble, the West's embargo 
on so-called strategic goods and the refusal to grant the 
Soviet Union a most-favoured-nation status.
The expression "a normal level of trade" which 
has found a wide usage both in Soviet and Western 
economic literature, is inconclusive. It is used to sum up 
some of the arguments covered by the concept of 
“normalisation'', but in addition it implies that trade is 
below what is supposed to be normal. This level is never 
defined. Trade between the West and the Soviet Union 
before World War II was very small compared to the amount 
of trade conducted between the Western countries.
In this respect, there is little unnatural in the present 
situation. However, the severance of any trade links
14
by a political fiat is "unnatural" from an economic 
perspective. Therefore, the initial phase of the "Cold War" 
precluded many trade agreements that could have been 
profitable were not concluded. The permanence of these 
conditions had made the low level of trade "more natural" as 
the countries became adapted to it. The Swedish economist 
Gunnar Myrdal maintained that:
"While political forces can strangle trade almost 
instantaneously, it will usually be a difficult and 
time-consuming process to change back to more 
normal trading relations."3 
He continues his argument by stating that attempts to 
"normalise" trade may be impossible, because investment 
allocations in the countries involved, have been made in order 
to enhance self-sufficiency. Thus, without any political 
initiative to open up the economy to the outside, an increase 
in trade is unlikely. Whether such an opening would have 
resulted in a "norma 1isation", or a "natural level of trade" 
is irrelevant. What is important, is that this would be a 
development which was initiated on the political level, due to 
the absence of an economic incentive. Therefore, trade 
between the capitalist West, and the socialist East, 
has a political content far different from the trade within 
these regions. To underestimate this aspect would be a 
grave mistake, it would be equally grave to discuss the 
political and economic aspects in isolation without focusing
15
on their inter-re1 atedness.
1.2. A Functionalist Approach to the Politcal Economy of 
East-Ulest Trade
International trade has attracted the attention of 
theoreticians for centuries. The various explanations and 
models explaining its importance and contribution to the 
growth of the countries involved, is today an integrated part 
of political parlance in both parts of Europe.
Despite the fact that intra-governmenta1 
organisations were set up to regulate trade during the 
latter part of the nineteenth century, few scholars attempted 
to create a theoretical framework where the interplay between 
international politics and international economic relations 
could be explained. One of the first major efforts in this 
respect was made by David Mitrany in the 1930s.
The i nternat i onal events dur i ng the i mmed i ate pre-war decade 
were marked by the futile efforts of the liberal democracies 
to combat the rise of totalitarian regimes in Europe. Among 
the means applied by the then League of Nations were 
embargoes and economic sanctions against the belligerent 
nations. Professor Mitrany’s basic idea was that 
international co-operation could create a loyalty towards the 
supra-national aims among those involved, a loyalty that
16
would become stronger than their allegiance to their own 
countries. In his own words, the state is "too weak to 
secure us equality" and at the same time "too strong to allow 
us l i b e r t y " . I n t e r n a t i o n a l  co-operation in all fields 
could be used to increase the welfare of the states 
participating, but above all, it could create, to quote the 
title of one of his books, a working peace system.
A unique possibility to implement Professor 
Mitrany's ideas, emerged after the end of the Second World 
War. Professor Gunnar Myrdal, who shared Mitrany's 
optimistic beliefs, was given the chairmanship of the United 
Nations Commission for European Reconstruction. However, his 
idealism did not convince the attitudes of the super-powers, 
and the primacy of political considerations brought an end to 
his efforts to integrate Europe economica11y .
The political division of the world, did not make 
trade entirely impossible, and scholarly interest in the 
thoughts put forward by men like Mitrany and Myrdal soon 
increased. Distinguished contributions on the peace-building 
effects of economic intercourse were made by others, among 
them Sewell, Groom, Haas and Galtung. In the late fifties 
and during the sixties, the debate increased and what became 
known as the functionalist approach was put forward.
Somewhat later, the school split as the integrative processes 
in Europe and other parts of the world gained force.
Whereas the disagreements and the formation of new groupings
17
are of little interest here, the core of the functionalist 
approach is important.
Functionalism was launched in opposition to the 
prevailing belief in the importance of structure among 
political scientists at the beginning of this century.
The central idea of functionalism is in the name: primacy is 
given to func t i o n . The form is of secondary importance, the 
main requirement is that it should be flexible, changing in 
harmony with the changes in the function. Functionalism is 
not a rigid model with the emphasis on the institutional 
framework.
"The implication of the functionalist mode is to 
see a multiplicity of forms and levels of organization, 
each reflecting a system of transactions which may or may 
not produce institutions at the world level-"25
The feeling of national security which was 
previously determined by the level of armaments available 
and military alliances signed, would increasingly be 
determined by international co-operation as the states grow 
more interdependent for the maintenance of their citizen's 
standards of living. According to Mitrany, this could be 
achieved through a gradual co-ordination of political and 
economic activities across the borders, growing internationa1 
planning and support for international political bodies. The 
function of economic intercourse will be to serve as an 
instrument for peaceful co-existense. The following statement,
18
made by the then Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union,
Andrei Gromyko, is representative for this view:
"It is beyond doubt that large-scale long-term economic 
and scientific co-operation will form a kind of basis 
for material security in Europe, by providing it with 
an additional margin of safety-"41*
This optimism has been criticised both in the
Soviet Union and in the West, because interdependence/
V
 ^ " increase the vulnerability of a state to sudden changes in
their opponent’s behaviour. There is no automatic guarantee 
that a government will refrain from using trade as a political 
weapon. On the other hand the anticipation that an 
adversary may do so will have a moderating influence on the 
conflicts that may emerge.
Of particular interest when discussing the 
development of East-West trade is the heuristic approach 
inherent in functionalism. The gradual evolution of 
co-operation is understood to depend on the experience 
and mutual trust gained during the process, and the 
participants'abi1ity to apply these skills to new tasks.
This ability is not solely dependent on the will of those 
involved, what has been called the environmenta1 conditions, 
the "functional commitments of a generation", for instance an 
upsurge in nationalist sentiments will influence the 
development of any integrative process and be decisive for its 
success.-7. The emphasis on the volitional and the heuristic
19
aspects makes any stringent model impossible, the function is 
more important than the form, i.e. the structural expression 
of the process.
Functiona1ists maintain that the most important 
contributions to international co-operation are not made by 
politicians, but by experts. Politicians will regard the 
protection of national sovereignty as their most important 
duty, bureaucrats and business-men are less occupied with 
questions concerning national prestige.
"Technique keeps the trivial in its right perspective..-And 
to keep discussion technical has the great additional 
advantage of keeping it undramatic...It makes the notion 
of triumph much less accessible, when a priori, the nature 
of the triumph is not intelligible enough to be news".13 
Leaving the process of co-operation to experts, i.e. not to 
politicians or diplomats has practical advantages.
A comission given the task, from a political authority, 
to facilitate trade, will be able to work continuously 
because their target is limited in extent. They will 
organise their priorities according to what is rational from 
an economic point of view, and ideally be immune to 
ideological influence. If a complex problem is split up 
into a number of minor issues, it becomes practically 
possible to solve it. The method is:
"binding together those interests which are common, where 
they are common and to the extent to which they are
SO
common...1 ike other forms of union it (functionalism) 
links together a number - any number - of political units, 
but for one purpose at a time...one might put it, that 
(it) is a limited liability association between political 
units"
The functionalists disagree on the possibilities 
and the reasons for the emergence of a conflict. Some 
maintain that the asp irat ions of those invo1ved are 
stimulated and lead to an equilibrium, that in turn prevents 
any conflict to terminate or affect the integrative process 
negatively. This somewhat naive belief has been 
contradicted by the course of events, Myrdal's experiences 
as head of the ECE illustrate this.
Johan Galtung provides a theoretical 
framework for the political implications of trade. His 
ideas are of relevance to our discussion and will be 
mentioned briefly.10 If co-operation is to succeed it 
must be symmetric. Symmetry is needed to avoid dominance by 
the stronger, more advanced country over its lesser 
developed partner. Co-operation should, ideally, lead to 
similar changes in the national economies of those involved. 
This view excludes the possibility of successful co­
operation between countries at an unequal level of economic 
and technological development. Professor Groom, although 
agreeing with Galtung's ideas, claim that there is a 
possibility of success, if the countries involved openly
El
acknowledge that there is a role differentiation. Such an 
acknow1edgement can only be achieved on the basis of mutua1 
trust and confidence, which must be initiated politically.
The more advanced state would then have to moderate its 
claims and demands in order to lessen the political and 
economic effects for the other party. This would make 
structural violence, a favourite concept of Galtung's, 
impossible.
Functionalist arguments have for 
a long time pervaded the writings of scholars and the 
statements of politicians in the Soviet Union, and make up 
a corner-stone for the doctrine of peaceful co-existence.11 
The argument that security and trust can be created and 
maintained through international trade is frequently 
repeated. What is not repeated is the "futuristic" contents 
of functionalism, that national loyalties will dwindle and be 
replaced by allegiance to the international community.
The idea of a stride towards world peace is 
obviously appealing from a propagandistic point of view.
The role of the state as protector and promoter of 
internationa1 links is not contradictory to the communist 
system. However, if the state takes on a role anything other 
than initiator and co-ordinator, and uses its powers to 
inhibit co-operation it becomes a negative factor according 
to functionalist thinking.
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1.3. Soviet-Ulest European Trade
Outline of Approach
Trade is the most regular form of contact 
between the Soviet Union and the outside world. The size of 
turnover changes from year to year, so has the composition of 
exports and imports, but economic intercourse with the West 
has remained an important source of contact. Because of the 
state monopoly, political changes have affected trade.
The reforms initiated by the Gorbachev leadership do not 
differ from past developments in that respect. Still there 
are a number of factors that set the present reforms apart 
from previous attempts, i.e. their scale and the implications 
for the economic and social mechanisms in Soviet society. 
Earlier, the assumption of an external threat was used to 
oppress every deviation from the party line. Today, the 
international atmosphere of detente has made this argument 
improbable. The boldness of the present debate has made it 
difficult to assess what the future holds, and because many of 
the reforms are still on the planning stage, their implications 
are difficult to estimate. What is sure today, is that the 
reforms have envisaged a new role for foreign trade, there 
is an increased willingness to open the domestic economy for 
foreign investments, and increase industrial co-operation 
with the West. Foreign trade is to be used as a growth factor
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to overcome the economic gap exisiting between the Soviet 
Union and the market economies.
valid source of information to the background for the present 
initiatives is the debate between academics and politicians in 
the Soviet Union. Whereas academic debate in the West usually 
is without any direct relations to the political elite, and 
therefore does not provide the observers with anything more 
than an indication of the possible future path of developments, 
this does not apply for Soviet society. The links between the 
leadership and the intelligentsia are more intimate, and an articl 
in a prominent journal or a newspaper may often serve as a signal 
of future changes. Vneshnyaya torqovlya, the official 
journal of the Ministry for Foreign Trade, Ekonomicheskaya 
qazeta and Voprosy ekonomi k i have all been
indispensable for an understanding of the most recent events.
For the decade leading up to Gorbachovs election in 1985, the 
Soviet sources have largely consisted of books. The source 
material has not been limited to Soviet publications, Western 
books and articles are used whenever relevant.
Why Soviet-West European trade? Many answers can 
be given. As we have already discussed, the pattern of trade 
depends on the partners' level of economic development.
Soviet foreign trade can be divided into three categories: 
trade with the members of the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA), trade with the captalist market economies
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of Western Europe, North America and Japan, and finally trade 
with the developing countries in the Third World.
Table 1
TRADE TURNOVER IN PERCENTAGES
_ _ _ _ _ _ 1970 1971 1978 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Socialist 65.2 65.4 64.5 58.5 54.1 56.3 55.6 57.3 59.8 56.1 53.7 52.8 54.3 56.0 57.5 61.1
-CMEA 55.6 56.2 59.6 53.9 48.9 51.8 50.8 52.6 55.7 51.9 48.6 47.6 49.1 51.2 52.1 54.9
Capitalist 21.3 21.5 22.6 26.6 31.3 31.3 32.9 29.6 28.0 32.1 33.6 32.2 31.6 30.1 29.3 26.7
Dev.count. 13.5 13.1 12.9 14.9 14.6 12.4 11.5 13.2 12.2 11.8 12.7 14.9 14.1 13.9 13.2 12.2
SUM 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Vneshnyaya torqovlya, different years.
Socialist planned economies make up the largest 
Soviet foreign trade partner. Despite the close political 
ties, their share of Soviet trade decreased throughout the 
seventies. At the beginning of the present decade, Soviet 
trade with the CMEA group grew to the same level as in 1970. 
Soviet export largely consists of oil and gas, the imports 
mainly machines and equipment. This pattern, characteristic 
for trade between industrialised and developing countries, 
has become even more pronounced during the last fifteen years. 
It is in the interest of Soviet security to maintain close 
links with Eastern Europe and the other socialist countries, 
and the systemic similarities facilitate trade greatly.
Trade between them is priced according to the average price 
on the world market for the preceding five years, making it 
possible to draw up trade agreements for the near future 
without fearing the rapid price fluctuations of the free 
market.
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The developing countries are the least important
trading partner. The Soviet Union purchases mainly
raw-materials and perishables, Soviet exports are 
d
Soviet trade with Western Europe, although much
smaller in terms of turnover than CMEA—Soviet trade, has a 
similar composition of exports and imports. Soviet exports 
are dominated by energy and semi—processed products, whereas 
imports have a much higher technology content. In addition
there are few other similarities between the West and other 
Soviet trading partners. The political setting makes the 
transactions unique. The frequent tensions and political 
"war of words" between the USSR and the West put quite 
different demands upon the Soviet negotiators than any 
agreement concluded with a developing country or a planned 
economy.
discussed in some detail. I will here make some purely 
introductory remarkes to justify singling out Western
to these commodities, the Soviet Union is second to South 
Af^it^r the world's largest gold producer. ~
T U
commodity^not mentioned in Soviet statistics we must rely
Apart from the composition of trade,
The Soviet view of Western Europe will later be
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Europe as a separate group. Although the Soviet Union 
conducts trade with the two most advanced industrialised 
countries outside Europe, Japan and the United States, the 
policy towards them is influenced by security reasons and 
economic factors different from those deciding the relationship 
with Western Europe. Strategically, the European continent is 
split between the USSR and the West. Political tensions, or 
alternatively detente, are nowhere as acutely felt as in 
Europe. For both, it is of interest to observe the 
developments occuring in the other part of the continent, and 
if possible to try to influence it.
Western Europe is not only given a high 
priority in the Soviet Union for security reasons.
Economically, this is the most important market for 
Soviet energy output as well as purchases of commodities the 
Soviet Union does not produce at all, or in insufficient 
quantities. Western Europe is in these terms, far more 
important than the United States. On average during the last 
fifteen years, around 60% of Soviet imports from capitalist 
countries originate here, and around 90% of exports to the 
capitalist countries have West European destinations.1B 
In fact the United States, despite leading in many 
technological fields, have a trade pattern with the Soviet 
Union that deviates from the general structure of East West 
trade. Agricultural products and raw materials make up 
around 80% of current US exports, the West European
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percentage for the same commodity group is on average between 
13 and 16. The difference is even more pronounced in the group 
of machinery and equipment which makes up half of West European 
exports, but only around 10*/. of US goods sold to the Soviet 
Union.13
The trade between the two superpowers differs from 
the general pattern in terms of stability as well. In 
Soviet literature and articles, the United States is accused 
of using the economic intercourse as a weapon for American 
interests. In Soviet eyes, the debate on the evils of too 
close trade connections with the Soviet Union has been 
started by the CIA. The American political campaign and 
economic sanctions against the West European linkage to the 
Soviet gas grid, and the US grain embargo following the 
invasion of Afghanistan were taken as prime examples of US 
discriminatory practice. Concerning Soviet-US trade, Moscow 
seems to opt for a separation of trade and politics, a line 
quite different from the insistence on the expansion of trade 
as a result of good political relations.
Soviet trade with Japan does not differ as much 
from the general pattern as that of the US. Like in the case 
of Western Europe, Japanese exports are dominated by 
technology and machinery; Soviet-Japanese trade has not 
shown the same degree of stability as the trade links with 
Western Europe. It seems that Japan was instrumental in the 
development of East Siberia, and as the initial phase of this
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is drawing to a close, Japanese involvement has decreased 
markedly. Politically, it would be unwise to treat Japan 
together with Western Europe. The present leadership in the 
Kremlin seems to show a greater degree of differentiation in 
its policy towards the individual capitalist countries. 
Gorbachov's speech in Vladivostok in 1987, under 1ined Soviet 
interests in renewing relations with Japan, without any 
reference to the other Western countries.
!.*». Outline of Thesis
Our task will be to analyse and explain the current 
changes in Soviet trade with Western Europe. However, a 
proper understanding of contemporary events is only possible 
on the background of past developments. Only then will 
we be able to describe the origins of the present problems 
and assess the possibility of solving them successfully.
After this short introduction, where the theoretical approach 
as well as the resons for the focus have been established, 
attention will be given to the developments of the past 
decade. For the sake of clarity, a distinction between the 
political and the economic aspects will be made. Obviously, 
not every topic can fit easily into these boxes. The 
composition of trade will be dealt with in some detail. 
Particular attention will be given to the effects of the drop
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in the oil price on the Soviet economy, and the various 
attempts to cope with the rapid deterioration of the terms of 
trade.
The political aspects will concentrate on the 
various strategies behind Soviet trade with the West and the 
political implications of the trade. The build-up of the 
bureaucracy and its effects upon the trade will be assessed.
In the second half of this thesis, we will 
concentrate upon the reforms initiated since the election of 
Mikhail Gorbachev by the Politbureau in April 1985. Special 
attention will be given to his view on the function of foreign 
trade and its relationship with the domestic economy. The 
endeavours to become member of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), and the attempts to rectify decades of 
Soviet disinterest in European Common Market (EEC) will be 
described. As will be shown in detail the future of the 
reforms depends to a significant degree on the relationship 
between the enterprises and the foreign trade bureaucracy.
The discussion and the reforms in the Soviet Union 
procede at a rapid pace. My discussion will focus on the 
period between April 1985 and January 1988.
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S. The Economic Aspects of Soviet Trade with Western Europe
5.1. Introduction
In this chapter, we will discuss the economic 
aspects of Soviet trade with Western Europe. The purpose 
is to provide a background for the reforms initiated under 
Gorbachev's leadership, as well as to introduce certain 
concepts central to the understanding of the problems.
The various forms of trade conducted between the Soviet 
Union and Western Europe will be analysed.
Soviet economic intercourse in Western European 
markets raises the question how dependent Soviet economic 
performance is on the West. In order to asses its 
importance, one must distinguish between general and 
specific dependence. This issue is not only related to the 
closeness of co-operation between individual industrial sectors 
in the West and in the Soviet Union, but the symmetry of the 
relations. The composition of exports and imports decides 
whether the relationship is symmetric or not. The balance of 
trade, and the degree of indebtedness are additional 
influencing factors. Symmetry or asymmetry cannot be 
assessed on the basis of one single statistical measure, 
but a common measure is to compare the share of capital 
intensive goods of the imports and exports of a country.
To avoid asymmetry, they should ideally be relatively
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equa1.
The financial importance of foreign
2 trade to Soviet national income is difficult to assess. The
&■
* problems of doing this has been the subject of a lengthy 
debate among Western scholars.1 No original thoughts and 
profound comments can be expected here. I will primarily 
devote my attention to the role of foreign trade to Soviet 
economic strategy and development.
The table below shows that the traditional Soviet 
economic strategy of extensive industrialisation had run into 
serious troubles. The economic development had been based on 
heavy industry and a surplus of labour resources. In the 
post-war era it became clear not only that the domestic 
resources had been depleted due to rigid planning mechanisms 
and wasteful exploitation of raw-materials, but that the 
technological development in the West was far ahead of the 
Soviet Union. This backwardness was thought possible to 
overcome through greater involvement in trade with the 
advanced capitalist countries. This change in policy 
coincided with, as stated previously, a lessening of political 
tensions in Europe.
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Table 2
TRENDS IN SOVIET ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE. Average annual percentage growth 
rates, 1966-85,
1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85
Net Material Products. 7.7 5.6 A.2 3.A
Industrial Production 8.5 7.4 A.5 3.7
Agricultural Production A.2 0.8 1.6 2.0
6ros5 Investsenti 7.6 6.9 3.A 3.5
Eiploysenti 3.2 2.5 1.9 1.0
Labour Productivity
in Industry 5.8 6.0 3.2 3.1
Real Per Capita Incoies 5.9 A.A 3.A 2.2
GNPe 5.5 3.8 2.7 2.7
Sources: 1. Narodnoe khozvaistvo SSSR. various issues
2. CIA. Handbook. various issues
Western Europe became an important market for 
Soviet purchases, and to an increasing extent of Soviet energy. 
The price of oil increased sharply in 1973-74, and this 
improved Soviet terms of trade. This improvement gave the 
Soviet Union the possibility to increase imports at a much 
faster rate than exports. In addition the growth in imports was 
made easy by Western credits.
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2.2. SOVIET EXPORTS IN THE SEVENTIES AND BEGINNING OF THE
E I G H T I E S
Table 3
THE COMMODITY STRUCTURE OF SOVIET EXPORTS TO THE OECD-AREA, 1975-198*
Year Energy Rax-iat. and lachinery Industrial Agricult.
seii-prDcessed and equip. consuier goods, products
1975 53.7 36.8 *.7 0.7 3.6
1976 56.7 35.6 *.3 0.7 2.1
1977 56.5 37.2 3.1 0.6 2.0
1978 60.1 32.6 3.5 0.9 1.9
1979 6*.2 28.9 3.9 0.8 1.5
1980 70.1 2*.l 2.8 0.6 1.1
1981 77.3 18.8 2.2 0.* 1.0
1982 79.1 17.2 1.8 0.3 1.0
1983 78.6 16.9 1.7 0.3 1.1
198* 79.2 17.0 1.7 0.3 1.2
Source: Statshandelslandernas utrikeshandel 1975-198*
Del IX, " S o v j e t u n i o n e n " , Ost Ekonoaiska Byran,
Stockhola, 85.11.1986 
2 . 2 . 1 .  E n e r g y
The export of energy, in the form of crude oil and 
petroleum products, natural gas, coal and electricity, 
remained an important, but not dominant part of Soviet 
exports. Prior to 1973, this group accounted for only 20 per 
cent of overall Soviet exports to the West.s After 
1973, this changed drastically. The increase in the share of 
energy can be explained by a r
: the steep
rise in the pri^e on the world market for oil and,
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somewhat later, gas. West European governments realised that 
a crisis in the Middle East, or a sudden increase in prices
■ . . .. ' £ Y K M Vcould endanger the supo 1 ie.s . 1 /] I v fl i.
NN'uk W  f c  <^ oWr&lj5>ar iMWtnl of- • rwhJU'
W \|k  4\ovAia . A
Table 4 ^
S0vlET~ENERGFixP0RTS_WTHE~0ECD-ARiA~~1975-798i~-_Value-in_thDU5and 
dollars, and certain West-European countries shares of the OECD iiports
in X.
Year Value Britain France FRB Italy Austria Finland Sweden
1975 4581514 3.3 7.9 16.7 13.9 5.8 19.4 8.8
1976 6101517 6.4 6.9 16.5 17.7 5.3 16.7 5.6
1977 6851558 7.8 8.0 15.1 16.3 5.7 17.3 5.4
1978 7931878 6.4 7.6 19.1 15.4 6.1 14.6 5.7
1979 11988635 4.3 9.8 88.5 18.0 4.8 15.6 7.1
1980 16818434 8.5 16.8 18.8 14.8 5.8 16.3 3.5
1981 18359699 8.5 15.3 16.9 14.3 6.7 15.8 8.0
1988 19889958 3.7 11.6 18.5 15.8 4.3 14.1 8.9
1983 19605739 3.5 11.8 19.8 16.1 3.5 14.4 4.0
1984 80499764 3.7 10.8 80.4 17.8 4.0 18.0 8.8
Source: OECD Statistical Series C, 1975-19B8, Series B 1983-84.
A desire to spread supplies was expressed by 
Western po 1ititicians, and the Soviet Union was able to fill 
the demand. The "oil price shock" coincided with an 
increased Soviet ability to service Western import needs.
The price increase served as a strong incentive to expand the 
country's productive capacity, and covered the loss in income 
from other commodities sold to the West. Although the price 
increase forced Western industry to transform to more 
economical forms of production, demand remained high. A 
further expansion of Soviet production was planned involving 
large-scale co-operation with Western enterprises, in
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particular West-German and Italian companies.
Not unexpectedly, the large profits generated from 
the oil sales together with the building of a pipeline for 
the transport of oil and gas to the treshold of Western 
Europe, lead to a clear dominace of oil among the various 
sources of energy exported. Certain developments can be 
detected, the sales of electricity to the West remained very 
limited and was increasingly marginalised during the 
seventies. Only the two Western countries sharing a border 
with the Soviet Union, Finland and Norway, imports any 
substantial amounts of electricity. A similar trend has 
been evident in the case of coal. Due to its high sulphuric 
content as well as a general decline in Western demand, it 
has decreased in importance. In 1984, slightly more than £ per 
cent of Soviet energy exports to the OECD consisted of coal 
and electricity.3
Soviet exports of gas to the West has increased at 
a faster rate than oil. Yet, an increased reliance on 
gas need not be an exclusively positive thing. Whereas oil 
deliveries can be regulated relatively flexibly, the 
technicalities of exporting gas severly limits this quality.
The main difference between the two energy sources lies in 
the absence of a world gas market. There is no equivalent 
to the spot market for gas. Whereas oil exports can be 
increased to meet increased demands for hard currency \ 
home, this is not the case for natural gas. The matter is
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further complicated by the fact that gas cannot be increased 
to counter-act a slump in oil exports, even on a long-term 
basis. Firstly, the price of gas is linked to the price of
oil, secondly, a decreased demand for oil is in fact a
decreased demand for energy, i.e. it affects gas negatively as
well. However, it should be added that the long-term
agreements covering the deliveries of gas are attractive 
from a planner's point of view. l
z v
The increase in'oil and oil products took place 
mainly in the beginning of the seventies. When West European 
demand for gas increased, this became a major export 
commodity, but not until the end of the decade. The growth 
in the export of oil was far more steady than the sales of 
gas. In 1984, oil and oil products accounted for 
approximately 65 per cent, natural gas ca. 33 per cent.**
As table 4 shows, there are considerable 
differences in the sales to individual countries. Finland has 
over the years become the most stable customer, and the country 
with the greatest degree of dependency on Soviet oil supplies 
to fulfil its demand. In fact, oil accounts for almost the 
entire part of Finnish imports from the USSR. The purchase 
price is regulated by long term agreements, but the Finnish 
state oil company resells it according to world prices. This 
has generated considerable income as the Soviet price usually 
has been far lower than the world market equivalent. Despite 
this price discrepancy, the Finnish oil price for the
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domestic consumer has meticulously been kept in line with the 
developments on the world market, thus forcing Finnish 
industry to economise parallelling the drive for 
energy-saving in other West European companies. The surplus 
holdings of oil resulting from the cut in domestic 
consumption has been re-exported to the West at considerable 
gains.
The sharpest increase in any country's purchase of 
Soviet energy has occurred in Holland. This, however, was 
not due to any long-term agreements, but to Dutch purchases 
of relatively cheap Soviet oil on the spot market in 
Rotterdam.
In the case of West Germany, overall energy imports 
from the Soviet Union have increased. The relative 
importance of gas has grown very quickly, and West Germany 
remains the largest market for Soviet gas. Politically, 
worries have been voiced both in Bonn and Washington over the 
potential vulnerability this entails for German industry.
The Amercians tried to influence the West-German government 
to buy Norwegian oil and gas, but the Soviet offer was more 
competitive. Still, it has been claimed that strategic 
considerations have refrained West Germany from importing 
more.
The importance of energy exports for the 
generation of hard currency cannot be under-estimated. 
According to statistics for 1985, about 80 percent of Soviet
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hard currency returns came from crude oil exports (65 per 
cent) and natural gas (15 per cent).55 Financially, the 
Soviet Union is therefore extremely affected by the price 
changes on the world market.
£.£.£. Raw Material and Semi-Manufactured Goods
Table 5
Certain West-European Countries' Share of Soviet Exports of RAW-MATERIALS 
AND SEMI-MANUFACTURED 600DS to the OECD-area, 1975-84, (in X)
Year Britain France FR6 Italy Austria Finland Sued
1975 10.0 9.0 12.5 6.6 2.0 8.6 4.3
1976 19.6 10.2 14.1 6.6 1.7 5.8 3.0
1977 17.6 11.5 15.4 6.4 2.1 4.7 2.3
1978 7.8 12.3 19.5 6.4 2.0 4.3 1.7
1979 7.3 11.3 19.3 7.9 1.9 4.3 3.6
1980 7.4 12.9 13.9 9.5 2.2 5.6 2.3
1981 7.4 11.0 16.1 9.0 2.7 6.4 3.1
1982 6.7 10.1 15.4 7.6 3.0 6.8 4.6
1983 7.8 9.4 13.1 8.2 2.9 7.3 2.1
1984 7.4 6.2 12.6 7.8 3.3 6.6 4.3
Source: See Table 3.
This group has remained relatively stable in 
volume, but has decreased in importance as a major export 
commodity. Its share of overall Soviet Exports to Western 
Europe has gone down dramatically, from ca. 37 per cent in 
1975 to a mere 17 per cent ten years later. Raw materials,
mostly wood, paper pulp, textile fibres, and ore, have 
dominated throughout the period. However, their relative 
size has declined, mainly due to the increase in export of 
chemical products. The expansion of this group of commodities 
was made possible by massive investments, and by importing 
Western machinery for the chemical industry. In 198^, 25 per 
cent of raw materials and semi-manufactured goods were 
chemical products.6 Other main export articles were 
non-ferrous metals and minerals.
In an OECD context, Japan has been the major 
customer for this group of Soviet exports, In Western Europe, 
West Germany has been the most important destination, although 
its share has declined considerably from a fifth of Soviet 
exports of raw materials and semi-manufactured goods to the 
OECD in 1979, to around 13 per cent three years later. This 
negative development has been reflected in other West European 
countries, with Great Britain as the notable exception. The 
British market share has risen quite steeply from ca. 10 per 
cent in 1975 to 20 per cent the following year. Yet, in the 
year prior to Gorbachev's election, the British market had 
declined in importance to a mere 7.^ per cent.
Precious stones belong to this group as well. But 
apart from Belgium and Luxembourg which throughout the 
seventies accounted for ca. 60*/. of Soviet exports to the 
OECD, no countries point themselves out as dominant.*7.
<+1
2.2.3. Export of Machinery and Equipment
This commodity group makes up so little of overall 
Soviet exports to the West that many observers disregard it 
all together, and concentrate on the above groups in stead. 
From an economic point of view this is understandable, the 
share has declined from 4.4 per cent in 1975 to ca. 1.7 per 
cent in 1984.
The most important commodity in this group has been 
cars, in 1984 they accounted for ca. 27 per cent of the 
machinery and equipment exported. This was a sharp decrease 
from five years earlier when they made up 43 per cent of this 
export group. During the same period, the importance of ship( 
grew, the main buyer was Finland. Finland retained her 
posistion during the seventies as the most important
Soviet export market for machinery and eqiGpment. This
V '
mainly due to a large single order for Soviet equipment 
the construction of an atomic power station at Lovisa i 
F inland.
2.2.4. Other Commodities
The picture would not be complete unless we 
mentioned a few other marginal groups. The share of
42
was
for
West
industrial consumer goods dwindled, reflecting lacking Soviet 
investments to enable exports. Some commodities which had 
been important during the sixties like furniture, books, 
records and optic equipment lost ground to antiques and works 
of art, mostly exported to West Germany
Soviet exports of perishables have at no point been 
above one per cent of Soviet exports to Western Europe during 
the seventies. Bad harvests together with increasing 
domestic demand has left little for sales abroad. A further 
problem are the strict quotas imposed by the EEC. The 
Chernobyl disaster in 1983, resulted in fears of importing 
contaminated perishables adding to the difficulties facing 
Soviet exports of food.
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2.3. SOVIET IMPORTS DURING THE SEVENTIES AND BEGINNING OF
THE EIGHTIES
Table 6
THE COMMODITY STRUCTURE OF SOVIET IMPORTS FROM THE OECD-AREA, 1975-1984
Year Energy RaM-iat. and Machinery Industrial Agricult.
seii-processed and equip. consuier goods, products
1975 0.3 41.5 36.6 3.8 17.3
1976 0.3 40.0 35.7 4.1 19.2
1977 0.4 41.4 39.1 4.4 13.9
1978 0.6 42.1 37.5 4.4 14.8
1979 0.5 45.1 28.9 4.3 14.8
1980 0.6 44.7 24.9 5.0 23.9
1981 0.9 41.2 21.9 5.8 29.3
1982 1.3 41.4 26.7 4.9 24.8
1983 0.9 40.1 30.1 4.9 22.1
1984 0.9 38.4 24.9 5.1 29.1
Source: See Table 3.
Whereas Soviet exports are easily described as 
being dominated by energy products, imports show a far 
greater diversity. The major commodity groups are raw 
materials and semi-manufactures, machinery and equipment, and 
products for the agricultural sector. Industrial consumer 
goods have taken up around 5 per cent of the imports. Energy 
did not surpass 2 per cent between 1970 and 1985.°
g.3.1. Machinery and Equipment
Table 7
Certain West-European Countries' Share of Soviet Iiports of MACHINERY AND 
EQUIPMENT fro« the Soviet Union, 1975-198*, (in X)
Year Britain France Switzer. FRS 
Liechtenstein
Italy Austria Finland Sweden
1975 *.6 12.6 2.7 29.5 8.5 2.0 8.* 2.9
1976 *.1 8.* 3.1 28.5 7.3 2.2 13.1 3.4
1977 3.5 10.7 3.0 28.0 10.* 2.3 14.7 2.4
1978 5.0 10.6 2.6 26.2 8.5 3.0 14.0 1.3
1979 5.2 1*.8 2.7 25.2 9.0 *.0 11.8 2.9
1980 6.6 11.6 3.1 29.0 8.9 2.0 13.0 2.8
1981 *.5 6.4 2.7 23.2 8.1 1.7 21.0 2.3
1982 *.0 6.6 2.* 2A.1 7.3 2.* 21.6 2.5
1983 3.6 10.7 1.* 27.8 11.2 2.1 22.4 1.4
198* 5.3 7.7 2.1 29.8 9.5 3.9 20.9 1.9
Source: See Table 3.
The German scholar Heinrich Machowski describes 
Soviet imports of machinery and equipment as being largely 
aimed at supporting already existing production. Thus 
directly reflecting the planners' efforts to do everything to 
fulfill the plan.** There is sufficient evidence to 
support Mr. Machowski's assumption, there have been no radical 
changes in the import of these commodities from Western Europe. 
During the seventies, apart from Soviet decisions to import 
entire plants for the production of a certain commodity, 
like cars, this group remained relatively stable in its 
composition
Those changes that have appeared, have been
*+5
the result of large-scale projects, or politically endorsed 
expansion of an industrial sector resulting in increased 
imports to comply with the priorities. The decisions to 
build a pipeline for oil, and later gas from Siberia to 
Western European countries are examples of such large-scale 
projects. The equipment required was either too sophisticated 
or too costly to be produced in the Soviet Union, and had to 
be purchased abroad. There were certain political obstacles 
to the construction of the pipeline. The American government 
was staunchly opposed to Western dependence on the Soviet oil 
fields, and to emphasise the US. point of view, an embargo on 
the export of any technology related to the project was imposed. 
After a short delay, Soviet industry was able to fill the gaps 
created by the Americans, of course to great political acclaim 
from Moscow.
The size of imports involved in such projects can 
be illustrated with the Soviet import of machinery and 
equipment under the Gas Agreement of 1981. In 1981, this 
group accounted for $ 129 millions, the following year the 
first purchases for the gas pipeline were made, ammounting 
$ 268 millions. In 1983, imports lay at a record 
high of $ 463 millions.10 As has been shown in table 4, 
the largest market for Soviet oil and gas is West Germany, 
it is therefore not unexpected most of the machinery and 
equipment imported is West German. The country's position 
as chief supplier has undoubtedly been strengthened by
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favourable financial conditions. A very low interest rate has
cent (1975) and 23 per cent (1981) of all Soviet imports of 
machinery and equipment W jj
During recent years, Italy has become an important 
exporter of capital-intensive goods to the USSR. The 
country's state-owned company Nuovo Pignone received in 1981 
an order for turbines and compressors at the sum of $ 1 
billion. This order has not yet been fulfilled, exports of 
macinery and equipment from Italy amounted to $ 391 millions 
between 1982 and 1984.13
France has not been affected by the gas project to 
any great extent, Soviet imports have mainly consisted of 
turbines, office machines, refrigerators and heating 
equipment.
The development of Finnish exports of this 
commodity group has been remarkable. Of the West European 
countries, only Finland and the Federal Republic were able to 
increase their market shares. All the more remarkable, as 
Finland was not involved in the gas project. The main 
commodity was ships, which increased steadily in importance, 
in 1984 accounting for more than 50 per cent of Finnish 
exports of equipment.13
attracted Soviet buyers. West between 30 per
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2.3.2. Agricultural Products
The OECD-area has not only been an important source 
of much needed technology, but has increasingly been used as 
a larder when the Soviet Union has been struck by bad harvests. 
The share of imports from the OECD countries has been 
dominated by the grain purchased in the non-European member 
states, the United States, Canada and Australia. The size 
occupied by grain varies according to the Soviet harvest results 
in 1977 62 per cent of agricultural imports were grain, in 1984 
it had increased to 84 per cent.1^
The European share has mostly consisted of meat, 
and meat- and dairy products, reflecting the decrease in 
livestock as the fodder situation has deteriorated in years 
of bad harvests. However, one must conclude that the role of 
the West European countries as suppliers of agricultural 
commodities has been quite limited when compared with the 
grain exporting countries.
2.3.3. Raw Materials and Semi-Manufactures
This is the largest commodity group imported 
from the capitalist countries. The share has remained 
very stable since the mid-seventies, varying from 42 per 
cent in 1985 of overall imports from the OECD, to 37 per
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cent ten years later. The role of Western Europe as a 
supplier is far greater than these numbers suggest. Apart 
from Japan, the non-European share in this trade is very small.
Table 8
Certain Hest-European Countries' Share of Soviet Iaports of RAW-HATERIALS 
AND SEHI-HANUFACTURED GOODS froa the OECD-area, 1975-84, (in X)
Year Britain France FRG Italy Austria Finland Sneden
1975 3.9 8.5 26.6 11.0 1.9 10.4 2.8
1976 3.4 8.6 20.5 10.5 1.9 8.1 1.9
1977 6.5 12.2 20.5 10.8 2.1 8.8 2.0
1978 4.4 10.7 22.5 8.4 2.6 7.7 1.9
1979 3.6 9.9 23.0 7.2 2.9 7.2 1.7
1980 5.1 11.4 23.3 6.9 3.0 12.7 2.0
1981 4.5 8.5 18.0 8.0 3.6 15.5 1.8
1982 2.9 CJ1 CO 19.1 9.3 3.3 14.6 1.5
1983 3.4 6.1 22.1 10.7 3.7 12.3 1.5
1984 6.1 6.7 20.5 11.1 4.4 10.3 1.4
Source: See Table 3.
In volume, the imports stagnated during the latter 
part of the seventies. The dramatic fluctuations we have seen 
in other groups have not occurred here.
Within the group, semi-manufactures have been the 
main commodity throughout the period, accounting for between 
60 and 70 per cent. The most important products have been 
iron and steel. West Germany was the chief supplier, a peak 
was reached in 1979 when 35 per cent of Soviet imports were 
made here. However, West Germany's share has declined 
both in relative and in absolute terms in the 1980s. This 
has happened over a period when Soviet imports went down.
^9
This decline in Soviet demand has been caused by the 
completion of the gas pipeline.
Cellulose and paper products have been the main 
Finnish export commodities within this group. As this demand 
remains unaffected by any large-scale projects, Finland has 
been able to maintain her market position.
Chemical products, including the increasingly
a
important group of plast ^products, have accounted for around 
a fourth of overall imports of raw materials and 
semi-manufactures from the OECD area.
g.4. Some Comments on the Soviet Import and Export Structure 
(1970-198*0
The sharp increase in the oil prices in 1973 raised 
Soviet export earnings considerably. The decline of almost 
all other commodities was covered by the petroleum-do1lars, 
and it gave the Soviet Union the possibility to increase 
imports. Oil was an export commodity well suited to 
Soviet foreign trade, whereas the quality of machinery can 
vary greatly, oil retains the same characteristics no matter 
where it is pumped out of the ground. The connotations of 
shoddy workmanship attributed to Sovied products do not apply 
to oil. Another important point concerns the "p1anabi1ity" 
of energy exports, excluding the small quantities of oil sold
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on the spot market, they are usually regulated by long-term 
agreements, and therefore easy to plan.
Soviet problems on the export side are manifold.
In his book on how to increase exports, especially of 
machinery and consumer goods, A.V. Engibarov lists a number 
of deficiencies causing the bad results.1® In his 
opinion, Soviet exporters should use long-term market 
forecasts so that they can be prepared to meet any demand as 
it emerges. At the same time he advocates greater 
flexibility at the enterprise level, enabling managers to 
adapt rapidly to changes in demand. Implicit in this view 
is an accusation against the rigidity caused by the 
incorporation of the foreign trade activities in the national 
economic plan. In addtion, Engibarov emphasises the lack of 
knowledge of Western marketing techniques among Soviet 
negotiations. This has been repeated many times since, 
and is without doubt a weak point. In a domestic 
economy characterised by chronic shortages, advertisements or 
any other marketing activity is superfluous. In the West, 
a proper marketing method can be decisive, but whereas one 
may have to portray a car as something "sexy", oil does not 
need any glossy wrapping.
What is perhaps more interesting is Engibarov's 
discussion of the price. Traditionally, the competitiveness 
of Soviet commodities has relied on the relatively low price 
compared to commodities produced in the West. Engibarov
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writes: "It is important to underline ... that lowering the 
price on any commodity for the sake of helping sales is 
erroneous" rather one should use "... non-price factors"
like greater emphasis on the customers' requirements, 
marketing, advertisements and above all, the quality of 
the commodity. The poor performance of Soviet goods on 
Western markets cannot be explained by the price, the cost 
of production in the Soviet Union are low. At times the 
country has been accused of "dumping", i.e. offering 
commodities for sale at a price far below the average and 
thus ruining competition.
Whereas a Western handbook in export would 
underline the relationship between high sales figures and a 
low price, Engibarov is right in his emphasis on the quality 
of a commodity as more important. Apart from a few 
commodities produced with Western equipment, the Soviet Union 
has not been able to offer a wide-range of high-quality 
commodities on the Western market. The increasing 
concentration on energy products in the export sector, and 
the dominance of machinery and equipment from Western Europe 
is a clear sign of an increasing gap between the 
technological levels in the two economies. Even industrial 
sectors that enjoy political priority, have performed badly 
and Soviet products fall short of Western standards. This 
even applies to the energy sector where the Soviet Union uses 
out-dated techniques and methods, increasing costs
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considerably.
Another factor that should be mentioned here, is 
the stagnation in economic growth in Western Europe in the 
latter part of the seventies and first years of the eighties. 
This lead to a decrease in import needs, affecting the 
Soviet Union adversely.
Some Western observers have claimed that the Soviet 
Union suffers from an "export-aversion and an import-hunger". 
The export-aversion is a legacy from the Stalinist period, 
when the theory of "socialism in one country" resulted in an 
economic development based on autarky. Only the surplus 
remaining when all domestic needs had been satisfied 
could was sold abroad. Needless to say, there is no 
incentive to export when the commodities are in demand at 
home. In addition, there was no economic incentive to produce 
for foreign markets. Whereas the profit-motive is an impetus 
to export in the West, a Soviet enterprise manager did not 
increase his earnings sufficiently to make up for the stringent 
quality requirements for a commodity singled out for export.
The "import-hunger" results from the planners 
attempts to make up for the short-comings in the domestic 
economy. In addition, political decisions to expand a 
certain sector may result in increased imports. For 
instance, in the sixties, the food and textile industry were 
given priority, during the beginning of the seventies the 
focus had shifted to the car industry.
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In the West, special attention has been given to 
Soviet imports of high technology. Judging from the 
impressive mass of literature devoted to the subject, one 
might be tempted to believe that Soviet imports consisted of 
little else. As we have seen from the statistics, reality is 
quite different. Even within the machinery and equipment 
category, export of highly sophisticated equipment is not 
above the average of trade between the West and other parts 
of the world. Looking closer at the composition of Soviet 
purchases of high technology, a considerable amount has been 
targeted to meet the expansion of the chemical industry.
However, as this import decisions were taken under pressure 
from political priorities, there was no guarantee that the 
commodities purchased could be efficiently utilised. The 
enterprise manager did not always have the know-how, or 
equipment to use the imported machinery. Western exporters 
have sometimes complained about a hostile atmosphere at 
enterprise level. The following West German observations 
are not unique;
"The initiation phase for installations procured from the 
Federal Republic of Germany generally takes longer time 
in the Soviet Union than in Western countries.... In 
comparison, the time needed in the Soviet Union to assimilate 
technological knowledge on the fundamental features of 
imported installations are considerably longer. It can 
be observed that at least five years are necessary to copy
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single machines. The imitation of complex installation 
can take up to ten years. The industrial plants are set 
on fulfilling production plans. Innovation is regarded 
above all as a disturbance which endangers plan 
fulfilment and thus jeopardizes premiums.1117
Two scholars from the University of Hamburg,
Andreas Wass von Czege and Raisa Tchakhmakhtcheva analysed 
the Soviet import and export structure. They concluded that 
the hierarchical rigidity of the foreign trade bureaucracy 
lead to an inherent tendency in the system to avoid 
complicated transactions, and especially commodities where 
the productive capacity is hard to estimate in the short 
term.10
The importance attributed to the import of 
technology for the overall performance of the Soviet economy 
can be further dampened if we compare import of technology 
with growth rates. Throughout the seventies, Soviet 
purchases of equipment and machines rose almost five 
times expressed in rubles, from 0.9 million in 1971 to
million in 1981, 17 while the rate of economic growth 
over the same period fell. Another indicator which normally 
increases as a result of technological innovation is labour 
productivity. It grew at an increasingly slow rate from 
5.8 per cent in 1971 to 3.1 per cent in 1980 (See table 2). 
This does not discard the argument that imports of technology 
are important for Soviet economy, the figures could have been
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worse without the Western commodities.
The role of technology imports for the defence 
sector is difficult to assess. There are no Soviet sources 
available, and Western literature on this issue are based on 
assumptions. However, there is no doubt that those 
commodities that are suited to the needs of the military 
sector are rapidly utilised. In 197S, it was discovered that 
bearings from an American company were used in Soviet 
inter-continental missiles. Seven years later, trucks 
produced in a plant bought from the West, were used during the 
invasion of Afghanistan.
Looking at imports in a wider perspective, it has 
been claimed that imports of agricultural products have had a 
greater impact on the Soviet economy as it has made scarce 
investment capital available in the civilian sector.
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g.5. Debts and Balance of Payments
Table 9
Current Account Balance and Soviet Debts to the Hest 1970-1985, 
in «i11 ion US 4.
Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Gross debt 
(end year)
n/a 1,808 2,408 3,748 5,175 10,577 14,707 15,609
Net Debt 
(end year)
n/a 582 555 1,685 1,654 7,450 9,969 11,181
Current acc. 
balance
260 414 810 1,490 2,666 -3,882 -3,854 2,080
Year 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
6ross debt 16,373 18,047 17,861 20,900 20,000 20,501 20,303 24,764
(end year)
Net debt 10,393 9,241 9,289 12,470 10,000 9,577 8,960 13,664
(end year)
Curr acc. 2,944 3,668 3,484 2,600 5,176 6,582 6,235 4,390
balance
Sources: 1970-81: Joan P. Zoeter, “USSR: Hard Currency Trade 
and Payments* U.S. Congress JEC Soviet Econoiv in 
the 1980s: Probleas and Prospects:
1982-84: Handbook of Econoiic Statistics 1984.
Figures for 1985 derived froi Wharton Econoietric Forecasting 
Assosciates, CPE Service, Analysis of Current Issues. VI, 16 
(24.04.86) but with net interest assuced to be 10X of end-year debt.
Table quoted by Philip Hanson in “Soviet Foreign Trade Policies in 
the 1980s* Berichte des Bundesinstituts fuer ost- 
Missenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, 41-1986, pp.56-57.
Western estimates of Soviet hard currency holdings 
do not correspond with the picture drawn up in Soviet sources. 
The greatest problem is posed by the Soviet arms export to 
the developing countries, it is assumed that the payment is 
in hard currency. Whereas this trade is part of Western 
calculations, they are not mentioned in Soviet statistics.
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In comparison with the other CMEA-countries, the 
Soviet Union has been financially prudent, limiting the hard 
currency borrowing to a minimum. Even during the initial 
half of the seventies, when the interest rates in the West 
were low, the Soviet Union did not take up loans to finance 
the modernisation of industry and import of capital goods 
like Poland. Compared with the other East European 
countries, the Soviet Union could rely on its reserves of 
gold in cases of financial distress.
Soviet gold sales increased after the mid-seventies, a trend 
coinciding with a decrease in the import-growth. Net debts 
hardly grew at all, and the Soviet Union was even able to 
reverse the size of the debts until the drop in energy prices 
in 1985.
The Soviet balance of payments has shown a deficit 
only twice during the seventies, in 1975 and 1976. Various 
factors resulted in this deterioration. The main reason was 
the bad grain harvest in 1975, which forced the Soviet Union 
to import large amounts\^for human and animal consumption. 
Soviet trade relations had been affected by the US.
Congress' refusal to ratify the US-USSR Trade Agreement in 
1974. At the same time, hard currency incomes had been 
influenced by the temporary drop in oil prices between 
the two OPEC agrements in 1973/74- and 1979/80. Some of the 
capital goods imported after 1974 had already been ordered on 
credit, there was little the foreign trade po1icy-makers
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could do to rectify the deficit until 1976, when as 
mentioned above, imports were limited.
E.6. Financina Foreian Trade
Soviet foreign tradej fpi iftddj-U
i 40 W bi laterally lo4<W\This applies to the transactions conducted 
with West European countries. This preference has 
resulted in a systemic avoidance of multilateral trade and 
co-operation agreements. However, the financial 
mechanisms used change according to the various forms of 
trade conducted
Most transactions are conducted in hard currency, 
and is thus not different from the trade between the market 
economies. Yet the systemic differences between the Soviet 
Union and Western Europe have resulted in a number of 
transaction forms that deviate from the ordinary manner of 
transactions between industrial countries by paying in kind. 
As the ruble is not convertible, the Soviet purchases of 
commodities in the West would have been severely 
limited if it had not been able to pay for the imports in 
this way. More or less willingly, Western companies have to 
accept to be payed, partly or completely in commodities. The 
best known example is the agreement between Pepsi Cola 
Company and Stolichnaya Vodka according to which bottle is
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exchanged for bottle.
Transactions where the use of money is avoided 
amounts to around 10 per cent of world trade according to 
Gatt statistics.120 This number covers many debt-ridden 
Third World countries, so the share of the planned economies 
is smaller. In East-West trade generally, 20 per cent of all 
agreements involve the payment in kind. Statistics for the 
Soviet size have not been produced. The number of agreements 
is not a good measure since the volume of commodities 
exchanged is not reflected. Bearing in mind that the Soviet 
Union has concluded a number of large-scale agreements with 
Western companies, the oil and gas pipelines being the largest, 
the Soviet share by far surpasses those of her allies.
So far the terminology applied to this trade has 
been avoided as there is considerable confusion among Western 
writers. Counter-trade is frequently used as a 
comprehensive label, covering a variety of transactions.
For the sake of simplicity, the terms applied throughout this 
chapter are those applied by the 0ECD.ei According to 
the OECD, it is necessary to distinguish between commercial 
and industrial compensation. They differ in content and in 
duration, industrial compensation agreements usually involving 
the partners in a long-term co-operation.
Commercial countertrade transactions normally last 
between 12 and 18 months. Barter trade is the most primitive 
form of countertrade, money is not used and the payment is
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entirely in kind. No third party is usually involved, and the 
transactions are conducted simultaneously and over a brief 
period of time. Pure barter agreements were quite prominent 
during the sixties. At that time there was a greater demand 
in the West for Soviet products and the Western partner did 
not have any great problems selling the goods.
More sophisticated is compensation trade, a label 
covering several widely used sub-categories. In its strictest 
sense, a compensation deal is based on a single contract, 
stipulating the deliveries as well as the counter-deliveries. 
The Western exporter may be payed in a concvertible currency, 
but only as a credit until the commodities received have been 
sold. However, the fluctuations of the exchange rates together 
with frequent deficiencies and delays on the Soviet side, have 
put many obstacles in the way of this trade. According to the 
OECD,it is today "only of historic interest, having practically 
fallen into disuse".
Still, the second sub-category, counter-purchases 
is the most frequent mode of countertrade transactions between 
the Soviet Union and the West. Counter-purchases involve 
not one, but two mutually independent contracts. The basic 
contract covers Soviet imports from the West, the second is an 
obligation on behalf of the Western company to purchase 
Soviet goods at approximately the same value. I have not 
found examples where the the basic contract concerns imports 
of Soviet goods. The reason for the dominance of this kind of
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transactions is the possibility of transferring the second 
contract to a third party. If the Western company cannot 
find any suitable Soviet goods, the contract can be bought by 
another company. Not seldom, this agreements span a period 
up to five years, in some cases with no set termination 
date.
Other variants of counter— purchases, like 
parallel transactions and pre-compensation purchases are 
less used. The former has been called "a gentleman's 
agreement". It involves no formal obligations, but a mutual 
undrstanding that the Western seller will purchase goods for 
roughly the same value in the Soviet Union. The latter 
does not appear in trade transactions between the USSR and 
Western Europe as the Soviet partner has problems fulfilling 
the characteristic features of this trade form. The more 
advanced East European countries, like Hungary and the CSSR 
have engaged in this kind of transactions. A pre-compensation 
purchase involves the delivery of the countertrade goods 
before the Western exports are realised. This kind of trade 
can only be carried out if the counter-purchase goods are 
easily marketable in the West. Usually a market-survey 
jointly conducted between the Eastern and Western firms is 
carried out before the agreement is signed. As Enigbarov 
stated, this is a technique alien to a Soviet enterprise. In 
addition, a pre-compensation purchase is only possible if the 
two companies are able to work together intimately.
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Industrial compensation agreements are usually 
divided into buy-back contracts and industrial co­
operation. The former has been used with some frequency in 
trade with the Soviet Union, especially in connection with 
turn-key plants. A part of the commodities produced are 
delivered to the Western partner, partially or completely 
replacing cash. The time lag between the construction of the 
plant and the export of the finished products may be 
substantial, and the Western partner may receive a bridging 
credit or the cash amount of the payment first.
Both the oil and gas agreements belong to this 
category, pipelines and equipment were exchanged for energy. 
However, buy-back agreements are not restricted to 
large-scale projects. During the seventies, Finnish 
construction companies build hotels in the Soviet Union. 
Finnish tourist athorities payed the workers in return for 
the right to use the hotel for a specified number of nights.
Industrial co-operation agreements are sometimes 
omitted in the listing of various forms of c o u n t e r t r a d e ^ 3 
A concise definition may be difficult to arrive at, the 
Austrian economist Jan Stankovsky has defined it as "an 
intensive and long-term form of economic cooperation at the 
enterprise level between partners belonging to different 
economic and social systems". As has been stated 
above, co-operation between enterprises are more prevalent 
between the West and Eastern European countries where the
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bureaucratic obstacles are fewer than in the Soviet Union.
The incentives to engage in industrial co-operation 
differ according to the economic environment of the 
enterprise. Co-operation, like any other trade, can only 
occur if the profit prospects are greater than the costs 
incurred by the co-operation. The prospects of new 
markets, cheap labour and raw materials together 
with low costs of production are the major incentives for the 
Western partner. From the Soviet point of view, import of 
new technology is positive. Yet, there seems to be signs of 
ambivalence in the Soviet attitude on this point. The most 
recent technological equipment is not welcomed as its output 
may be difficult to assess, on the other hand outdated 
production techniques are refused. Yet, the free flow of 
innovations and information resulting from co-operation is a 
considerable incentive for the Soviet planners because it may 
spread within one industrial sector. Apart from that, it has 
certain benefits in the form of constant Western supervision 
and improvements. The output from a turn-key plant quickly 
lags behind the Western equivalent in terms of production and 
quality. Periodical modernisations have to be imported from 
the West at considerable costs.
The profit potentials of industrial co-operation 
depends upon the kind and scale of the technology 
transferred. It must be segmentable, that is divisible 
between two production units. Not every kind of technology
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falls within this category. Another factor influencing 
the feasibility is the size of the Western firm. Not 
unexpectedly, large, multi-national companies have the 
means to to bear the costs of the prolonged negotiation- and 
introduction-phase. Equally important, as the name implies, 
they have experience in technology transfer. Large firms, 
and especially multi-national companies have channels for 
the marketing of countertrade commodities at their disposal.
A German survey on industrial co-operation concluded that the 
degree of satisfaction increased proportionally with the size 
of the Western enterprise.®0 If the counter-goods are 
sub-standard, or they are difficult to sell due to low 
demand, a small firm has less capacity to carry the losses 
than a large enterprise. Jan Stankovsky's conclusion that 
the future of industrial co-operation is largely dependent on 
the participation of multi-national companies and enterprises 
of similar size, is based on this assumption.®6
firm, the co-operation is usually less intimate*, often 
involving little more than the selling of a production 
license. Industrial co-operation agreements are dominated by 
large Western enterprises, as the smaller frequently are 
unable to offer the Soviet partner commodities in the desired 
quantities. The share of small companies in co-operation 
agreements between West Germany and the Soviet Union was almost 
halved from 28.2 percent in 1972 to 15.0 per cent in 1979.e-7.
In the cases where the Western partner is a small
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Questions concerning the administration of the co­
operation often give rise to problems. For the Western 
partner, the ability of the production to change according to 
the demands of the world market is crucial. A Soviet manager 
will assess this flexibility negatively when compared with 
the stability and security of being part of an overall plan. 
The possibility of state intervention endangering the 
production may be a disincentive for a Western enterprise. 
However, the survey referred to above, showed that a mere 25 
per cent had insured against this eventuality. In fact, 
it seems unlikely that this would happend. Industrial 
co-operation agreements is given great importance by Soviet 
spokesemen as evidence contradicting any claims of 
backwardness. The conclusion of an industrial co-operation 
agreement is announced in the Soviet press in terms quite out 
of proportion with its economic importance.
Industrial co-operation agreements are a relatively 
recent feature of Soviet-West European trade. They were used 
during the latter half of the seventies to implement the 
transition to a more intensive mode of economic development. 
The idea was to create "islands of modern technology", 
transforming the surroundings. The same strategy had been 
used by other countrys with considerable success, so-called 
"reverse engineering" played an important role in the 
transformation of Japan into a leading industrial nation. If 
modernisation had been dependent on the diffusion of new
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ideas alone, this might have been succesful in the USSR.
Apart from the fact that the diffusion mechanism in the Soviet 
economy is controlled by the economic planners, there were no 
incentives to improve and expand the new methods that were 
imported. Industrial co-operation has had only a marginal 
effect on the Soviet economy. In fact, the only country where 
this kind of trade has had any sizeable impact has been Hungary. 
In contrast to the USSR, economic reforms transferring 
responsibility and decision-making power from the planners to 
the managers, were carried out prior to the conclusion of 
co-operation agreements.
Industrial co-operation agreements remained limited 
in numbers and importance. The enthusiasm surrounding the 
Second Basket of the Helsinki Declaration has been quite out of 
proportion with the results. Soviet hopes of modernising their 
industry with a more diversified export structure as the result, 
were not realised. Although the "spirit of Helsinki" 
undoubtedly helped the Soviet Union to attract Western interest, 
the economic slowdown in the West made businessmen less 
willing to risk their capital on long-term agreements in an 
unknown market.
The main reason for the lacking results, was the 
absence of any changes in the economic mechanisms of 
planning and management. Encouraging innovations is one 
thing, but to make them function is quite another. As any new 
technique carries risks in terms of output and profitability,
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often requiring a considerable period to give maximum 
performance, the planners will view them quite differently 
from the politicians. The planning of the unknown is 
impossible.eo Concerning the entire strategy of importing 
modernisation, it is interesting to recall that Marx had 
underlined its futility. He repudiated the idea 
that a partial mode of production can be imported without 
changing the surrounding economic mechanisms.
The problems arising from the attempts to import 
techniques and ideas from a market economy to an alien 
setting, were not solved during Brezhnev's leadership, and 
only those co-operation agreements given high ranking 
political support were of any longevity.
g.6.1. Trade in Licences
A license is a document giving the buyer the right 
to use a patented process of production. The trade in
licenses is thus a trade in innovations. The difference from
industrial co-operation is clear, the purchase of a license 
does not result in any long-term contact, or supervision and 
control of the end—result by foreigners. If foreign 
participation is considered undesirable, licenses is an ideal
way of importing modernisation. Bearing in mind the
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avoidance of cross-border contacts and exchanges of ideas and 
innovations outside the scope of the planners, it is not 
unexpected that Soviet writers repeatedly has emphasised the 
importance of the licence trade. This view is well reflected 
in the following statement, made by a Soviet economist:
"The exchange of licenses remains one of the most 
efficient channels for the transfer of technology! 
utilising licences accelerates the technological 
development of countries in the corresponding fields by 
7—8 years, at the same time, co-operation in production 
(can only achieve) 1-2 years".®9 
No Western economist has substantiated this claim to 
the influence of licenses on a speedy modernisation of 
the production.
The export of licenses from the Soviet Union to 
the capitalist countries is often presented in Soviet media 
as the best evidence against Western accusations of 
sluggishness and backwardness. Mr. A. S. Voskoboy, Head of 
the Main Administration for Scientific and Production 
Co-operation of the USSR State Committee for Science and 
Technology, claims:
"It is often said that scientific and technological 
cooperation benefits the USSR alone and that, allegedly, 
the Soviet Union receives more information than the 
Western partners. The facts, though, prove differently.
By today, the USSR has registered 1600 US patents, whereas
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the United States has registered 5600 Soviet patents — 
practically four times as many. This fact alone proves 
who is gaining more."30
Although there is no reason to doubt his figures, they 
represent only a part of the truth. The United States is 
a very bad example. American prudence in exporting 
technology and patents is politically founded, and applies 
to any communist country, or indeed neutral country suspected 
of re-exporting know-how eastwards.
Still, we are left with the puzzling fact that the 
Soviet Union seems to lead in the field of industrial 
inventions. According to statistics, the country has more 
engineers and scientists employed in the industrial research 
sector than any Western country. Based on this number 
the size of the export of licenses does not compare 
favourably with other industrial countries.31
Two arguments contradict any assertion of Soviet 
leadership. First of all, the Soviet export of licences 
is largely within the metallurgical and chemical sectors, 
both have been the cornerstones of Brezhnev's industrial 
policy. Apart from those, there are serious weaknesses in 
the domestic economy concerning inventions and innovations. 
This was admitted by Mr. Voskoboy:
"....Soviet foreign trade associations may
draw on the help of competent R & D centers which
are frequently highly successful in their work on the
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laboratory level, where they obtain effective results, 
but who experience certain problems in their practical 
realization of their developments because our national 
production facilities are overburdened".3e
The second reason can be found in the strict central 
control of foreign trade applied to the purchase and selling 
of licences. Import and export are strictly regulated by 
Li tsenzi ntorq. a sub-division of the Ministry for Foreign 
Trade. The access of a Soviet enterprise manager to the 
innovations in the West is virtually non-existent. Every 
channel of information is controlled by the foreign trade 
bureaucracy. The free flow of know-how, considered 
indispensable in the West, is unknown. Deprived of the 
knowledge of recent changes in the West, a Soviet manager 
has no reason to press Litsenzintorg for the purchase of a 
license. In fact the entire bureaucratic procedure is so 
cumbersome and time-consuming that it alone explains the 
imbalance in the Soviet license trade. If a Soviet manager 
has been made aware of any innovations that can be used by 
his enterprise, he must first make inquiries whether this 
innovation can be recreated by domestic scientists without the 
purchase of a license. If the answer is negative, a formal 
request can be made by the manager to the branch ministry 
responsible for the industial sector concerned. The branch 
ministry will then send an application to the State 
Committe for Inventions and Discoveries and to Gosplan.
71
The planning organs must be convinced that the license can 
reduce production costs, according to Philip Hanson, at least 
by one third when compared to improvements available 
domestically.33 In addition, the license must give minimum a 
12 per cent return, the present value of the production will 
be calculated with an 8 per cent discount rate. The assesment 
is based on shadow exchange rates, which are not available to 
the Western seller. He will therefore not be able to adjust 
his offer to meet domestic competition.
Throughout the seventies, the "non-commercial" 
channels of information, for instance exchanging technicians, 
engineers and scientists with the West was negligible.
These practices play an essential function for the cross- 
border diffusion of ideas in the West.
Finally it should be stated that there are ceratin 
contradictions between various statistical sources on the 
trade in licenses. An article written by the then Deputy 
Chairman of the State Committee for Inventions and 
Discoveries, E. I. Art'emev, in 1979, illustrates this.3**
He states that from the late sixties to 1977, The Soviet Union 
sold 550 licences to the West. Over the same period the 
import of licenses from the same area was 2.5 times bigger, 
clearly contradicting Voskeboy's claims, and the statistics 
published by Litsenzintorg. The latter only supervises pure 
license transaction, Art'emev on the other hand was in charge 
of industrial co-operation agreements and turn-key plants,
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both embodying import of production licenses.
2.6.2. Countertrade. Advantages and Disadvantages
Throughout the seventies, Soviet officials 
maintained that countertrade was the most progressive form 
of international economic intercourse. These claims were 
made despite accusations from the International Monetary 
Fund, and leading Western nations that it disrupted the 
natural pattern of trade. Although there is no evidence 
that countertrade has adverse effects on international 
economic relations, we have seen that there are aspects of 
countertrade that makes it a mixed blessing for the Soviet 
economy.
The catchement area is limited, only enterprises 
of a certain size can engage in countertrade. This would 
not have mattered if innovations were restricted to 
large companies. Clearly, that is not the case.
Countertrade practices are not wide-spread.
Engaging in negotiations requires skills and experience. This 
has lead to the present situation where a small number of 
specialised West European companies function as 
intermediaries, levying charges for their expertise.
A valuable point of criticism often voiced by 
Western business men concerns the superior position of the
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Soviet negotiator. He is both purchaser and seller, a 
role that gives him considerable power. This would be avoided 
if the pattern of bi-laterality could be broken. Although it 
is easier to achieve a balance on the basis of bi-lateral 
trade, it is less flexible than multi-lateral economic 
relations. The monopoly position of the Soviet partner is 
regarded as a negative aspect, but might have been slightly 
more acceptable if the Soviet side had not attempted to 
control the sales of the countertrade commodities in the 
West. As mentioned above, it is quite common for a Western 
company to sell the goods to an enterprise which has 
specialised in countertrade. These companies have marketing 
channels at their disposal not available to the receiver of 
the goods. The problem arises when the Soviet trade 
officials claim that this is a breach of the initial 
agreement. In some cases, these accusations have been made 
against selling the commodities by a subsidiary firm of the 
Western partner. Apparently, the Soviet trade officials 
believe that this reselling of the goods leaves their partner 
with huge profits. Though this is unlikely, it would not be 
a breach with common business practice in the West. To avoid 
the embarassment of a a long complaint procedure, it has now 
become common for the Soviet side to demand a "right of 
transfer" paragraph in an agreement.
Countertrade makes up a kind of transactions that 
are regarded in the West as costly, cumbersome and
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consequently to be avoided. Despite strenuous Soviet 
efforts to counter these views, countertrade still lacks 
prestige internationally.
One of the most serious complaints made against 
countertrade, is that it sometimes results in dumping 
massive amounts of cheap goods and ruining the market.
The protective measures taken by the West to avoid this 
is frequently reported in the Soviet press, either 
as "trade-imperialism" or as signs of "the cyclical crisis 
of capitalism". Obviously, the Soviet selection of counter­
trade commodities is limited due to the sub-standard quality 
of output. There have been cases where foreign trade 
negotiators have counted on the ignorance of the Western 
counterpart and offered items already sold in the West 
by a company with the exclusive selling rights. Lada 
cars is just one of these commodities frequently appearing on 
the list of countertrade goods.355
£.7. Some Concluding Comments
Above we have discussed some of the problematic 
aspects of the economics of Soviet-West European trade. By 
using the term economics, we have refrained from analysing 
the political and bureaucratic reasons behind many of the 
problems.
75
Even though Soviet trade officials measure their 
achievements in terms of total turnover, and on that 
background may claim considerable success, voices have been 
raised in Soviet media maintaining that the opposite is true.
The heavy reliance on a single export commodity has 
created instability. The effects of the changes in the 
energy prices have hit the Soviet purchasing power severely. 
Other countries are in a similar situation, but one may 
conclude that the loss of stability is more serious in a 
planned economy than in a market economy. Not only does 
the entire planning process become more difficult because 
the hard currency income can not be estimated, but the 
economic mechanisms do not have the flexibility to cope 
with rapid changes. Any deviation from the planned 
amount of foreign trade is endangers the other sectors of the 
economy. This touches upon the question of Soviet dependency 
on the foreign markets. If foreign trade had little 
prominence, the effects of the changes in prices or demand 
abroad would not have any serious repercussions on the 
domestic economy. As stated in the introduction, foreign 
trade was during the 1970s, increasingly used as a growth 
factor in the Soviet economy. During the years of extensive 
economic growth, characterised by massive industrialisation 
programmes, only the surplus left when domestic demands had 
been met was exported. The enhanced role given to foreign 
trade has reversed the priorities. According to the present
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policy on foreign trade, the planning process will 
commence with an estimate of the import required to sustain 
the politically set targets of modernisation and 
intensification of production. The final step in the process 
will be to determine the level of exports needed to 
generate the hard currency for the purchases in the West.
This is one of the fundamental differences between the foreign 
trade of a market-type economy and a centrally planned economy, 
not only is the latter limited by the availability of 
commodities, but the imports decide the economic development and 
growth to an extent unknown in the West. In a market-type 
economy, the economic growth depends on the volume and value of 
exports.
On the export side, economists have referred to 
the price flexibility of capitalist enterprises. The Soviet 
rigidity has made it far easier for their competitors to make 
more attractive offers. Apparently, this is not the case in 
the area of energy, here the Soviet observers follow price 
developments very closely and have been able to compete with 
Norway, their main rival in Western Europe.
The depreciation of the dollar, the base currency 
for energy transactions with the West together with the 
decrease in the oil price lead to a shift in Soviet imports. 
During the early seventies, it had been possible to purchase 
both food in years of bad harvests, as well as expensive 
machinery in the West. Most of the food and fodder were
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bought in the non-European OECD countries, Australia, Canada 
and the United Stated for US. Dollars. The machinery and 
equipment were bought chiefly in the Federal Republic for 
German Marks. The changes in the exchange rates between the 
mark and the dollar limited Soviet purchasing power severely. 
Faced with the options between food and machinery, imports of 
the former increased at the expense of the much-needed 
capital-goods from the West. The politically set priorities 
of intensification of the economy and modernisation of the 
productive sphere suffered a set-back. As has been pointed 
out previously, the domestic economic setting is ill-suited 
to the transplants of sophisticated equipment from the West, 
and the beneficial effects cannot easily be estimated. The 
gains from increased food imports are easier to see. The 
change from machinery to food on the import side has been 
encouraged by the down-ward trend in world food prices. The 
Common market countries as well as other OECD countries have 
large surpluses of food. It should be emphasised that 
buying grain and food with the hard currency generated 
through sales of oil and gas is highly cost-effective for the 
Soviet Union. According to estimates presented by Jan 
Vanous, the Soviet domestic marginal costs of grain 
production in 1985 is IS.8 times that of gas, and 2.5 times 
that of oil.3** The exchange ratio ton for ton of oil 
against grain equalled 0.67 tons of oil per ton of wheat in 
1985. Whereas the exchange ratio for oil against all other
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products fell during the first part of the 1980s, this trend 
was only reflected to a minor degree in food and grain.
The various kinds of trade we have looked at, all 
have in common that they are easily controllable. But the 
supervision of the central foreign trade bureaucracy is 
imposed at the cost of open information channels. Any 
exchange of ideas between managers and engineers, as well 
as the incentives to use them, is impossible without them. 
Without any contacts with the Western market, the enterprise 
manager is deprived of any knowledge concerning the 
competitiveness of the commodities. If the future of his 
enterprise depended on the sales in the West, he would have 
implemented the necessary improvements to increase sales. 
Attempts were made to link managerial bonuses to sale 
figures, but as the statistics for Soviet manufactures show, 
this i j did not 
commodities beside oil and gas.
The commodity structure of the import and export 
sector is a fact contradicting the image of a 
progressively developing industrial state. Soviet 
commentators have pointed out the general lack of skills 
required to compete in an alien setting, i.e. the market.
"The problem of marketing" was given considerable attention 
durting the latter half of the seventies. However, the 
debate did not lead to any radical changes. Still, it was by 
no means without impact, no real changes can be carried out
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with the hope of success without any previous discussion.
The old arguments about Western trade imperialism and 
protectionism could not cover the systemically determined 
reasons for the poor Soviet performance. The important 
point here is that Gorbachev was not given a "tabula rasa". 
Many of his ideas had been put forward during the final years 
of the Brezhnev-period.
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3. The Political Aspects of Soviet Foreign Trade with
Western Europe
3.1. The State Monopoly of Foreign Trade
The previous chapter has discussed the 
composition of Soviet foreign trade, its destination and 
origins. This chapter will discuss the political 
aspects. As has been shown, the Soviet foreign trade profile 
differs considerably from that of the Western countries. 
Politically, the fundamental difference between the two 
economic systems lies in the Soviet state monopoly over all 
foreign trade activities. The principle of state control 
was established as early as 1918, and was not interrupted 
by the brief NEP-period in the twenties when foreign 
investments, privat initiative and ownership was permitted 
to give the economy a brief respite. At first the 
People's Commissariat for Trade and Industry was given 
the responsibility for the foreign economic activities.
The Civil War together with the Western blockade had 
effectively severed most trade links. When the hostilities 
ceased, foreign trade was revived and a separate 
Commissariat for Foreign Trade was established.
State monopoly does not only mean state 
ownership (I refrain from the term 'public'), but the
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legitimacy of political influence on foreign economic 
activities. Western doctrine asserts the independence of 
foreign trade from the sphere of politics, aptly 
illustrated in Great Britain's continued trade with South 
Africa despite the government’s condemnation of apartheid, 
the Soviet Union repeatedly emphasises the unity of foreign 
trade and foreign policy. Foreign trade is to be applied in 
the fight for global peace, and co-operation between the 
capitalist and the socialist parts of the world. Thus, 
the Soviet doctrine is that trade is an extension of the 
foreign policy, just by other means. The Minister for 
Foreign Trade for the greater part of the seventies,
N. S. Patolichev, describes the grand aims of the foreign 
trade of the Soviet Union thus:
"The decisions of the CPSU on the development
and protection of foreign economic links enjoys
;
the unanumous support of the entire Soviet people.
iv
The strategy of the party to develop mutually beneficial 
co-operation with every country in the world has the 
approval of ... progressive forces abroad and all 
sober-minded activists, it completely corresponds to the 
strengthening of peace and international security, and 
with the interests of workers. The economic 
relations between West European countries and the 
socialist countries safeguards the works of hundred 
thousands or even millions of people under the conditions
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of economic crisis and unemployment-"1
This chapter will try to answer to what degree this viewpoint 
is reflected in the foreign trade activities. We will 
therefore expect that a deterioration in political relations 
between the Soviet Union and a West European country is 
reflected in the economic links between the two. As has 
already been pointed out in the introduction, the decrease 
in trade in the period of the Cold War can be explained as a 
result of political tension, as well as a result of Soviet 
efforts to integrate Eastern Europe politically by using 
economic means.
Finally in this part of the thesis, the foreign 
trade bureaucracy will be described in order to explain the 
policy-making process and the relations between the domestic 
and the foreign economy. The party and the state are two 
separate structures. Yet, there are several links between 
them at every level, both in the form of party members 
in high ranking post in the bureaucracy and in the party's 
duty to combat any "formalism" in the state 
administration, usually understood as any attempts 
to act without consulting the party. Although the 
relationship between the party and the state undoubtedly 
is ripe with conflict, the basic problem for Soviet foreign 
trade negotiators is the combination of the stability and 
predictability preferred by a planned economy, and the 
ability to act flexibly in Western European markets where
8 6
the future may be impossible to envisage. The foreign 
trade policy makers are set to implement politically set 
targets, and at the same time must meet both their 
obligations to foreign partners, and assure a sufficient 
hard currency income by means of exports. It is necessary to 
emphasise that despite every effort or initiative undertaken 
by the Soviet side, the reactions of the foreign markets 
will be decisive, not only in terms of success or failure but 
also for the range of options available. Thus, Western 
sanctions and embargoes, while triggering Soviet resentment 
and protests, will seriously limit the range of commodities 
available for import by the Soviet Union.
3.5. Towards a Socialist Foreign Trade Policy
According to Soviet spokesmen, state influence on 
foreign trade is by no means exclusive to Soviet foreign 
economic activities. In his description of Western foreign 
trade policy, Vladislav Malkevits claims that:
"The system of means to influence the national economy can 
be found in the arsenal of state-monopoly, regulation, 
management to secure the basic conditions for the 
capitalist mode of p r o d u c t i o n . . e 
The socialist foreign trade is aimed at more than merely 
reproducing the system, as apparently is the function
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given to foreign trade under capitalism. Patolitsev states 
that:
"The development of the foreign economic links of the 
Soviet Union is conducted according to the path drawn up 
by the Party, serving the task of communist construction 
in our country, responding to the interests of peace and 
global co-operation for the benefit of all people.
The foreign economic strategy of the CPSU therefore has, a 
great international significance".3
In the same article Patolichev asserts that the 
legacy of Lenin still influences decisions. This merits a 
few further comments. Lenin in fact left a dilemma which has 
troubled Soviet politicians ever since. Although Lenin strove 
to use every opportunity to propagate the ideals of Soviet 
communism with a number of enemies in the West as a logical 
result, he was quite aware of their economic and technological 
superiority. Lenin expressed the situation of the Soviet Union 
quite bluntly, socialism could not exist if all the relations 
with the West were severed. Without capitalism, socialism 
could not be successfully implemented.^ The feasibility 
of realising socialism "depends on the relation of Soviet power 
and authorities with the most recent progress achieved by 
capitalism".55 From Lenin's point of view, and 
Patolichev's for that matter, trade with the West builds 
communism and helps to stabilise the system.
This viewpoint does not differ from that held by
8 8
Western economists or politicians. A country purchases 
abroad what it does not produce at all, or in insufficient 
quantities. It exports what it produces above the demands of 
the domestic industry if the price is competitive when 
compared with the prices charged by other countries. In this 
respects, the Soviet Union complies with the doctrine of 
comparative advantages, i. e. due to natural resources, human 
skills, capital goods and geographical conditions a state 
will have the opportunity to produce certain goods at a more 
advantageous price than its competitors. The degree of 
involvement in international trade will decide the extent of 
development of a country's comparative advantages. It is 
relevant to emphasise that "comparative advantages" are not a 
set of factors fixed for perpetuity, but depends on the 
adaptability of a country's economy to the emerging wishes of 
its trading partners. Consequently, a strategy of autarky 
and self-sufficiency is incompatible with the intentions 
behind this doctrine.
An accusation sometimes made in the West, is that 
Soviet trade is conducted in order to realise "the inter­
nationalisation of administrative-socialist conditions 
globally".A This goes somewhat beyond the mere political 
statements made at every CPSU Congress and points towards the 
technicalities of the trade transactions. As was pointed 
out in chapter two, there is a clear tendency in Soviet 
foreign trade to avoid the expenditure of hard currency.
89
However, as the share occupied by countertrade of world trade 
is comparatively marginal, the imposition of Soviet trade 
behaviour as the rule and not the exception seems utopian. 
Attempts have been made by the Soviet Union to gain support 
for her trade behaviour in international fora. Yet, in 
comparison with smaller states, the Soviet Union does not 
have a high profile on foreign trade policy issues. As was 
pointed out in the introduction chapter, the USSR's share 
of world trade is far too small to give Soviet policies any 
particular weight. The USSR has frequently participated in 
international meetings under the auspices of UNCTAD (United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development). Although 
Soviet delegates have voiced their support for the Third 
World countries' attempts to achieve a supra-national control 
over international trade, the Soviet Union has been careful 
to avoid any commitments that could limit national 
sovereignty. Dn the other hand, it has been a clear 
tendency from the Soviet side to support initiatives aimed 
at undermining or limiting the principles of free trade.
This has been the case in the United Nations' divisions for 
industry (UNIDO) and trade (UNCTAD) where Soviet support for 
a New Economic Order has been vigorously propagated.
However, there seems to be a discrepancy between the 
political statements and practice. As is shown in tab 1e 1 , 
apart from sales of weapons, Soviet trade with the developing 
trade with the developing countries has remained low.
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It should be mentioned, that despite the developing nations' 
expressed preference for countertrade the Soviet Union is an 
insignificant trading partner. For both, the trade with the 
capitalist and industrialised West is clearly more 
important. This difference in political statements 
and actual behaviour is a consistent part of Soviet foreign 
trade.
3.3. The Political Determinants of East-West Trade
As stated in the introduction chapter, the 
differences in political and economic principles between the 
Soviet Union and Western Europe has given rise to 
antagonistic tensions. The level of international detente 
or, alternatively, tension will therefore play a role in 
East-West trade. On the background of this, it is possible 
to compare the development of trade in the seventies and 
early eighties with the progress of internationa1 events.
The first signal of a relaxation of international 
tensions was given as early as 1967, when the NATO summit 
had declared that "military security and a policy of detente 
are not contradictory but rather mutually complement each 
otherm"'7. Shortly after, the West German government 
launched its "Ostpo1itik", in full awareness that Germany 
held the key improved] relations in Europe. The political
f~
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initiatives resulting in the different "Ostvertrage", 
facilitating movements of individuals and acknowledging the 
Oder-Neisse border, the improved relations lead to an 
agreement on Soviet exports of gas to West Germany. In 
October 1972, the United States signed a comprehensive trade 
deal with the USSR. The basic idea was that a close economic 
integration of East and West would make a conflict too costly 
for it to emerge. Undoubtedly, there was great interest in 
the possibilities of trade relations on both sides. However, 
the initial euphoria could only be realised if trade 
relations would entail profits. Henry Kissinger commented 
realistically that:
"We must be mature enough to recognise
that a relation-ship, if it is to be stable, must offer 
both sides advantages and that the most constructive 
international relations are those in which both parties 
see an element of profit. Moscow will derive benefits 
from others. Here one cannot balance accounts daily in 
each case, but only for the whole area of relations and 
over a period of time."0 
Kissinger argues along the lines of Myrdal, stating that 
although political initiatives can open up for improved 
international relations in most fields, including trade, 
political pledges alone cannot sustain the improvement in 
the long run. The increased trade during the first half 
of the seventies was stimulated by political detente and
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a rapid economic growth in the West. After the first oil 
price "shock" in 1973, the OPEC countries were left with a 
considerable financial surplus, and these petro-do11ars were 
recycled into the Western banking system. This sudden 
influx coincided with the a lowering of credit demands in the 
West due to the onset of an economic recession. The Soviet 
Union took advantage of these favourable financial 
conditions and borrowed money to pay for the increase in 
imports. Although compared with other East European 
countries, the Soviet borrowing was characterised by 
considerable financial prudency. In retrospect, it is clear 
that the increase in the energy prices had adverse effects on 
Soviet economic development. Debate between Soviet 
economists had stressed the need for a shift towards a more 
intensive path of economic development, with increased labour 
productivity and less reliance on continuous increases in 
inputs to expand output. The developments in the price of 
oil had a short-term beneficial effect as it increased the 
influx of hard currency, yet this enabled the Brezhnev 
leadership to disregard the pressure for change. This inertia 
resulted in a widening of the gap between the technological 
level of development in the Soviet Union and in the west. 
Today, we may conclude that the task of modernising Soviet 
industry would not have been as Sisyphean in its extent and 
complexity if the hard currency had not been solely used to 
cover domestic deficiencies.
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The initial half of the seventies have been 
regarded as an era of detente, during which the arms race was 
replaced by economic and .political competition. There was 
seemingly less willingness to revert to threats of violence, 
although the conflict itself was not removed. It had only 
changed character. One question that must be asked when 
discussing the relationship between politics and trade is 
therefore how can detente be measured? Some attempts have 
been made to answer interms of the number of superpower 
summits or trade agreements signed. There is no clear 
definition of detente, and there can be no single answer.
The issue is further complicated by the fact that 
international contacts remained relatively relaxed throughout 
the latter half of the decade (until the invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979) despite a decline in the economic 
relations. The reasons were those envisaged by Kissinger, 
without any long-term prospectives of profitability, Western 
business lost interest.
The prevailing point of view among many Soviet 
economists and writers in the seventies, was that the 
decline in trade was politically motivated.9 This 
development was regarded, and propagated as a threat to 
peaceful co-operation and co-existence.
To claim that trade promotes peace is not new.
This view originates in 19th century liberal thinking on the 
virtues of free trade, and was taken up by the
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functionalists. Mitrany argued that an improvement in one 
area of international relations would have a spill-over 
effect. According to functionalist thinking, after a certain 
period of time, the beneficial effects of international co­
operation become evident, and will subsequently be 
institutionalised in the form of intra-governmental 
agreements. This had happend in Western Europe, and explains 
the pressure exerted upon the Carter Administration by her 
allies, to adopt a less hostile attitude towards the Soviet 
Union. The frequent disagreements between the United States 
and Western Europe on the state of East-West relations can 
partly be explained by the relatively extensive trade 
relationship between the Soviet Union and Western Europe when 
compared to the size of US-USSR trade.
Some Western observers and scientists have 
attempted to assess the relationship between politics and 
economics in East-West trade by giving estimates for the 
possible size and intensiveness it would have had in the 
absence of "non-economic factors” .10 The problems of 
defining a non-economic factor are considerable.
Complete absence of politically set (but often economically 
motivated) barriers is like a Weberian ideal-type, an aim 
that cannot be fully realised. Even in the absence of 
trade barriers, the poor quality and limited availability 
of Soviet goods would preclude any dramatic rise in economic 
intercourse. Conditions of detente will, presumably, result
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in a lessening of obstacles. However, there are those who 
have argued that the relationship between trade and detente 
is spurious. Two American scientists, David Jodice and 
Charles Taylor have concluded that the improvement in 
political relations did not lead to any fundamental changes in 
the economic contacts.11 Though not discarding their 
findings entirely, there are considerable problems of 
interpretation attached to them. The spill-over effect is not 
easily quantified, and to assess if politics or economics 
have the primacy in East-West relations is difficult, if not 
impossible. A related question that should be posed, 
concerns the possibility that a political conflict might have 
deteriorated even further without the mutual contacts and 
common interests generated by trade.
3.4-. The Carrot and the Stick Approach
Soviet writers and spokesmen frequently accuse 
Western politicians of imposing limitations on the economic 
intercourse. COCOM is often given as the most blatant 
example.ie As has been pointed out, Western behaviour has 
only marginal influence on Soviet foreign trade performance, 
but accusing the West of creating obstacles is a convenient 
excuse for Soviet inadequacy. There are several 
examples of attempts made by Western governments to use trade
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as a means to obtain political concessions, the U.S. grain 
embargo following the Afghanistan invasion is a recent example. 
Vet, economic warfare has not been limited to the West.
When the West German government accepted NATO's intermediate 
range missiles, the Soviet Union threatened to cut trade 
relations. If this had been carried out, German energy 
supplies would have been endangered in the short run.
Thus, by the early 1980s, the Soviet attitude was quite 
different from the spirit of the Moscow Agreement signed 
between the two countries in 1970. The threat did not 
materialise and the trade relations remained unaffected by 
the political accusations. If a temporary embargo on all 
trade contacts between the Soviet Union and the Federal 
Republic had been occurred, it is not difficult to see who 
would have been the looser. According to Angela Stent, less 
than one per cent of the German labour force dependj^s on the 
trade with the Soviet Union. 13 The largest company is 
Mannesman Anlagebau, and they have stated that a severance of 
links would just mean a redirection of trade to other 
countries with only temporary losses.1** The Federal 
government has foreseen that a Soviet energy embargo, the 
largest import commodity, would have serious effects on the 
German industry. To counter such a move, large reserves have 
been built up, and it would be possible to receive the 
required amounts of oil and gas from Norway. Soviet policy­
makers are aware that economic sanctions against West
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Germany, and any sanctions would include energy, 
would lead to West German reluctance to rely on Soviet 
supplies in the future. A West German counter—move in the 
form of an embargo on machinery and equipment would have dire 
consequences for the Soviet economy as it would mean a 
severance from the largest supplier of these covetted 
commodities. These motives must have influenced the Soviet 
politicians and limited their behaviour to verbal 
accusations.
Finland has often been cited by the Soviet Union as 
an example of the benefits that can be gained by close 
economic contacts with the Soviet Union, and the impressive 
increase in the colume of trade is often quoted to 
substantiate claims that political friendliness generates 
economic advantages:
"The USSR does not co-operate with any other 
capitalist country on such a large and extensive 
comprehensive scale. This is no accident, the 
achievements we have recorded are the results of the 
consistent and peace-loving policies pursued by both 
countries, are the fruits of good neighbourly relations.
In the current difficult international situation, Soviet- 
Finnish co-operation is a good example of how states with 
different social systems can and must build their 
relations."1 =
One must disagree, Finland is not a good example,
98
but rather an anomaly. The present close involvement between 
the two countries originates in the Finnish defeat in the 
"Continuation War" of 1944 and the immense war debts levied 
on Finland. In order to meet the obligations, Finland was 
forced to build a machine industry with the Soviet Union 
as the sole purchaser.The political and economic influence of 
Moscow was expressed in the 1948 Treaty on Friendship. 
Co-Operation and Mutual Assistance.
The experience and skills earned as a result 
of the trade, gave Finland a unique position in Western 
Europe. As has been showed, Finnish trade does not 
differ significantly from the general West European- 
Soviet trade pattern in terms of commodity structure. What 
is radically different has been the long-term agreements 
that form the basis of the economic intercourse between the 
two. The USSR is the largest single trading partner 
for Finland, and the duration of the trade agreements has 
given the Finnish economy a cornerstone marked by stability 
and predictability. The beneficial effects have been 
considerable, in the cases when the world market prices have 
slumped, Finnish exporters were still able to sell to the 
USSR and receive payments far higher than would have been 
achieved on any other market. As has been mentioned,
Finland refines Soviet crude oil and resells it on the world 
market. There have been cases where the Soviet Union has met 
competition from Finland when negotiating energy sales.
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This is of course contrary to Soviet interests, and recently 
there have been signs of a change in the Soviet policy 
towards Finland. Worries have been voiced from Finnish 
businessmen that the long-term agreements will decrease 
in proportion and that the Soviet Union has become more 
price conscious.16 The State Bank of Finland has reported 
changes in the currecy exchange rate.1-7 So far trade has 
been conducted on the basis of a clearing account in rubles, 
controlled by the Bank. There have been statements indicating 
that this will be changed, with adverse effects on Finnish 
profits. If this is done, there "uniqueness" of Finnish trade 
will be a part of the past.
3.5. Soviet Trade Strategies
This section will discuss how Soviet trade with 
Western Europe is influenced by the needs and requirements of 
the domestic economy. A main purpose is to point out how the 
Soviet foreign trade policy makers try to accomodate to the 
changing domestic context. Previously, the exposition has 
been limited to point out the shifts in foreign trade and to 
what extent the Soviet Union is open to new modes of trade. 
Soviet trade with Western Europe has experienced changes both 
in the preference of exports and imports and in the Soviet 
debts and payments balance. Throughout this period, it has 
become increasingly clear that that the Soviet economy
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is unable to compete with the industrialised countries in term 
of labour intensive output and quality of products. Various 
strategies have been applied by the policy-makers to 
overcome this backwardness.
Generally, there are five different alternatives 
facing the Soviet economic planners in. their efforts to raise 
output and quality. The most radical measure would be to 
adapt a policy of autarky, thus avoiding the loss of prestige 
occasioned by the dismal performance of Soviet capital 
intensive goods on the foreign markets. As has been 
mentioned, this strategy was adopted during the Cold War. 
Apparently, spokesmen for this alternative can still be found 
among senior Soviet economists. In an article on foreign trade 
and the domestic economy, N. Shmelev states that this option 
has been advocated.10 The debate on the feasibility of this 
move was spurred by the policy of sanctions and embargoes 
initiated by the US. Administration following the invasions 
of Afghanistan. However, there were no indications in official 
speeches or statements that an autarkic strategy was 
contemplated seriously. What is important is that sanctions 
and Western hostility resulted in Soviet resistance to engage 
in any long-term trade agreements with the West. According to 
Shmelev, fears had been voiced over the potential 
vulnerability of the Soviet economy. Incidentally, this echoes 
the debate in Western Europe at the time of the Gas Agreements 
in the early seventies.
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The option favoured by the Soviet leadership 
during the greater part of the 1970-19B5 period, was to 
strengthen the role of the plan combined with large-scale 
industrial projects. However, it would be only a part of the 
truth to claim that the entire export and import structure was
the result of prior planning. There was a clear tendency to
use foreign trade as an emergency solution whenever the 
economy was faced with a bottleneck. The best example is the 
fluctuations in the Soviet import of food and fodder from
year to year. Yet, this strategy is not limited to the
agricultural sector, the import of industrial products have 
been affected by this as well. A bottleneck can emerge when 
the Soviet industry is unable to meet a sudden domestic demand, 
either because it has not been foreseen by the planners or 
because the productive capacity is overburdened. It is 
difficult to assess the reasoning in every case. This is 
illustrated by the US. embargo on equipment for the pipeline 
project. This initiative was based on the assumption that 
the Soviet Union would be unable to produce the desired 
quality and quantity domestically. After a short while,
Soviet industry produced the desired equipment.
There are Western economists who claim that 
overcoming bottlenecks is the single most important function 
of Soviet foreign trade.19 This is debatable, and the 
validity of this interpretation cannot be correctly estimated 
without an inside knowledge of the motives behind every
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transaction. It is more relevant to emphasise that this 
particular function depends on the domestic context. If 
the economy is characterised by stagnation and the absence 
of dynamic innovations, foreign trade may be relied upon to 
cover the shortcomings to a large degree. This was the case 
in the Brezhnev years. Yet, importing solutions are not 
exclusively limited to lack of progress. Radical 
transformations of the economic mechanisms may result in 
short-term productivity losses, and an enhanced role for 
foreign trade. Friedrich Levcik, an Austrian economist, 
points out that this was the case in the sixties, when 
certain sectors of the Soviet economy were subjects to 
reforms.eo Even to a lesser degree, imports can be used to 
facilitate changes in the domestic economy. For instance, 
a political promise to expand the range of consumer goods may 
take a long time to materialise, imports can be used to 
overcome the time-lag between a political decision and a 
restructuring of consumer-goods production. In his 
discussion of this particular strategy, Ulrich Wagner mentions 
Poland as the prime example.01 Whereas the imports of 
consumer goods in Poland where done to meet strong public 
demands, there has been a tendency in the Soviet Union to let 
the import of consumer goods increase for a short while as a 
result of "political cycles", i.e. changes of leadership.
The present leadership has not followed this strategy.
Without doubt though an increase in Soviet gold sales would
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bring more consumer goods to the country and thus providing 
the population with an incentive to work harder, and even 
more important, the leadership with popularity.
One of the main problems at issue here, is the fact 
that despite political initiatives to modernise production, 
increase output and quality, the targets have remained 
unattainable. The political legitimacy of the system is at 
stake unless the grand promises of a higher living standard 
fail to lead to some kind of visual results.
Consequently, foreign trade can at best be used to cover the 
time lag, and at worst be used as a permanent solution. As 
has been stated previously, the import of machinery and 
equipment has become an indispensable solution to the problems 
in a few, but important industrial sectors. This is the case 
in the excavation and drilling sector. Here, the import 
of machinery was necessary because the domestic industry was 
unable to meet the demands. It would have been a rational 
solution to rely on imports during the initial phase and 
then copy the goods. However, imports for this branch have 
not ceased nor been reduced. Bearing in mind that this is 
one of the industrial sectors that enjoys preferential 
treatment from the politicians, it is significant that the 
domestic industry does not have the capacity to copy 
imported techniques sufficiently to meet Western standards.
It has been pointed out by Ulrich Wagner, that the 
integration process undertaken by the CMEA might affect the
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Soviet trade relations with Western Europe.ee It is 
reasonable to assume that intra-CMEA trade in those 
commodity groups that traditionally have been imported from 
the West will increase. At the 25th session of the CMEA 
countries in 1971, a "Comprehensive Programme for Socialist 
economic Integration" was adopted. What has been called 
"Long-Term Special Programmes for Co-Operation" have been set 
up in every industrial field, including technology and 
machinery. This has obviously been done in order to decrease 
the dependency on Western supplies of capital-intensive 
goods.03 The shift in trade towards the CMEA after 1975 
was facilitated by the integration process started in 1971.
Western observers disagree as to what extent 
Soviet foreign trade is conducted in order to import 
innovations.5^ There is little doubts that all imports are 
screened to see if they can be used by the defense sector, or 
alternatively be copied by the domestic R (research) and D 
(development) sector. As Soviet exports of capital goods have 
been in decline since the beginning of the seventies, this 
strategy has not been successful. The inadequate ability of 
industrial production to meet requirements, has been 
acknowledged officially for a number of years. Concerning 
the reasons for the lack of commodities fulfilling societal 
needs, this author tends to agree more with the Hayek statement 
referred to previously on the impossibi1ity of planning the 
unknown, than the moralising judgement on Soviet innovation
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made by Ulrich Wagner.ea According to the latter, a 
centrally planned economy is ipso facto a totalitarian 
dictatorship, anyone who who makes an innovation thus 
contributes to the stability of the system. His conclusion 
infers that the Soviet union is full of suppressed inventors.
A more reasonable explanation, more in line with 
recent Soviet debate on industrial policy focuses 
on the inadequate channels of diffusion available, and even 
more important, the stiffling effects of the plan which 
effectively excludes any modernisation that may interrupt 
production even temporarily. A study on the import of 
technology for certain sectors concluded that:
"...in most of the technologies we have studied there 
is no evidence of a substantial diminuition of the 
technological gap between the USSR and the West in the past 
14-SO years, either at the prototype/commercial application 
stages in the diffusion of advanced technology."
We must conclude that the strategy of importing modernisation, 
has only had a marginal impact on the national economy, not so 
much because imports were insufficient when compared with the 
requirements but because there were no accompanying changes in 
the domestic economic mechanisms that would encourage and 
facilitate their application and diffusion.
The problems connected to an efficient usage of the 
imports are crucial to the future of the Soviet economy.
Soviet press has brought reports of wagonloads of expensive
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Western machinery remaining forgotten and rusting at a distant 
side-track. Foreign trade representatives were set to 
fulfil import plans issued by the planning authorities, 
with scant attention to the end-users' needs and requirements. 
Under Brezhnev's leadership, the answer to the problem of 
inefficient diffusion channels and modernisation, was a 
massive expansion in the number of industrial institutes.
The emphasis put on enterprise network analysis, budgeting 
and management practices in Western economic literature, was 
imported to the Soviet Union, but not to the corresponding 
level. In the Soviet context these principles were applied 
centrally, to enable the bureaucracy to respond more flexibly 
to the problems of the economy. No attempts were made to 
strengthen the responsibility or expand the autonomy of the 
enterprise manager like in the West.
Attempts were made to attach scientists and 
engineers to the individual enterprises. This strategy of 
cohabitation had previously been tried out in the defence-, 
and space-sectors, with considerable succes. The decisive 
difference is the political endorsement and economic priority 
given to these sectors, which do not suffer from the endemic 
shortages in the civilian sectors of production. Neither 
space- nor defence-products are exported to the West, and the 
foreign trade sector is at the mercy of what the domestic 
industry can produce. It is clearly in the interest of the 
Soviet Union to offer competitive products. However, the
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surrounding bureaucracy, material shortages, and constant 
interference from the central authorities force enterprise 
managers to make decisions that are rational seen on the 
background of these factors, but resulting in output that 
have few chances on the Western markets.
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4. The Policy-Makers
4.1. Introduction
Soviet debate on the problems of bureaucracy 
increased in momentum during the latter part of the 
seventies. Special attention was given to the inadequate 
communication structure wherein all information was 
channelled vertically to the top levels, the poor quality 
of the information, as well as the overlapping scopes of 
responsibility which lead to insecurity and institutional 
conflicts in the decision-making process. One of the most 
valuable contributions to the literature on this topic was 
made in 1975, by V. P. Gruzinov.1 His book contains a 
very thorough analysis of the function and responsibility of 
the various participants and their interaction patterns.
Most of this section will draw upon his findings, because 
they provide more interesting and credible reading than the 
frequent complaints against petty tutelage and 
narrow-minded bureaucracy so often found in Soviet media. 
Gruzinov goes further, the detailed description of the 
systemic inadequacies of the bureaucracy implicitly attacks 
the entire decision-making structure. Gruzinov's work has 
been a pre-cursor to the discussion currently taking up much 
of the debate on the problems of the economy in the Soviet 
press.
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Certain common features can be found in any 
bureaucratic structure, and they deserve to be mentioned 
as they will influence decisively the outcome of any reform 
attempts:
- The behaviour and the decisions taken by the 
participants are influenced by the tasks they are set to 
fulfil. These tasks are given according to their position 
in the bureaucratic hierarchy. In the Soviet context, party 
affiliation will be an additional and important factor.
- The information channels are decided by the various 
functions. Nobody apart from the very top echelons have 
potential access to all the information. In the Soviet 
foreign trade apparatus, this means the Minister of Foreign 
Trade, the Director of the Bank of Foreign Trade 
(Vneshtorgbank) and the planning authorities (GOSPLAN and 
GOSSNAB). What is important here is that the quality and 
the quantity of information in a Soviet bureaucratic body 
differs significantly from a Western counterpart. When
we take into account that the state administration in the 
West does not interfere in the decisions taken at enterprise 
level, the difference between the scope and function of 
the decision-making process in the West and in the Soviet 
Union becomes clear. In the West, the information is 
alotted according to what will be rational from the point 
of view of fulfilling the task.In the USSR, the rationality 
is based on what is important from a political point of view.
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The neutrality of the civil service is a principle 
contradictory to communist dogmas. In reality, the 
political control of the bureaucracy has resulted in an 
extreme degree of secrecy. Therefore, what may seem 
to be rational solution from a Western perspective rarely is 
so for a Soviet bureaucrat. Needless to say, that many of 
the problems emerging during trade negotiations are based on 
lacking Western knowledge of the Soviet decision-making 
process.
The difference in rationality explains why certain 
forms of trade are preferred to others. It has already been 
pointed out, that transactions which are easy to estimate in 
terms of output and return, as well as forms of co-operation 
with minimal Western interference have played a major role. 
What should be added here is that the Soviet bureaucracy, 
like any other bureaucracy, will tend to monopolise its 
expertise and power. This monopoly has adverse effects on 
the economy as its insulates domestic producers from 
knowledge about tradings practices, as well as preventing any 
efficient delegation of responsibility outside the foreign 
trade bureaucracy.
International trade poses great demands on the 
decision-making process and the ability to react rapidly and 
adapt to economic changes on the world market. This section 
will attempt to draw up a picture of the foreign trade 
bureaucracy in the Soviet Union to see how suited it is to
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fulfil the task it is set to perform. The initial problem 
will be to identify the various bodies influencing the final 
outcome of the decisions taken. There is no single 
decision-making unit, rather a number of instances 
involved according to the character, duration and contents 
of the transactions. The central bodies in the Soviet 
foreign trade sector are: the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade, the State Banks, the state planning authorities 
(GOSPLAN and GOSSNAB), the State Committee for Science and 
Technology. Whereas these are all part of the state sector, 
the political leadership should not be forgotten, as the 
principle of state monopoly de facto is the influence of the 
political power.
4.2. The Constituent Organs of the Foreign Trade 
Bureaucracy
The function of the various units differ as their 
names imply, and their influence upon the decisions varies 
according to the phase of the planning process; the drawing 
up of the plan, the contact with the Western partners, the 
implementation of the plan, the link with producer/consumer 
at home etc.
Political influence on the foreign trade activities 
is expressed through the constitutional right of the highest
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organ of state power, the Supreme Soviet, to dismiss and 
appoint the Minister of Foreign Trade. In the time between 
sessions, this task may be performed by its Presidium. In 
addition, both chambers of the Supreme Soviet, the Soviet of 
the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, have a standing 
Comission for Foreign Economic Affairs which supervise the foreii 
trade activities. They may issue recommendations and proposals 
to the Supreme Soviet. Their power is, however, at best 
marginal. Any fundamental changes or innovative moves of 
radical importance are not made by these organs but in the 
highest echelons of political power with the Politbureau of 
the Communist Party as the most important decision-making body. 
The degree of involvement in foreign economic questions cannot 
be correctly estimated in every case. As has been shown, the
ftcrt-
degree of political control of foreign trade hastresulted 
in any strong, politically motivated moves of significance 
in Soviet-West European trade. The threats to cut off 
trade with West Germany being an exception. Likewise 
would the foreign trade sector get in contact with the 
political leadership if certain trade issues would touch upon 
sensitive political questions. One example is the Soviet 
invitation to Norwegian companies for the drilling of oil on the 
Kola peninsula and in the Barents Sea, in the latter case the 
maritime border between the two countries has still not been 
settled. Yet, it is probably correct to assume that political 
influence is much stronger in the trade between the USSR and the
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developing countries in Asia and Africa where the export of 
armaments has been a frequently applied method to consolidate 
political influence.
The long-term outlines of the trade is set by the 
politicians, but these outlines usually amount to little 
more than the routine pledges to expand the economic links 
with foreign countries as a part of the general policy of 
peaceful co-existence. The large majority of import and 
export transactions between the Soviet Union and Western 
Europe are of a non-controversial nature, any 
high-ranking political interference is unlikely in the 
everyday conduct of trade.
The Council of Minister, the supreme organ of state 
power, is important as a co-ordinative and integrative force
of the country's econojic activities. This function becomes
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evident when one considers the composition of the Council.
The financial institutions, the planning authorities all have 
representatives here in addition to the various branch- 
ministries. Attached to the Council of Ministers is the 
Commission for Foreign Economic Questions which deals with 
the problems and plans concerning trade with the non-socialist 
countries, a separate Commission has been set up for CMEA-trade. 
The Commission does not take any decisions but prepares and 
collects the material required by the Council. The Council 
of Ministers does not have the capacity to control the details 
of the trade transactions. This should not be taken as a sign
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of lacking influence or importance, the Council is not a 
rubber-stamp organ like the Supreme Soviet. General questions 
concerning the profile of imports and exports will be taken 
here. The allocation of resources to the enterprises 
supplying the export sector as well as any signals of future 
shortcomings that should be covered through import will be 
discussed and the possible solutions drafted.
Among the representatives of the various 
ministries, there are two cross-sectional bodies 
that are represented in the Council. Both play an important 
role in the Soviet economy, one is the state planning organ, 
GOSPLAN, the other is the State Commission for Technical and 
Material Supplies, GOSSNAB. GOSPLAN draws up plans for the 
entire economy. Formally, it is entrusted with the duty to 
co-ordinate the various sectors of production by means of 
five-year plans. In actual life, the importance and 
influence of GOSPLAN is perhaps best felt in the seemingly 
continuous issuance of readjustments and countei— plans.
For instance, if the domestic industry is unable to 
meet a set target for various reasons, GOSPLAN may, provided 
that the shortcoming will have serious repercussions on 
the rest of the economy, push for a purchase of the desired 
commodity abroad. GOSPLAN is a central link between the 
domestic economy and the foreign trade sector.
GOSSNAB's responsibility is to ensure the the 
material basis for the fulfilment of the targets set by
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GOSPLAN. The plans are disaggregated, and the allocation of 
the necessary quantities of material for the fulfilment of 
export-agreements as well as the amount of imports, and their 
composition are decided upon. GOSSNAB is thus an important 
body in a foreign trade context. The "import-hunger" of 
Soviet industry will make it the prime target for petitions 
to import commodities from the West. It is a part 
of GOSSNAB's duties to ensure the fulfilment of contractual 
deliveries abroad. However, GOSSNAB is not a direct 
signatory in agreements with foreign partners, complaints 
concerning Soviet fulfilments of a contract are not made to 
GOSSNAB although it would be involved insofar as the 
rectification would require any additional supplies of 
input.
The State Committee for Science and Technology 
(GKNT) is responsible for the implementation of the targets 
set for the scientific development and the industrial research 
programmes. This Committee has a screening function, ensuring 
that similar scientific equipment is not imported for two 
different branches. In addition to preventing import- 
overlapping, the Committee is responsible for the diffusion 
of technological innovations. The annual plans for 
"The Introduction of New Technique" and "Scientific and 
Technological Co-Operation with Foreign Partners" are 
supervised by the GKNT. In comparison with GOSPLAN and 
GOSSNAB, the GKNT is directly involved in foreign trade
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acitivities and has the right to sign trade agreements. This 
aspect of GKNT's work is entrusted to a separate foreign 
trade organisation Vneshtekhnika.
On the basis of the political priorities set by the 
Politbureau, and the economic targets composed by GOSSPLAN 
and GOSSNAB, the Minister of Foreign Trade, together with 
his deputies draws up a plan for their implementation. 
According to Gruzinov,® the integration of the various 
activities is the responsibility of the First Deputy Foreign 
Minister. Together with the other deputies, around twelve 
in number, they form the foreign trade policy unit, deciding 
upon the division of the tasks to ensure the implementation of 
the long-term strategies. The cross-sectional units,
GOSSPLAN, GOSSNAB and the GKNT can be called upon to assist 
in the decision-making process. However, it is just as 
likely that these bodies will try to extend their role as 
advisors into lobbies, endeavouring to influence the 
decisions in accordance with their interests. The Minister 
of Foreign Trade may leave the leadership of this cabinet 
to his First Deputy Minister, although decisions cannot 
be signed without him. If no solution can be arrived at 
with a majority, he has the final say.
In 1978-79 the Ministry for Foreign Trade was the 
subject of a major reorganisation.
"The purpose was to improve the management and planning 
activities of these organisations, to make them more
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efficient, improve the quality of their commercial work on 
a self-supporting basis and achieve higher end results".3
In reality, the reforms aimed towards closer relationships 
between the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the various branch 
ministries. Internally, the bureaucratic structure and the 
delegation of power was altered. A major result was a singling 
out of a number of sectoral interests into individual foreign 
trade organisat ions (FTOs), most representing a particular 
industrial branch.
So far, the levels directly involved in the 
policy-making process have been described. The next strata 
in the ministerial hierarchy is concerned with managerial 
issues. Far from being a sign of unimportance, this level 
which mainly consists of the leaders of the various foreign 
trade associations, is where "the immediate leadership of 
the foreign trade policy"** lies. This level serves as the 
linkage between the policy-makers and the implementers.
The targets set by the planners are broken down, and the most 
feasible way of realising them is decided upon. On the 
background of their central position, one may be tempted to 
say that this is where the "eminences grises" of Soviet 
foreign trade are. Their importance is by and large a result 
of the excessive specialisation expressed in the delegation 
of tasks. As stated initially, the flow of information is 
subject to centralised control. Information is directed 
according to the tasks the various divisions of the
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bureaucracy are set to perform. This creates severe obstacles 
to an efficient and comprehensive integration of the 
Ministry's activities. These problems are of course not 
limited to Soviet bureaucracy, they are just much more 
pronounced due to the shere size number of employees and the 
vast amount of tasks it has been set to fulfill. The strict 
division of the tasks into around seventy foreign trade 
organisations makes the efforts to integrate the activities 
almost impossible. Any supervision becomes slow, difficult 
and inefficient. As a result a vacuum is created, 
which is rapidly filled by informal contact channels and 
interaction patterns made necessary by the need for rapid 
decisions concerning transactions with the outside, the foreign 
partner.
In his analysis of the hierarchical structure 
within the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and the resulting 
problems, Gruzinov claims that there is no single unit with 
the duty to supervise and direct the overall development of 
exports and imports. In stead, there are four separate 
offices dealing with imports, and three supervising export.
The integration of foreign trade therefore becomes close to 
impossible. Moreover, the organs that are supposed to 
co-ordinate and integrate the Ministry's work, are 
overwhelmed with what Gruzinov diplomatically labels matters 
of an "operational character".® Judging from the 
hiearchic structure, these matters are probably bureaucratic
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conflicts, emerging from a general overlapping of 
responsibilities and tasks. "As a result, the moment emerges 
when the overloading becomes exorbitantly large"
Gruzinov's book was published in 1975, and one 
may expect that the reform efforts towards the end of that 
decade would have taken his complaints into account.
However, no efficient measures were introduced counter the 
excessive bureaucracy. On the contrary, the expansion and 
the increased importance of the all-union foreign trade 
organisations strengthened the functional differentiation. 
Initially, it had been decided to establish ^5 FTOs, but in a 
short time, the number had increased to more than 70.
The importance of the FTOs should not be 
underestimated despite their position at the 
bottom-level of the foreign trade bureaucracy. They are 
given the task to implement the foreign trade decisions taken 
by the policy-makers. They form the link between the the 
Soviet Union and the foreign markets. They are the 
signatories to trade agreements with foreign partners. After 
conferring with the directives issued by GOSPLAN and GOSSNAB, 
they decide the contents and volume of the agreements.
The separation of the power to conclude an 
agreement from the decision-making process hardly 
contributes towards speed and efficiency. This split is 
one of the crucial obstacles to a more active foreign trade 
profile. However, one may assume that the de facto power of
123
the FTOs is greater than the formal division of tasks within 
the foreign trade bureaucracy allows for. The picture is 
further complicated by the fact that the FTOs seem to have 
more influence in export than import questions. In the 
latter case, the FTOs merely function as import agents 
fulfilling the targets set by the planning authorities.
On the other hand, their powers over the Soviet supplier are 
quite extensive concerning exports. As the FTOs are the link 
between the foreign purchaser and the Soviet producer, they 
have to make sure that the demands and specifications of the 
purchaser are met. The FTO is a juridic person, thus if the 
commodities exported are not according to the contract, 
the foreign partner has the right to sue the FTO. In order 
to make the FTOs efficient and price-conscious, they are run 
according to the principles of full cost-accounting. They 
run an economic risk if the commodities exported are judged 
substandard and payment withheld. However, this would not 
lead to bankruptcy, and in practice the only consequence 
would be a loss of bonuses for the managerial staff and a 
reprimande from superior levels.
The internal structure of the FTOs merits some 
further comments.*7 The functional differentiation we have 
seen elsewhere in the Ministry is mirrored here. The 
managerial leader is the director. The top level of the FTO 
consists of three councils, one for export activities, one 
for one for market developments, and one for operational
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activities. Directly subordinate to the director are three 
separate sectors, one responsible for the commercial 
activities engaged in the export and imports of the 
commodities, there is one section for economic affairs with 
offices for planning, transport and marketing. In addition 
to these, there are two offices with considerable power, the 
currency office and the office for complaints. The former is 
the link between the state banks and the foreign economic 
transact ions. Throughout the seventies, the FTOs did not 
possess any holdings in foreign currency apart from the 
amount alotted for the day-to-day transactions. Whenever 
the world market prices rose, or additional imports were 
required, this had to be cleared with the state banks.
The Office for Reclamations is important as this 
is where the foreign partners must turn with their complaints. 
The duration between the time a claim is made and a 
settlement reached is very long, a problem which 
probably can be explained as a result of the division between 
the office responsible for the transactions and the 
reclamation authorities. The reforms of 1978 did not improve 
this problem.
The final section is responsible for managerial 
and staff problems, and therefore of little relevance here.
Ideally, the FTOs should be able to choose between 
the various alternative forms of transactions and apply
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their expertise to find the most profitable one. To a large 
degree they do this, but as the analysis and description above
tasks and sectors must be a severe impediment. The 
supervision from above, in addition to the considerable 
number of instances that have to be contacted to enable a 
transaction to go through, do not exactly add to efficiency, 
clarity and speed. As a result, the Soviet negotiators find 
themselves in a constant dilemma between the market demands 
and the pressures from the bureaucracy. Bearing in mind that 
the principle of full cost-accounting leads to personal 
interests in the outcome and profitability of an agreement, 
the result is a clear tendency to avoid deals which may 
involve risk taking, and a transfer of all difficult 
questions to superior levels. Obviously, this is very 
unfortunate as it adversely affects the superior levels 
ability to co-ordinate and supervise the foreign trade 
activities. Undoubtedly, this was what Gruzinov implied in 
his statement about the ovei— whelming amount of 
administrational matters confronting the higher ecehelons of 
the bureaucracy. In addition, the scope of independece the 
negotiators may have, can at any time be limited by the
has the right to interfere as a part of its duty to fight 
against bureaucratic "formalism".
The upward transfer of difficult decisions and
shows, the differentiation and split between the various
interference of superior levels. The Communist
126
problems has highly negative consequences. The superior 
levels do not have the time to go through the details of a 
matter and the final outcome may be far from rational.
Gruzinov emphasises this point, stating that "the success and 
efficiency of managerial work largely depends on the quality, 
completeness and the timing of information..."s
The foreign trade bureaucracy functions as a 
gate-keeper. As stated previously, one of the chief intentions 
behind the state monopoly has been to prevent any undesirable 
influences from the foreign markets. The cycles of inflation 
and unemployment, any dumping of cheap goods on the Soviet 
market, are avoided. At the same time the Soviet Union is 
participating, and drawing advantage of the international 
markets from being fully realised. As has been shown so far, 
the structural complexity hinders these targets from being fully 
realised. The multitude of bureaucratic organs involved and 
the cumbersome and long negotiation process are severe obstacles 
to a dynamic foreign trade. However, the problems far from end 
here. Some attention must be given to the relations between the 
foreign trade bureaucracy and the domestic productive sector.
The laudable motives of avoiding the evils of 
capitalism, apart from the point that the success of this 
strategy is disputable, has had the additional effect of 
isolating Soviet industry from the Western markets. The 
gap between Soviet output and the West has been discussed in 
detail above. Based on the analysis of the bureaucracy, it
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is relevant to expand this issue a bit. The measure of 
success in the bureaucracy is baseds on quantifiable 
parameters, not entirely different from those imposed on 
Soviet industry where performance is assessed according to 
value and volume, consequentially, there are no incentives to 
facilitate the transfer of information. Apart from patents, 
copyrights and licences, information does not carry a price 
tag and its effects cannot easily be judged in economic 
terms. The Soviet producer, cut off from the export market 
by a huge bureaucracy, does not know how his commodities 
compare with Western equivalents. He cannot keep pace with 
the developments and stands to loose his share of the 
market.
i
It is probably correct to assume that the 
relations between a Soviet enterprise and an FTO is abundant 
with conflicts. The enterprise does not have any interests 
in the performance of his commodities, he does not reap any 
profits and will prefer the stability of state-set plan 
targets instead of constant demands for alterations and 
improvements made by the FTO. Decisions on what to export 
are usually taken without prior consultation with the 
producer. Production for export will therefore easily be 
regarded as a punishment by the enterprise. The criteria 
are higher for goods destined for the foreign markets, the 
State Committee for Standards <GOSSTANDARD) will 
return anything it finds faulty with a subsequent loss for
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the producer.
As mentioned above, the productive sphere has a 
larger degree of influence in import questions. The Soviet 
enterprise may put a request forward for permission to import 
a given commodity. Yet, even in this case, the lack of 
contact between the domestic consumer and the foreign 
producer will have adverse effects. Only the end-user can 
estimate correctly the qualitites of the various alternatives 
and the how they correspond to his requirements. The 
negotiator from the FTO does not possess all the necessary 
information.
In order to facilitate the import of innovative 
techniques, every FTO set up an office for this purpose in 
the wake of the 1978 reform. The intentions were to reduce 
the dependency on the West for high technology goods, and 
increase Soviet exports of capital intensive commodities.
This strategy, called the "technological-gap-trade-approach" 
is based on the assumption that the difference in development 
is not a permanent feature but transient.^ There is a 
possibility that this may apply to trade between countries at 
different developmental levels and in due time result in 
increasing similarity of the export and import structures. 
This belief has constituted the fundament of Soviet trade 
with the West since Lenin. However, the basic condition for 
this strategy's success is that the two countries display the 
same systemic features. This has been a major reason behind
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the success of Japanese trade with the West since the War.
As we have seen, this strategy has not resulted in any 
differentiation of Soviet exports to Western Europe, and the 
dependence on the West for innovation and modernization has 
not decreased.10
A . 3. Some Concluding Remarks
In chapter two, the problems of Soviet export and 
import were pointed out. In this chapter, the problems 
arising from the bureaucratic structure have been analysed.
As has been stated briefly, some measures have been 
introduced in an effort to, improve the foreign trade 
performance. However, the inherent tendency in the system to 
avoid risk-taking and transactions that may be difficult to 
estimate in terms of output and profitability, leads to a 
deliberate avoidance of a vast range of trade forms that may 
have been profitable from a Western point of view. The 
reform-attempts of 1978 far from solving the problems, 
enhanced the difficulties as they led to an even stronger 
division of the sector along commodity structure. The 
multitude of different state and party-organs with a right 
to be consulted, or with an interest to further, contribute 
to the problems of co-ordination and integration. In 
addition, one should remember that this increase the
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complexity of a trade agreement, not only for the Soviet 
side, but for the Western partner as well. The cost of 
transactions, or rather the principle that "time is money", 
is consequentially considerably larger for the Western 
partner entering into a trade relationship with a Soviet FTO. 
The potential profitability of the deal must therefore be 
higher than in a trade agreement between two Western 
enterprises to merit the time and efforts spent.
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PART II
5.1. The Gorbachev Leadership's Point of Departure
By the end of the seventies it had become 
increasingly clearer that the Soviet Union was faced with 
an economic and political crisis of utmost gravity. As 
shown in Table 2, economic growth had virtually stagnated, 
labour productivity had fallen drastically. Despite the 
considerable amounts of capital made available for 
industrial investments, the renewal of extant equipment and 
machinery had reached a dismally low level. Around three per 
cent of the annual share of industrial investments had been 
targeted for this purpose. According to Western estimates, 
the return on capital investments had been falling since the 
beginning of the sixties, largely following the downward 
trend of other economic indicators.1 Summing up the 
Brezhnev era in Soviet^ economy, attempts to introduce a 
strategy of intensive growth had failed. The economic 
development based on extensive growth equated more 
input of labour, raw materials and labour with higher 
output. Cheap labour from the countryside and natural 
resources in abundance made this development possible. The 
repeated official statements that the Soviet Union was on the 
threshold to a more intensive growth, with emphasis on human 
skill and capital intensive output had no impact.
Ironically, the name given to the 10th Five-Year Plan was
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"The Five-Year Plan of Quality and Efficiency".
Before the development and status of Soviet foreign 
trade in the years immediately preceding the election of 
Mikhail S. Gorbachov in 1985 are discussed, it is interesting 
to go into some detail on the efforts undertaken to improve 
the foreign economic profile of the country. Special 
attention will be devoted to the official policy on a few key 
sectors of relevance to foreign trade, agriculture, the 
energy and the defence sectors.
importer of commodities needed for the agricultural sector, 
mainly fodder in the form of grain, and fertilisers. It
supply the country with the desired quantities of the 
mentioned goods. The U.S. grain embargo was aimed at 
crippling the Soviet economy by striking at the weakest point. 
However, the grain embargo did not have the intended effect. 
The Soviet officials could claim that the U.S. sanctions had . 
been a failure and a sign of declining U.S. influence over 
the world economy. Still, the basic fact remained that 
the Soviet Union had to spend large sums of hard currency on 
grain, instead of purchasing high technology and machinery 
imports from the West. In order to comprehend fully the 
extent of this problem, one should remember that around a 
quarter of the Soviet labour force is employed in agriculture. 
This is more than in any other industrialised country.
As has been stated, the Soviet Union became a net
became increasingly impossible for the agriculture to
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Traditionally, additional labour resources like students or 
army recruits, have been called upon during harvests in order 
to secure the yields. Although increased agricultural output 
and a lessening of the dependence on the West frequently had 
been propagated as official policy, little had been done to 
alter the methods of production. Not surprisingly, the 
introduction of new labour methods was one of the first 
changes initiated under the Gorbachev leadership.
Whereas grain purchases have been a heavy drain on 
the Soviet hard currency holdings, sales of natural gas and 
oil have been the main commodities generating the income 
making the purchases possible. As has been discussed 
previously, th e f a l l  the energy price, and the subsequent 
deterioration of the U.S. Dollar, had serious effects on the 
Soviet purchase power. However, the increasing difficulties 
in producing the required quantities of energy to keep up 
with, the fall in price and exchange rate, is a reason for 
worry. Climatic conditions, an under-developed infra­
structure, technical problems and shortages of labour have 
dampened Soviet plans for increased exports. This is shown 
by the fact that the plan-target for oil in 1980, 620-640 
million tonnes, were not expected to increase during the
subsequent four years. In reality, production fell short of
the plan target both in 1980, output = 603 million tonnes,
fuTiU-IW  ^ 512-'few 5
v T o  keep up with its obligations
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to foreign partners as well as domestic consumption, the 
Soviet Union has been forced to import increasing amounts 
from the Middle East.
The idea of opening up the defence sector, to the 
domestic economy was suggesed by L. Brezhnev in his opening 
speech to the Party Congress in 1981.3 The various 
reasons for the subsequent failure of this strategy have 
been pointed out. It is sufficient in this context to point 
out that Soviet exports of machinery and equipment did not 
improve during the eighties, and that this strategy did not 
have any noticeable effects.
These are not the only economic problems affecting 
the foreign trade performance of the Soviet Union. Other 
issues of a more cross-sectional character deserve to be 
mentioned as they influence overall economic development.
Some of them were summed up by M. Gorbachev as early as in 
1974, at a time when he was Secretary to the Central 
Committee:
"It often happens that the latest automatic production 
lines, robots and programmed machine tools are not 
effectively used because of insufficient skills on the 
part of the workers, engineers and technicians."**
The severe effects of shoddy workmanship on the overall 
economic performance was recognised without any serious 
attempts to improve the quality of production. It had been 
officially recognised that many of the problems resulted from
1 3 6
truancy and alcohol. To counter this, campaigns to make the 
workers show greater discipline were launched at regular 
intervals. Although resulting in short-term efficiency rises 
and a fall in absenteeism, they did not have any permanent 
impact. Apart from higher output figures for the enterprise 
or factory, and a small rise in the workers' pay, there were 
no material incentives for the labour force to be persistent 
in their strive towards more efficiency. Due to the poor 
selection of consumer goods, a rise in take-home pay is 
meaningless.
It should also be added that even a short-term 
increase in output that had not been foreseen by the 
planners, may cause difficulties as it will have 
repercussions on the supply industry. The latter may 
have problems fulfilling existing plan targets, let alone 
additional demands for material.
Some of the problems were caused by inadequate 
skills among the labour force. In 1986, plans for the 
reform the technical education, the introduction of 
introduce comprehensive quality checks in every 
enterprise were announced.3 The relationship between 
domestic production and international competitiveness was 
clear to Gorbachev. In 1984, the year prior to his 
election by the Politbureau, he gave a speech focusing on the 
gravity of the situation:
"We have to achieve a breakthrough. Only an intensive
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and highly developed economy can ensure the 
strengthening of the country's position on the world 
scene, and enable it to enter the next milennium 
in a manner befitting a great and prosperous 
country..-There is no alternative."^
Turning our focus to foreign trade in the first 
half of the 1980s, the statistics show that the turnover with 
the outside world expanded at a higher rate than the rest of 
the economy in 1983 and 1984.'7 The relative importance of 
the two most important groups, socialist countries and the 
market economies varies according to our indicators.
Measured in current prices, the socialist countries were more 
important. On the other-hand, the differences in price 
developments were to the West's favour, and the capitalist 
countries were the most important trading partner in 1983.
This was changed in the following year when purchases of 
machinery and equipment in the West were reduced, at the same 
time imports of this commodity group from Eastern Europe 
were increased. As a result, the balance of trade with the 
West was improved, debts were payed off, and the Soviet Union 
could boast of record surplus. Despite this short respite, the 
commodity structure was not changed, the importance of 
energy had not been decreased.
In 1985, Soviet foreign trade with the West did 
not yield returns similar to those of 1984. Total hard 
currency surplus fell sharply from the 1984 record of
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$ 3.8 billions to a mere $ 0.2 billions, trade with the 
with the West remained firmly " in the red" as the 
surplus of $ 2148 millions dropped to a deficit of $ 784 
millions in 1985.s
The fact that the atmosphere of detente had cooled 
considerably during the first half of the eighties must 
account for a certain part of the decline in trade.
Political tensions increased in the wake of the Polish 
crisis, and the US grain embargo. On the 26th Party 
Congress in February-March 1981, Brezhnev stated 
that disarmament and co-existence had suffered setbacks.9 
In his opinion, the reasons were to be found in the economic 
climate of recessions prevailing in the capitalist part of.- 
the world. Other reasons are probably closer to the truth: 
for instance the introduction of martial law in Poland in 
1981, President Reagan's refusal to acknowledge the SALT II 
Treaty, and the continuation of the war in Afghanistan did 
not contribute towards detente on the European continent.
As a response to suspected Soviet involvement in the Polish 
cricis, the U.S. President announced an embargo on high 
technology goods and a strengthening of COCOM-rules.
Soviet hopes to widen the perceived split between the United 
States and her NATO allies after European refusal to follow 
the grain emabrgo, did not materialise. Apart from Finland, 
relations between Moscow and Western Europe did not pair the 
levels of cordiality achieved during the seventies. The
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dialogue remained strained. The Soviet Union suffered a 
political setback when the influential Italian Communist 
Party protested against Soviet involvement in Poland. In 
France, a country with long traditions of a relatively 
pro-Soviet attitude, President Mitterand publicly supported 
the American disarmamanet proposals in Geneva and Vienna, 
thus distancing himself from the policies of his pre-decessors. 
The French expulsion of 47 Soviet diplomats, journalists and 
businessmen led to a deterioration of the relationship between 
the two countries. Western determination to go ahead with the 
decision to station nuclear missiles must have dampened the 
Soviet expectations of detente created by the Madrid 
Conference on European Security’ In 1980.
However, Soviet policy on foreign trade showed no 
signs of fundamental alterations, politically motivated 
changes could not be detected during the eighties.
At the CMEA-summit in 1984, the. Soviet Union together .. 
with the other member states, issued a statement favouring 
closer connections with Western Europe, and more 
significantly, any policy of autarky was declared impossible. 
The Summit would "...in the spirit of the Helsinki and Madrid 
Conferences" work for an expansion of the trade.10
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5.2.CHANGES IN SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE SINCE 1985
5.2.1. Introduction
The changes of cadres in the Soviet leadership in 
1985, and in the immediate period after the election of 
Mikhail S. Gorbachev as the new General Secretary of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, resulted in a new policy 
towards Western Europe as well as a new interpretation of the 
role played by foreign trade in the national economy. As has 
been mentioned previously, many of the ideas that 
have been implemented since 1985, had been voiced during the 
interime rule of Gorbachev's predecessors, Andropov and 
Chernenko. Albeit many of the ideas had been advocated by 
.Gorbachev himself, a group of reformist economists and 
“sociologists had emerged not as a fringe group, but 
within the establishment ready, to ..implement their plans when 
the political climate changed.
Reformist ideas had been voiced previously, but 
with little effect. Thus, the radical novelty of the post-85 
Soviet leadership lies not so much in the new openness 
surrounding political debate, but in an officially endorsed 
investigation of the fundamental characteristics of the 
Soviet system. In the sector of foreign trade, there was a 
will to discuss, and initiate measures that would make the 
foreign trade activities of the country more compatible with
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the plans for the modernisation of the national economy.
An integrated part of these new plans is a far more - -
positive approach to the Common Market. Although Brezhnev 
had at various occasions expressed Soviet interest, Soviet 
invitiations to enter into co-operation agreements were 
turned down by the West for various reasons. Gorbachev 
realised that a new policy towards Western Europe would be 
meaningless without an acknowledgement of the Common Market 
as a unity of considerable political and economic power.
Part of Gorbachev's attempt to give the Soviet Union a more 
positive image, as well as more international prestige, was 
the application for membership as an"observer in the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Soviet relations to 
the Common Market and GATT will be treated in chapter 6, 
after an outline of the present Soviet leadership's policy 
towards Western Europe, and the role of foreign trade-in its 
economic strategy.
An element in the comprehensive reform which 
provoked considerable debate and interest in both the USSR 
and the West, was the legislation permitting the 
establishment of joint ventures between with Western 
enterprises. Despite the Soviet drive to attract partners, 
certain deficiencies in the legislation soon became apparent, 
and Western investments have so far not materialised at the 
desired level. The joint venture legislation, and the 
problems surrounding it will be discussed in chapter 7.
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As we have seen, the only large-scale reform 
during the seventies had been a restructuring of the foreign 
trade bureaucracy. The final outcome had not been an 
improvement of the performance of Soviet foreign trade, but an 
expansion and enhancement of the bureaucrats' power.
Therefore, limiting their influence was to be a major task 
for the new leadership. The problems resulting from these 
attempts will be analysed in chapter 8.
As the performance of the Soviet Union on the 
Western markets ultimately depends on the performance of the 
dorrts.0/tic industry, it will be logical to end this work with
V
an analysis of the measures implemented to create a closer 
relationship between the. Soviet enterprises and the foreign 
markets. Special reference will be made to the recently 
issued Law on the State Enterprise.
5.3. Towards a New Concept of Europe
International politics have been dominated by the 
superpowers since the end of the Second World war. Although 
this approach still permeates Soviet thinking, there are 
signs of a much more flexible foreign policy revealing a will 
to acknowledge the growing importance of Western Europe. 
Soviet foreign policy towards this region in the past was 
often interpreted in the West as attempts to drive vedges
1 4 3
between the Unites States and Western Europe. It would be 
wrong to suggest that this element has been completely -
discarded, but the fact that friendly relations with 
Western Europe will benefit the USSR politically as well 
as economically, seems to have gained more importance . This 
new thinking has of course been provoked by Western 
European economic growth sustained by an unprecedented 
process of political integration. Even though defence and 
security issues formally are not on the political agenda of 
the Common Market, the process undertaken has definite 
security implications which may materialise 'in the future. 
These developments require close Soviet attention, Therefore 
it was not surprising when Gorbachev emphasised that: "...the
European aspect, is one of the most important aspects of the 
CPS U ’s international activities."11 This statement, among 
others, gave rise to an interesting debate in Soviet 
newspapers and media, perhaps best epitomized by V. Zagladin, 
member of the Central Committee. He envisioned an energetic 
and dynamic foreign policy towards Western Europe of a 
character comparable to to the German Chancellor Willy 
Brandt's "Ostpo1itik".ie This attitude to the West becomes 
all the more interesting as Zagladin has been given the 
position of 1st Deputy Leader of the Central Committee's 
Department for International Affairs, a think-tank drawing 
up the new foreign policy of the Soviet Union.
Certain developments in the West have facilitated
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the transformation in Soviet policies. The economic position 
of the United States have displayed worrying signs during the. 
eighties. A weakened dollar and a growing trade deficit has 
undermined its position internationally. Whereas the West 
European economy previously "caught a cold when Uncle Sam 
sneezed", parallelling U.S growth or recession with a varying 
time lag, the difference in economic development became 
visible during the first half of the eighties. Western Europe 
fared much better, using its economic power to fill the vacuum 
left by the United States. Today, more than 140 different 
nations have permanent missions stationed in Bruxelles 
monitoring West European development, a fact aptly expressing 
West European importance. .
During President Reagan's tenure, there have been 
some occasions where the West (notably the United 
Kingdom) has expressed worries on US financial policy. More 
important from the Soviet viewpoint, the United States and 
Western Europe have taken opposite standpoints within the 
Nato alliance over issues like expenditure, nuclear policy 
and COCOM. Yet, one may conclude that the Soviet perspective 
is more influenced by wishful thinking than facts. For 
instance, West European opposition towards the Strategic 
Defence Initiative (SDI) was portrayed as an attempt to 
re-establish U.S. economic hegemony in the West and the end 
of cohesion within Nato. The fact being that most of the 
opposition was voiced by leftist parties, many of whom where
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not in governmental positions. A split within Nato might be 
a short-term gain for the Warsaw-Pact countries and the - - 
Soviet Union. Yet, if Western Europe would be able to fill 
the vacuum by itself, and its economic basis would probably 
permit it to do so, an armed Western Europe might prove to be 
a disadvantage. Whereas a correlation of forces between the 
Warsaw-Pact and Nato can be established with relative 
certainty, it will be far more difficult for the Soviet Union 
to sustain military parity with two mutually independent 
blocks.
A fundamental error in the Soviet attempts to 
promote a split between the United States and Western Europe, 
has been a lack of understanding of the latter's unity and 
strength. As will be discussed later, much of this has 
resulted from the economic growth of Western Europe.
However, there is nothing to suggest that absence of US. 
military bases will reduce the continent to a congregation of 
"finlandised" nations. In this context, it is relevant to 
mention the comments made by one Soviet observer about the 
dangerous tendency to draw up plans for independent defence 
systems in Western Europe.13 This suggests that there is 
an understanding in the Soviet Union that too great a split 
within Nato would not be to the Soviet advantage or lead 
to more conciliatory tones from West European capitals.
In the 1970s, it was an intrinsic part of Soviet 
foreign policy to exploit and contribute to any grievances
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that may have emerged between the United States and Western 
Europe. The official attitude was suitably expressed by one _ 
Soviet foreign policy expert in 1979, when she stated that:
"the objective contradictions...create new possibilities 
for the exploitation of the intei— imperialist rivalry 
from the point of view of political tactics. Without 
doubt, this factor will grow in importance... This 
confirms anew the progressive way in which the communist 
parties exploit the inter-imperialist contradictions
with the aim to develop democracy and make detente
irreversible. " X £ *
Although the Soviet Union still looks favourably- 
upon anti-American statements from West European politicians, 
the somewhat paradoxical situation has emerged where both the 
United States and the USSR are accusing the Common Market for 
unfair treatment contrary to the principles of free trade. The 
Soviet attitude is primarily due to the EEC agricultural 
import quotas. The large surpluses in the West, the results 
of huge subsidies, have excluded imports from the outside
affecting both the USSR and the United States.
However, after 1985 the strategy towards Western 
Europe changed as the Soviet leadership was compelled to 
cease regarding it as a mere appendix to the United States.
The changes were not immediate. Yet the gradual 
liberalisation of the political debate showed signs 
relatively soon of a new way of thinking. Although I will
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not venture to provide the reader with a thorough discussion 
of the debate on Soviet foreign policy towards the West, I 
have chosen to concentrate on two articles which summarize 
the changes in the Soviet approach.
5.3.1. The Articles by Primakov and Bovin
Izvest iya and Pravda respectively. Not only did they 
coincide in time, but the viewpoints of the authors 
corresponded as wel1.13 The authors both belong to the new 
group within the-Soviet political establishment which has been 
labelled "internationalists" (mezhdunarodniki). This group 
comprises the new generation of strategists laying the grounds 
for a dynamic foreign policy paralelling the domestic 
developments.
Evgenii Primakov, author of "A New Philosophy of
World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) and a 
candidate member of the Central Committee. In 1986 he was 
given the chairmanship of the World Peace Council, an 
organisation controlled by the Central Committee's 
International Department.
Primakov's article merits our attention because it 
underlines the close relationship between the domestic
Dn July the 10 and 11, two articles appeared in
Foreign Policy" the Institute for
14-8
reforms currently being implemented and the foreign 
activities of the country. The principle that the state 
should function as a buffer between the international scene 
and the internal developments, belonged to the Brezhnev era. 
It was interpreted as inevitable, and desirable that the 
leadership's domestic policy should have an impact on the 
external relations of the country:
"The XXVII Party Congress of the CPSU and the following 
plenum meetings of the Central Committee defined 
democratisation as the most important instrument 
for an acceleration of all aspects of life in the 
Soviet Union- Openess, criticism, self-criticism, 
freedom from tutelage, renunciation of the principle of 
infallibility - all of this, originally aimed at the 
domestic scene finds its reflections today in the actual 
making and conduct of the foreign policy of our 
state. "x<£>
Primakov's views derives from the need to use the 
foreign policy to support the domestic reforms. In 
particular, he emphasises the beneficial effects of 
detente, but not in the abstract language of the seventies 
when the Soviet Union was portrayed as the sole guardian of 
world peace. If the political tension is lessened, a 
transfer of means from the defence-sector to the civilian 
sector of the economy is possible. He claims, probably with 
some truth, that the Soviet Union enjoys unprecedented
14-9
popularity in the West and that a redistribution of investments 
in favour of the consumers is now possible. He clearly 
implies however, that the popularity will not be sustained if 
there is a return to the dogmatic foreign policy of the 
past.
Like Primakov, Bovin's article is a departure from 
the ideological rigidity of the seventies. He does not 
believe that socialism is invincible, claiming that unless 
the reconstruction of Soviet society is successful, the 
global scenario can rapidly change to the benefit of 
capitalism. Although military parity with the capitalist 
world might have been achieved, the "correlation of forces", 
a Soviet concept comprising not only military potential, but 
economic and scientific indicators as well, is currently 
favouring the West. Apart from asking the very provocative 
question "Have we created the only possible model of 
socialism, even when all the historic conditions are taken 
into consideration?", he continues by deploring the present 
state of the Soviet Union claiming that the original targets 
had not been met:
"The most important economic tasks of socialism
still remained the overtaking of capitalism
in the level of labour productivity and the production
of items pro capita of the population, and they
were not solved. When taking all characteristics into
consideration, no society was created which could have
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served as an example, a model to be copied, and an 
incentive that could have been used in the fight for 
the socialist transformation of the world."1'7
The policy of co-operation and detente, propagated 
in the past in order to mollify Western Europe, was given a 
new interpretation by Bovin. Whereas the antagonistic 
relationship between the capitalist West and the socialist 
East previously had not been considered as incompatible with 
peaceful co-existence, but rather continued under a new guise, 
Bovin claims that the maintenance of peace must be superior 
even to class interests. Gorbachev later repeated the same 
viewpoints, well aware of the beneficial effects this would 
have on the image of the Soviet Union in Western Europe.
Thus, the role of the Soviet Union as the defender of the 
purity of communism and the interests of the working class 
world wide, has been replaced with a commitment to 
universal human interests irrespective of ideology .or 
social stratification.
I I
However, apart from being aimed/ world opinion, or
K
more specifically the capitalist West, Primakov and Bovin's 
articles were written with the domestic nomenklatura in mind. 
The ousting of Andrei Gromyko from the influential post as 
Foreign Secretary in 1985, was a signal to a new way of 
thinking, and these two articles provide both the foreign 
policy establishment, the domestic and foreign audience with 
important signs of change. The debate on the foreign
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economic relations referred to by Shmelev (see chapter 3) 
had its paralell in the foreign policy sphere.1® The
ideology and propaganda, to launch a campaign dismantling 
the legacy of dogmatic thinking from the seventies opened up 
for articles like these. As Primakov rightly claimed, 
the beneficial effects were visible in the West. If 
the perception of the Soviet Union as a threat to Western 
security was undermined, closer economic co-operation would 
be possible. Not only would COCOM lose its importance, but 
the Soviet Union would be regarded as a normal 
business-partner equal to any other country.
foundations for a new foreign policy strategy. Although the 
fight between the "modernists", the supporters of Gorbachev, 
and what has been called the "traditionalists", probably has 
not ended yet, the foreign policy sector must be one of 
Gorbachev's notable successes as the voluntarist aspect 
plays a larger role here than in other sectors were the 
material basis will be decisive for the outcome to a much 
greater extent.
joint efforts of Shevardnadze, the new foreign and
A. N. Yakovlev, Central Committee ^responsib li or
Primakov and Bovin's articles are important as
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5.*» Soviet Foreign Policy towards Western Europe since
1985 ......
As has been stated previously, there were no 
attempts to create a comprehensive foreign policy strategy 
towards Western Europe. However, the tendency towards a 
trade war between the United States and Western Europe, 
the latters decision to station U.S. missiles despite 
Soviet threats, and the disagreement between the two 
over Soviet oil deliveries clearly indicated the need 
for a more sophisticated foreign policy with a greater 
emphasis on the security, political and economic factors 
exclusive to Western Europe. Below,- it will be argued that 
such a change has taken place since the election of 
Gorbachev, both in the relationship between the USSR and the 
-Common Market, and even more pronounced in the bilateral 
relations with its most, important members the United Kingdom, 
France and West Germany.
Western Europe has a special position in Soviet 
security policy. As we have seen in many of the statements 
by Soviet politicians and scholars, they believe there is a 
strong positive correlation between trade and detente in 
Soviet foreign policy. Clearly, to build a better 
relationship, the Soviet po1icy-makers have to take West 
European needs into account. The Foreign '
recommended that the West Europeans "should raise their voice
153
and show their profile”, this was the time when they should 
fulfil their "specific function" in the process of detente - - 
and disarmament.1,? Along similar lines of thought,
Gorbachev tied the future of the Soviet Union to that of
I
Western Europe, stating that their relations wre
Jv
characterised by interdependence:
"Some in the West are trying to exclude the Soviet Union 
from Europe. Now and then, as if inadvertently, they 
equate Europe with "Western Europe". Such plays, however, 
cannot change the geographic and historical realities. 
Russia's trade, cultural and political links with other 
Europeans have deep roots in history. We are Europeans."20 
On the basis of this common heritage, the Soviet Union leader 
sees great and promising possibilities:
"There is no doubt that all European peoples 
without exception favor an atmosphere of neighborliness 
and trust, coexistence and cooperation on the 
continent. This would be a triumph for a new political 
thinking in the true sense of the word. Europe can 
set a worthy example. The world currently stands at a 
crossroads and which direction it will pursue depends 
largely on Europe's political position....Europe can and 
must play a constructive, innovative and positive 
role."21
The emphasis on common interests instead of the 
previous dominance of class-issues opened up for a widening
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of Soviet contacts with political parties on the left in
Western Europe, as well as movements on the fringe of the .. . ..
political establishment like the "greens" and various 
peace-groups. As a result of the Soviet foreign policy of 
the Brezhnev era, contacts had been severed between Moscow 
and many Western socia1-democratic, socialist and 
communist parties. In the case of the Italian Communist Party, 
there had been open accusations against what the CPI 
interpreted as imperialism from Moscow. This was embarassing 
and required mending, However, any amelioration of relations 
presupposed that the Soviet leadership realised that many 
parties left of centre did not regard Nato membership as
incompatible with their policies. Indeed, .the emphasis on the
European identity had been propagated by both the West German 
social-democrats and the Italian communists, while at the 
same time supporting Nato. When the leader of the CPI, 
Alessandro Natta, and the party's spokesman on international 
affairs, Giorgio Napolitano met Gorbachev in January 1986, and 
A. Dobrynin six months later, the talks focused on economic 
questions and matters of relevance to West European 
security.se Ideology had faded from the agenda.
Bilaterally, the new Soviet leadership made several 
initiatives to improve relations with individual countries.
The main trading partner in Western Europe, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, enjoys high priority in Soviet foreign 
policy. This is not different from the seventies, when the
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USSR made efforts to maintain good economic relations despite 
international tensions.
"In our relations with the Federal Republic 
of Germany, we take into account its potentials 
and possibilities, its place in Europe and the world and 
its political role...Europe's development is impossible 
without active cooperation between our two states...stable 
relations between the FRG and the USSR would appreciably 
change the situation in Western Europe for the 
better."e3
The position of the Federal Republic as a 
major financial centre and a strong industrial power must 
play an integrated part in the new approach to Western 
Europe. As Gorbachev stated, West Germany is in a key 
position. Yet, it would be incorrect to imply that the 
relationship between Moscow and Bonn has been characterised 
by friendly tones and mutual conciliation ever since 
Gorbachev's assumption of power. The West German 
government's decision to engage in the SDI programme in 
March 1985, provoked fierce attacks from the Soviet Union.
When the US-FRG negotiations had reached their conclusion 
and the agreement was formally signed in March the following 
year, the Soviet ambassador in Bonn claimed that this was a 
"profoundly hostile" act of the West Germans. When the 
West Germans later were affected by fallout from the Chernobyl 
disaster the following month, West German claims for
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compensation were refused outright. (Claims made by other 
countries were met with the same attitude) . . _ .
The German Chancellor Kohl's comparison of 
Gorbachev's public relations policy with that of the Nazi 
propaganda-minister Goebbels in October 1986 led to a further 
deterioration of the relationship between the two countries. 
However, the Soviet Union calmly pursued a policy of mutual 
accusations based on the expectation that the social- 
democrats would win the fortcoming election. When this did 
not materialise, a change in Soviet policy became imperative. 
Already two weeks after the election, the newly appointed 
Soviet ambassador Kvisinski, had a meeting with members of 
the West German government. The old grievances were not 
repeated by either side, and the impression that the Soviet 
leadership sought a fresh start was confirmed at a meeting 
between Zagladin, deputy leader of the Central Committee's 
International Department and Genscher, the re-elected foreign 
secretary.
West Germany's export of machinery and equipment 
had increased in volume and importance for the Soviet Union 
throughout the seventies. The present leadership's drive for 
a rapid acceleration of the modernisation of industry led to 
increased interest in the potential of trade and economic 
intercourse between West Germany and the USSR for this 
process. Efforts were made to draw up a frame agreement for 
scientific-technical co-operation, as a gesture of
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reconci1iation West Berlin was included and thus de facto 
acknowledged as a part of West Germany. Although of little., 
practical significance, the symbolic value of this move was 
appreciated in Bonn where politicians claimed that this 
might be a step towards de jure Soviet recognition of West 
Berlin as Federal territory.
The deterioration in the Soviet terms of 
trade led to a decrease in the exchange of goods between 
the two in the 1985. However, the emphasis on 
modernisation expressed in the 12 five year plan promised 
new opportunities for West German exporters to regain lost 
ground. Following the Chernobyl disaster, there was a sudden 
demand for nuclear-energy related technology. Although this 
might have had potential strategic significance to the 
Soviet defence sector, COCOM did not object to any of the 
agreements signedj.
The rap id economic growth of Britain and the 
position of Margareth Thatcher as a senior stateswoman, did 
not remain unnoticed in the Kremlin. Soviet politicians 
had previously regarded the "special relationship" 
between Britain and the United States as a euphemism for 
American dominance. The attitude of the Soviet foreign
i ' '
was quite different when he visited the London in 
July 1986. Not only does Britain possess nuclear weapons 
and has considerable forces at its disposal on the European
continent, the economic strength of the country had
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transformed Britain into a "superpower", equal to 
that of the Soviet Union.25
However, the rapprochement between the two 
countries had begun much earlier, even prior to the election 
of Gorbachev. In 1984, he headed a delegation of Soviet 
politicians to Britain. He met Thatcher, and found that the 
reforms they both wished to implement made their views 
surprisingly compatible. The return visit of the British 
Premier minister to Moscow in 1987 not only strengthened Mrs. 
Thatcher's position in the West, but was interpreted by 
Soviet media as a major victory for Gorbachev's policy of open 
arms towards Europe. Despite considerable differences on 
human rights, the relationship between the two countries 
improved markedly. This improvement was reflected in the 
trade relations, during the first half of 1987 the economic 
intercourse resulted in a Soviet surplus of $ 204 
millions.e<£> No other country contributed more towards 
Soviet hard currency income over the same period.
France was the first West European country 
Gorbachev visited after he had been elected, signalling a 
Soviet desire to revive the cordiality which had marked the 
relationship between the two countries for number of years.
A month after his first visit, in November 1985, Gorbachev 
made a stop in Paris on his way to Washington. The Soviet 
efforts were rewarded. In July 1986, President Mitterand 
visited Moscow. During his stay, he expressed his enthusiasm
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over the Soviet disarmament proposal which had been issued in 
January the same year. The French reluctance to support the 
SDI programme was appreciated by the Soviet leadership, as 
were French support -for the SALT II Treaty, and President 
Mitterand's insistence on Soviet participation in a Middle 
East peace settlement. French support had been given in 
expectance of Soviet recognition of the French force de 
frappe as a nuclear deterrent inedependent of Nato. This was 
given with reluctance, and the Soviet leadership claimed it 
was only a temporary solution as they expected British and 
French nuclear weapons to be included at a later stage.27
Despite the fact that Mitterand nominally is a 
socialist, the outlook of French politics is far too 
pro-American to the Soviet liking. The invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979 and the Polish crisis two years after had 
a serious impact on French popular sentiment, undermining the 
appeal of the communist cause and speeding up the decline of 
an already ailing French Communist Party. According to 
Soviet economists, what they perceive as a shift to the right 
in French politics has had adverse effects on the trade 
relations between the two countries:
"In 1982, France was encouraged by external pressure to 
raise sharply the cost of credit granted to the USSR for 
the purchase of French goods- This naturally narrowed the 
possibilities for purchases in France, particularly of 
machinery and equipment. A certain role was played by
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France's part in increasing the restrictions on trade with 
the USSR introduced by Nato and Common Market countries 
even on such goods as individiual foodstuffs and telephone 
equipment."
The Soviet leadership expected the diplomatic 
efforts to have a spill-over effect on the trade relations 
between the USSR and Western Europe. This was illustrated 
when Prime Minister Ryzhkov visited Stockholhm to sign a 
settlement over a long-disputed area in the Baltic, he used 
the opportunity to voice his disappointment over lacking 
Swedish interest in developing trade links with the Soviet 
Union.
Soviet foreign policy towards Western Europe has 
changed under Gorbachev, as the comments above show. Whether 
we are faced with a comprehensive strategy or not, might be 
too early to answer. Some Western observers claim that there 
is nothing new in the Soviet policy towards Western Europe, 
simply a more updated and sophisticated attempt to break the 
relationship with the United States. However, the 
pan-European ideas of Gorbachev are definitely more palatable 
than the American President's statements about the 
possibilities for a limited nuclear war in Europe.
1 A fundamental problem in the Soviet-West European 
relationship rests on the fact that the latter sends out a
multitude of vastly different, and not infrequently
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contradictory signals. Creating a comprehensive strategy is 
made difficult by the fact that Western Europe does not 
speak with one voice. Obviously, West Germany's interests 
in maintaining good relations with the USSR are stronger 
than those of Portugal or Belgium, and the Soviet policy 
towards a neutral country like Ireland will differ from the 
policy towards the United Kingdom.
Some dilemmas in Soviet relations with Western 
Europe deserves to be pointed out. The Soviet Union is 
interested in strengthening Western independence vis-a-vis 
the United States. For instance the civilian technology 
research programme EUREKA has been given positive comments in 
the Soviet media as a valuable alternative to the American 
SDI. On the other hand, attempts to revive the West European 
Union as an alternative to Nato has been met with scorn.
Gorbachev's reforms have not been given unanimous 
support by West European communists. The hard-liners have 
problems adapting to a new policy where principles like 
openness and democracy are at the forefront. Voices have 
been raised, questioning the erosion of traditional values 
in the USSR, at the other end of the scale, the 
Euro-Communists have not shown any signs of repairing their 
broken relationship with Moscow.
Although security questions play an- important 
role as incentives to create good neighbourly relations 
to quote Gorbachev, economic motives are important in the
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attempts to create mutual trust between Western Europe and 
the USSR. The Soviet economy is in a state of crisis:
"It is necessary again and again to call to mind what
the state of the economy was at the turn of the
seventies to the eighties. At the time the rate of
economic growth dropped to a level which in fact meant the
beginning of stagnation. We began to lose one position 
after another...In scientific development the gap with 
respect to the most advanced countries began to grow to 
our disadvantage" .es>
Detente and even p.artial disarmament would ease the strains on 
the Soviet economy. However, Gorbachev's emphasis on the 
value of trade both to sustain and promote peace are obvious. 
The reader will discover the striking resemblance with views of 
the former U.S. Foreign Secretary Kissinger, quoted in the 
introduction chapter when he reads the following statement by 
the Soviet general secretary:
"The building of the "European home" 
requires a material foundation - constructive 
cooperation in many different areas. We, in the Soviet 
Union, are prepared to search for this, including new 
forms of cooperation, such as the launcing of joint 
ventures, the implementation of joint projects in third 
countries etc. We are raising the question of broad 
scientific and technological cooperation not as beggars 
who have nothing to offer in return."30
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5.5. The Role of Foreign Trade in Gorbachev's Reforms
Not only on the political level has Western Europe 
been given special attention under the Gorbachev leadership. 
The development of economic relations with these countries 
is considered to be an important measure in the reforms to 
modernise Soviet economy. In 1985, the General 
Secretary emphasised the need for a "new approach to the 
entire external economy of the country".31 Similar 
statements were made during the seventies in attempts to 
increase the country's share in world trade and to increase 
exports of finished goods. The essential difference between 
the Brezhnev era, when a strengthening of labour discipline 
was regarded as the magic wand to solve all problems, and the 
present leadership lies in the will to adapt a comprehensive 
approach. The problems of the foreign trade sector and the 
Soviet Union's performance on the world market are no longer 
to be regarded in isolation. Indeed, the most promising 
aspect of the present discussion, is the ability to recognise 
that that the problems of the foreign trade sector are not 
different from those of the domestic economy. The answer 
to the complaint that the USSR's share of international 
trade does not correspond to the country's economic 
potential, is basically that the Soviet Union's level
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of economic development does not correspond to the 
requirements of world trade. From this point of view, 
it is insufficient to claim that the poor performance of 
Soviet products are caused by protectionism or trade 
imperialism, and that Soviet imports would have been radically 
different if it had not been for the artificial interference 
of COCOM. This new approach to foreign trade is aptly 
expressed by the economist Igor Dorogin, in an article from 
1985:
"Foreign trade effectiveness is a part of the efficiency of 
the economy as a whole. It calls for a marked 
acceleration of the scientific and technical progress in 
the country and a profound restructuring of the economy by 
applying material- and energy-saving machinery and 
technologies, by raising the quality of output and lowering
  its costs. No less important is the role of the
organizational aspect of the problems validity and fulfilment 
of the decisions made by the central authorities...the 
effectiveness of the foreign trade activity also depends on 
the flexibility and efficiency of the managerial system 
and the level and character of interaction between the 
sphere of production and the sphere of foreign trade."33
A new approach was clearly needed. Traditionally, 
increased investments, more skilled workers and raw materials 
had been the common prescription to rise performance. But 
why then were Soviet exports of machinery and equipment
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decreasing year by year when:
"the machine-building industry has been given 
everything that our economy has. Construction and 
development of a number of other enterprises has 
been stopped. In a word, it has been given the 
maximum I"33
To use foreign trade as a growth factor had been 
attempted as a strategy to modernise industry previously, 
notably in a few selected industrial sectors. The results 
had been dismal. The surroundings, e.g. the managerial staff 
and the workers were not interested in new processes or 
sophisticated equipment. To them it only meant an increased 
workload with new and unknown tools. Thus, instead of making 
the surrounding adapt to the imported goods, the latter were 
adapted to the surroundings. Any modernising effects they 
might have had, were soon neutralised.
To avoid importing expensive commodities without 
any subsequent improval of the economy, the basic economic 
mechanisms were to be revised. In order to understand the 
new strategy of Gorbachev, it is necessary to treat certain 
aspects of his reforms in greater detail.
The present five year plan, has been created in 
order to intensify industrial production and to increase the 
output of capital intensive goods. Not only is this 
necessary if the Soviet economy is to avoid becoming even 
more backward compared to other highly developed industrial
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countries, the old extensive growth model has depleted its 
own basis. Raw materials which had been wastefully used for 
so long, have become more expensive to excavate and to 
transport. The old logic where more input was understood as 
being synonymous with more output was declared obsolete. 
Moreover, the chronic shortages in nearly all sectors of the 
economy were no longer blaimed on flaws in the plan, but 
on too much central interference. Any curbing of the 
planners' authority or less emphasis on jth-e— d4-r-ee-t-rv^  
the directive nature of the plan would logically mean greater 
independence for the enterprises.
The five-year plan is to remain the most important 
guideline for the economic activity and development of the 
country. Serious efforts have been made in order to improve 
the planning-methods, in particular with the use of "target 
programming" methods making it possible to estimate the 
repercussions fulfilling one target has on the rest of the 
economy. Much discussion has focused on the role of the 
plan, and although the need for a transition from a directive 
to an indicative function has been openly acknowledged, any 
move to curb the power and influence of the state planning 
authorities has been met with considerable resistance. At 
the plenary meeting of the Central Committee in June 1986, 
Gorbachev accused members of these organs of frantically 
defending an outmoded planning system.3^
As a part of the new leadership's attempts to free
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certain sectors of the economy from what in practice has been 
the "petty tutelage" of GQSSNAB and GOSPLAN, "unplanned 
sectors" were introduced allowing individual economic 
activity and co-operatives for the consumers. Clearly, 
Gorbachev needs to create some kind of tangible evidence that 
his reforms are improving the living conditions of the Soviet 
population to retain the legitimacy of his leadership. From 
our point of view, the impact on the foreign trade sector is
non-existent. Of more relevance here are the plans to open
*
up for who lesale?\in industrial consumer goods. At the 
present stage, only a marginal share is traded outside the 
plan. If this proves successful and is expanded in the 
future, Soviet enterprises will be capable of responding far 
quicker to changes in the world market and will be able to 
engage in more direct co-operation with other Western . . . 
enterprises.
Even though the role of the plan did not change to 
any significant extent, the plan indicators were altered. 
Instead of emphasising volume and numbers, the quality and 
marketability were to be given increased importance. The 
enterprises were given a bigger say in the composition of 
plans. In order to make management more responsive to the 
demands of the economy, and not all the time on the 
changes in plan targets, the need for greater plan stability 
has been asserted. The constant p 1an-revisions in the past 
were a serious interference in production. It was expected,
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and rightly so, that the more the omnipotence of the planning 
authorities was restricted, the more it would allow for 
micro-economically rational decision-making.
require a financial platform. Subsequently, the enterprises 
were granted the rights to hold, and dispose of various fonds 
as they found appropriate. The possibility to take up 
bank-loans, as well as the right to retain profits were 
introduced. Enterprises producing for the export markets 
were given a certain percentage of the hard currency 
earnings as a reward.
the system of managerial bonuses was changed to reward the 
speedy installation and utilisation of imported machinery. 
As has been pointed out previously, the introductory phase 
for new machines and equipment are considerably longer than 
in the West. Efforts have been made to improve the 
relationship between the research sector and production.
"There is a large degree of indeterminacy in the different 
units of the "science-production cycle" (low
predictability of scientific results, high "mortality rate" 
of the initial scientific ideas and technological 
solutions, the international character of the scientific- 
technical revolution etc.) require special efforts so that 
the socio-economic development does not walk in the
However, managerial autonomy and rational decisions
In order to encourage innovation and modernisation,
A leading Soviet economist complained that:
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"footsteps" of such indeterminacy."33 According to the 
Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the B7th 
Congress of the CPSU of February 1986, in the future: 
"...college and university students must be drawn into 
research work and applying research findings in 
product ion. "3<£> In this way, the technology contents 
may be increased in Soviet goods, and competitiveness will 
improve. Integrating the engineers and scientists directly 
in production, the domestic setting would be far more 
receptive to imports from the West. The process of 
industrial modernisation had gone far too slow when compared 
with the West, Gorbachev has demanded revolutionary changes 
and a rapid introduction of the most recent technology into 
i ndustry. 3,7
With the danger of making premature judgements, 
some problems still remain unsolved. The basic issue, that 
there must be fundamental changes in the economic planning if 
the policy of "acceleration" is to have any impact, has not 
been answered so far. Even if the staff has been changed, 
and the authority of GOSPLAN and GOSSNAB has been 
restricted, there is still widespread dissatisfaction with 
their continued interference in the decision-making at 
enterprise level.
Another serious inconsitency in the reforms lies in 
the futility of introducing economic incentives to make the 
enterprises produce profitably, without changing the price-
1 7 0
mechanisms. The irrationa1ity of state-set prices, 
especially on imported goods, will distort the plans to make 
the enterprise-sector into a viable part of the economy.
Finally, the encouragement of managerial initiative 
to produce more high-technology products, may easily turn 
out to be impossible in the long-term without a slackening of 
the plan. Additional input may be impossible to procure 
for the producers as it has not been foreseen by the planners.
The opening up for trade in industrial consumer goods is 
aimed at removing this danger.
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6. Soviet Foreign Economic Diplomacy since 1985
6.1. Introduction
The desire to increase Soviet participation in
/
world trade lay behind the ^he attempts to become a member 
of GATT, and in the repeated invitations to the Common 
Market to negotiate a frame agreement. Apart from the 
obvious material motives behind the Soviet economic 
diplomacy, -GATT membership would remove some of the tariffs 
levied on Soviet exports, and a rapprochement with the Common 
Market might ease some of the quotas facing Soviet 
agricultural commodities^ other motives played their part.
The existence of the EEC had been acknowledged by Brezhnev in 
the seventies, but no political strategy towards it had been 
developed prior to Gorbachev's takeover. A new, vigorous 
foreign policy, as we have seen it in the bilateral 
relationship with individual West European countries, had to 
take the Common Market into account. Apart from Finland and 
Austria, the most important trading partners were all members 
of the Common Market. In the case of GATT, Soviet 
membership would be a recognition of the country's status 
as a major economic power.
In both cases, we are faced with bold initiatives 
from the Gorbachev leadership. In this capacity, they merit 
further analysis.
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6.2. The Soviet Union and GATT
The General Agreement on tariffs and Trade was set 
up in the post-war period to combat protectionist measures 
among the market economic countries and to further trade.
The signatories grant each other Most-Favoured-Nation status 
(MFN) pledging not to levy any tariffs on each others goods 
which may have adverse effects on the competitiveness of 
imports. A functionalist interpretation of the 
confidence-building and peace-keeping effects of trade 
played an important role in the founding of GATT, and still 
does.
In 1986, the GATT members were to meet in Uruguay 
for an annual discussion. The Soviet Union sent an 
application for the status of observer as a first step on the 
path to full membership. This was done in the expectancy 
that the application would be given a positive answer, other 
centrally planned economies were already full members. 
Bulgaria had been granted observer status in 1967, Poland had 
been accepted as a full member in the same year, Romania four 
years later. In 1973, Hungary was the last East european 
country to become a full member.
However, the examples above may give the false 
expression of these countries entering GATT without any 
further problems. For a planned economy to become a full
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contracting party, a number of obstacles must be 
overcome. As will be argued below, the Soviet Union had 
not implemented the necessary prerequisites for membership.
Despite the seemingly neutral intention of GATT 
to facilitate international economic intercourse, the concept 
of free trade uninhibited by state interference is inherent 
in the treaty. In an economy ^ re the enterprises are 
responsive to the market and not to state plans, tariffs will 
increase the price of imports and the competitiveness will 
be affected negatively. In stead of direct price control of 
production, tariffs are levied in order to make politically 
motivated changes in the extent and composition of foreign 
trade. This is incompatible with a planned economy for two 
reasons. Firstly, the fact that there is a plan deciding the 
economic development rules out equal treatment based on 
economic criteria, secondly, a system of state— trading makes 
tariffs meaningless as the state then ultimately would be 
charging itself. State planning of the foreign economic 
activities and free trade are contradiction in terms as a
state enterprise cannot follow the state plan and at the same
\
time have the autonomy to comply with the principle of 
non-discrimination. The validity of this central point was 
not grasped by the Soviet economist Vladimir Shmelov. In an 
article written in 1986, focusing on the Soviet Union and 
GATT, he wrote:
"The organization of foreign trade as a state
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monopoly in the socialist countries in no way prevents 
application of the most-favoured-nation treatment in 
accordance with contract obligations. The mutual 
granting or non-granting of the most-favoured-nation 
treatment by states with different socio-economic systems 
does not depend on this or that form of foreign trade, 
(state monopoly or other form) but on the objectives and 
the orientation of the trade policy pursued by this or 
that state."1
Another serious problem, a direct consequence of 
the making the state monopoly function as a buffer against 
the outside world, is the constant imbalance of domestic and 
world market prices. Karin Kock, a Swedish economist, states 
that even in planned economies where the states tries to 
comply with the minutes of GATT, the insulation of the 
domestic economy makes price comparisons based on real costs 
impossible.e How then, if at all, can a planned economy 
become a member of GATT. The most frequent argument made by 
Western representatives against accepting East European 
countries, is that a membership will amount to little more 
than uni lateral concessions. Based on this viewpoint, the 
English economist Peter Wiles has claimed that the only way 
for a planned economy to fulfil what he calls the "spirit of 
GATT", is by guaranteeing "global import quotas".3 
Allthough none of the socialist member states have gone that 
far, they have pledged not to initiate any discriminatory
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practices. Professor Wiles' suggestion might if it 
had been implemented, made the membership of the USSR more 
palatable to the Western members of GATT. However, it would 
not alter the planned nature of the economy, and therefore 
not fulfil the "spirit" of GATT. In practice, it would be 
impossible, as Soviet purchases on the Western markets are 
influenced to a decisive degree by the availability of hard 
currency. Although many East European countries have been 
willing to take up loans in the West to finance their 
imports, the financial prudency pursued by the Soviet Union 
makes any guarantees unlikely.
As mentioned previously, the Soviet application was 
made with the expectancy that it would be.met with the same 
answer Hungary had bee given in 1973. Hungary, like 
the Soviet Union had been engaged in radical reforms,and the 
membership had been an undisputed boost to morale. Some 
crucial differeneces between the two should not be overlooked.
6.3. The Hungarian GATT Membership and the Soviet Union
Similar to the motives of the Soviet Union, the 
Hungarian application had been made in order to achieve a 
reduction of the tariffs levied on Hungarian exports, 
especially by the Common Market countries. Hungary had 
abstained from becoming involved in bilateral negotiations with
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Western countries, as this was politically undesirable for a 
Soviet ally in the wake of the political unrest in Eastern 
Europe in the late sixties. GATT would be a neutral forum 
were the same targets could be pursued.
In contrast to the other East European members, 
Poland and Romania, Hungary insisted that the country was to 
be accepted as a member whose economic mechanisms were 
compatible with the tenets of the Treaty. The Hungarian 
negotiators asserted that the introduction of the New 
Economic Mechanisms in 1968, had increased the scope of 
market forces significantly, with a corresponding decrease in 
the directive role of the plan. It would therefore be 
meaningless to demand import guarantees from the Hungarian 
government similar to the requirements Poland had to accept 
in order to gain membership.
The Soviet reforms at the time of applying had not 
expanded the scope of market forces to any significant 
degree. The fact that a select group of the country's most 
technologically advanced enterprises had been granted the 
right to trade freely on the Western market did not suffice 
in the eyes of the Western GATT members. An article in 
Pravda at the time of the application, stated that these 
measuers had been initiated in order to create "additional 
possibilities for businesslike co-operation with foreign 
countries...both in its new forms and in the framework of 
GATT."**’ The refusal must have been a severe disappointment
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to the Soviet leadership.
Although the internal price mechanisms in Hungary 
still do not react to the development in the West with the 
same flexibility as Western countries, the material balancing 
system characteristic of Soviet type economies has been 
discarded. The central plan in Hungary at the time of the 
membership entry was more indicative than directive, only 
stressing the desired path of development. This target has 
so far not been achieved in the Soviet Union, however, it has 
been suggested during the debate as a task to be implemented 
in the future.
The existence of foreign firms, either in the way 
of joint ventures or as branch companies, is an important 
indicator of a country's participation in international 
trade. The amount of foreign involvement in the Hungarian 
economy was relatively limited in 1973. In the Soviet Union, 
the Law on Joint Ventures was not passed until 1987, after the 
application had been made to enter GATT.
Finally, another difference between the two 
countries which is of relevance from our point of view, 
concerns the time spent on the preparataory stage. Whereas 
the Soviet Union apparently believed that large scale debates 
on economic reforms and the fact that radical changes in the 
foreign trade sector and the economic mechanisms were 
promised, would be sufficient to constitute an image of 
readiness, the Hungarian entry was made possible after a
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prolonged negotiation period of four years. During this 
period, the Hungarian policy-makers were eager to comply with., 
the principles of GATT, heeding the advice given and 
implementing the required changes.3
6.4-. The Soviet Union Post-GATT
As has been shown above, the Soviet application had 
been made prematurely. Not unexpectedly, Soviet commentators 
quickly blamed this on US trade imperialism, GATT was 
described as an instrument in the American strategy to regain 
world economic dominance.6 -
Considering the Soviet application from an 
ideological viewpoint, it is relevant to recall Marx' theory 
of non-equivalent exchange. Here Marx maintained that only 
areas of equal development stand to gain from economic 
intercourse.*7 This viewpoint has later been reflected by 
the functionalists, most notably Johan Galtung who claims 
that the lesser developed partner must initiate protective
measures against the influence from the superior trading
|
parrtner. Trade between the USSR and Western Europe is far
^ r\ K
from equivalent, as has been amply illustrated.
What is important from our point of view, is that 
the application to become a part of GATT signifies an 
importantiturning point in Soviet foreign economic thinking,
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signalling a will to break permanently with the autarky in 
international economic relations pursued in the past.
If the USSR had been accepted, a possible future 
pattern might have included membership in the International 
Monetary Fund (like Romania, Poland and Hungary), and in the 
Worldbank (like Romania and Hungary), both entailing 
internationa1 prestige and the Soviet Union's status as an 
important foreign trade country. The future prospects for 
increased Soviet participation in international fora, voices 
have been raised in the West supporting Soviet aspirations. 
Mr. Willy de Clercq, the EEC Foreign Trade Comissioner said 
that Soviet membership in GATT might be realised in the 
future, the time was not right for an acceptance from GATT's 
point of view.
“I am concerned that GATT should function as 
well. That means that it has to be as universal as 
possible. But it also has to be coherent and based on the 
principles of the free trade system.,,c5>
For GATT, the problem was that a Soviet membership 
might not lead to a Soviet adaption to the principles and 
practices of GATT, but the direct opposite, GATT adapting to 
Soviet practices.
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6.5. The Soviet Union and The Common Market
The Common Market poses a considerable problem for 
the Soviet leadership. Western observers have commented on 
the lack of a comprehensive policy towards the EEC, and at 
the same time forgetting that the Common Market is not a 
political unit in every sense of the Word.1<£> The Common 
Market members are highly diversified in their attitudes 
towards the Soviet Union. This diversity, often bordering on 
open disagreement has been amply illustrated in the past 
whenever the possibility of signing a co-operation agreement 
with the -CMEA has been discussed. Without going into too 
many details, may it suffice to state that the Federal - -
Republic of Germany has gone to considerable efforts to 
create a formal framework regulating some of the aspects of 
the country's eastern trade. The Soviet leadership issued 
several proposals during the seventies. Yet, this was 
received without much enthusiasm by the Common Market 
members, and little else than Soviet humiliation was 
achieved.1"7 The Soviet Union is therefore faced with the 
somewhat paradoxical situation that whereas Western Europe
would be more than happy to create a framework for mutual
1,
security and disarmament, little interest is pa^ed to Soviet 
proposals to engage in closer economic co-operation. As trade 
relations with the Soviet Union played a minor role for most of 
the member countries, there was no need to go above the
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bilateral regulation of the economic relations t.o an EEC- 
Soviet, or EEC-CMEA agreement.
The implementation of a completely free inner 
market in 1992 will lead to a muche^closer integration of 
the members. As it then will be much more of a political and 
economic unit, it will prove to be a less complicated 
negotiating partner. Equally important, the EEC might find 
it imperative to regulate the commercial regulations with the 
USSR and the other CMEA countries, and therefore be far more 
forthcoming than in the past.
For many years, the Soviet media and political 
statements alike emphatically pointed out the social 
problems of the Common Market countries. Although these 
aspects still play an important role in Soviet political 
thinking, there is now an increased interest in the areas 
economic developments. Due to the poor results of the 
modernisation efforts of the~"past, there are benefits to be 
had from watching the developments in other countries. The 
present state of the EEC's economy, with an increasing 
emphasis on high technology and a lessened reliance on the 
heavy industries, is exactly what the economists in the USSR 
hope to see realised in their country.1®
Not long after Gorbachev had been elected, an 
official letter was sent from the Soviet leader to EEC
Commission, containing a draft proposal of a general
fagreement. Previous proposals had been rejecjbted by the EEC
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because the CMEA was not entitled to enter into agreements on 
behalf of its members. From the EEC's point of view, only- - - 
bilateral agreements between the Common Market and the 
individual East European countries was possible. The Soviet 
proposal had taken this into account in order to avoid any 
further rejections. The deadlock of the Brezhnev years, when 
the Soviet Union insisted on a treaty between "equals", had 
been broken. The Soviet draft acknowledged the significant 
difference in the jurisdiction of the two organisations, and 
aimed specifically towards a facilitation of the bilateral 
relations between individual CMEA members and the EEC. 
Negotiations have been going on ever since the proposal was 
issued in 1985. At the time of writing, most obstacles, to a 
mutual recognition have been overcome and a formal document 
drawing up fields of co-operation between the CMEA and the 
Common Market can be awaited in_.the near future.
There is an important compensation for this 
concession. An agreement will probably establish mutual 
representations in the two organisations. Today, the United 
States and the Peoples Republic of China have been g r a n t e d  
this right. Undoubtedly, the Soviet leadership is eager to 
be given equal rank.
Politically, there has been increased contact 
between the Soviet Union and the Common Market on the 
parliamentary level. Simultaneous with the sending of the 
Soviet proposal in 1985, representatives from the socialist
186
faction in the European Parliament were invited by 
the Supreme Soviet. Two years later, a delegation from the 
conservative Christian-Democrats went to Moscow on a formal 
visit.
large extent on a Soviet comprehension of the potentials of 
this area, as well as a consideration for the EEC members' 
need for security against external threats. The developments 
so far have been quite promising. The former attitude has 
been discarded, as well as the previous demands. The volte- 
face of '' - / , n£ jeadership is an important example of
A successful relationship with the EEC depends to a
the new Soviet policy towards Western Europe.
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7. Joint Ventures
7.1. Background and Introduction
As a result of the increasing integration of 
international trade and economic intercourse, new forms of 
co-operation between business partners have emerged. 
Industrial cooperation between enterprises domiciled in 
different countries is one of these. The degree of 
coordination and the frequency of contacts may vary. A joint 
venture on the other hand, is a much more intimate form 
of cooperation. There is a considerable divergence between 
the various definitions of what the concept joint venture 
covers. Most authors however, understand it to mean a 
contractual agreement between partners of different national 
background, resulting in the creation of a single economic
  unit usually, in the form of an enterprise or industrial
plant. Both partners contribute towards the ventures 
investment funds, and the profits, or losses are divided 
according to the proportions of the initial investments. 
Whereas activities like supplies of raw materials, marketing 
and sales may be the responsibilities of one of the partners, 
they are usually both involved in the daily tasks and 
routines of running the venture. This degree of intimacy 
makes a joint venture into the most sophisticated form of 
industrial co-operation, and needless to say, a joint venture
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can only be succesful if both partners show considerable 
flexibility and co-operative skills. A joint venture is by no 
means anovelty in the world economy, and in fact not in the 
history of Soviet economy either. During the NEP period from 
1921 to 1928, considerable amounts of Western capital were 
invested, and enterprises staffed with both Western and 
Soviet labour emerged. The autarkic line of economic 
development chosen by Stalin after the end of NEP, 
effectively excluded any kind of Western involvement.
After the end of the Second World War, Soviet 
experts gained much experience in the field of industrial 
co-operation under the auspices of the newly established 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Soviet economic 
requirements as well as political desires resulted in close 
involvement in the economies of the Eastern European countries. 
Although the term joint venture was not applied by Soviet 
economists to the various projects and integrative attempts 
during this period, the closeness and structure made them 
indistinguishable from the present joint ventures. It 
should be noted that the first time a formal joint venture 
agreement was signed between the Soviet Union and an. East 
European country was in 1984 when the Hungarian MEDICOR 
company and the Soviet Institute for Medical Instruments 
(VNIIMP) agreed to set up a jointly owned enterprise. 1
The possibility of entering into a joint venture 
agreement with a capitalist country had not been on the
191
agenda for economic reform in the seventies. Various 
explanations have been given by Western observers, many have 
underlined the the barrier based on ideology. I do not believe 
this has been the weightiest factor, even Lenin underlined 
the importance of trade with the West for the Soviet economy.
In my view, purely practical reasons are more valid, the
inferiority of Soviet industry has been the most effective 
prevention. Still, the legacy of an autharkic past when 
Western ideas were received with suspicion, has made any kind 
of co-operation with capitalist countries difficult, let 
alone joint ventures. The Deputy Chairman of the State
Foreig! Commission of the Council of Ministers, Ivan D.n _ 7
Ivanov, stated that people frequently asked "why we should 
invite foreign capitalists, when we have managed for 70 years
without them."2 To answer this, we must look at the
potential beneficial effects of joint ventures for the 
Soviet economy.
Direct Western involvement would entail an influx 
of new skills, methods, techniques and processes. Ivan D. 
Ivanov claims that these were the motives behind the Law on 
Joint Ventures of December 1987;
“l)To attract new technology and managerial expertise,
2)to stimulate 'jftlptf.rfc substitution, and 3 ) to expand our 
own export sector-"3 
As we shall see later, there is a potential clash of interests 
between points two and three, or rather between Western
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business interests opting for a foothold in the Soviet market, 
and Soviet officials hoping to generate as much hard currency 
as possible. If the joint venture is allowed to sell some 
of its produce on the domestic market, it would mean a 
break with the monopoly of the state. Although this 
was unthinkable only a few years ago, articles have recently 
underlined the advantageous effects of such a policy:
"It is known that monopoly of production, whatever form it 
takes, furthers the growth of production costs and prices, 
hindering the overcoming of deficits and increase in 
quality.
A joint venture will probab-ly be much more 
economical with labour, raw materials and energy, and produce 
more high quality goods than Soviet enterprises. To 
the degree that these assumptions are fulfilled, the joint 
ventures will serve as models of Gorbachev's industrial 
policies. He has repeatedly stated that a closer 
relationship between external and domestic economy is 
desirable. A joint venture based on long term co-operation 
is one of the means. Past short term Western involvement 
resulting in complete production plants have been used 
to boost export and to satisfy consumer demands.
But this strategy has proved costly, as Soviet 
innovation procedes at a much slower rate, the output 
rapidly loses competitiveness on the world market. After a 
while, spare parts and engineers are required to maintain
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the productive capacity. Frequently, they have to be 
imported from the West at considerable costs. In a joint 
venture, continuous supervision by the Western partner will 
be an efficient means against stagnation, and the subsequent 
loss of market shares abroad. Unless a joint venture is 
able to innovate and develop along the lines of enterprises 
producing similar goods elsewhere, Western business 
interests will not emerge. The crucial question is 
therefore how prepared is the Soviet side to accomodate 
Western demands?
7.2. The Structure of a Soviet Joint Venture
Very little is known about the preparatory stages 
of the first Soviet law on joint ventures. It was therefore 
a great surprise to many when the Politbureau voted in favour 
of the issue in December 1986, later followed by a draft 
proposal by the Council of Ministers in January 1987. The
/first law which covered the conditions that are to be met as
well as some regulations concerning the internal structure, 
were passed by the Supreme Soviet on January 13, 1987.s
Other regulations have followed since. However, as there is 
still a number of questions that have not been clarified by 
the law, more legislation is expected to be passed.
On the issue of ownership, the Soviet share must in
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no case be less than 51 per cent. This is not unusual in 
joint venture legislation, and did not influence Western . -
response as much as the regulations on the managerial 
structure. A Soviet-Western joint venture will internally be 
divided into three levels, the top positions being divided 
between a president and an executive director, an executive 
board comprising the managers present at the enterprise, and 
finally a supervisory board consisting of the investors. 
Whereas the executive board will be meeting almost at a 
daily basis, the supervisory board will not be convened more 
than once or twice a year. At every level, the upper hand 
will be held by the Soviet partner. Both the posts of 
president and -executive director are exclusively reserved 
for Soviet citizens, and as the majority of investments are 
Soviet, it seems logicjthat the chairmen of the executive 
and supervisory boards will be Soviet citizens. Herman 
Koebe, the head of a West German timber firm with long 
experience in trade with the Soviet Union, summed up the 
general impression in the West saying: "forty—nine
percent is a lot of influence, but no power."6
According to Soviet statements, the decision to 
exclude Western citizens from the top managerial positions, 
was made because one cannot expect them to be able to cope 
with the Soviet economic setting. Not only does this 
decision disregard the considerable expertise many Western 
firms have in Soviet trade, but it seems contradictory to the
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basic intentions behind allowing joint ventures to be set up. 
One of the main pull-factors was, as previously stated, to 
import Western management techniques. This may easily become 
impossible to implement if the top echelons are closed to 
anyone who does not hold a Soviet citizenship. An article 
in Vneshnyaya torqov1ya openly states that the Western 
partner's powers over the work force are virtually 
non-existent.-7 The level of wages, together with the 
firing and hiring of employees are the responsibility of the 
Soviet managerial members alone. The picture one gets then, 
is that the role of the Western partner is limited to 
importing the equipment required for the production, 
technological development and export strategy. But quality 
control, another task alotted to him, may be virtually 
impossible without any control of the work-force. One may 
therefore expect a number of problems to emerge internally 
in the joint venture, unless this sharp division between the 
managerial and productive levels is softened.
The official reason behind the ownership 
regulations deserves some more attention. However, as very few 
joint venture agreements have been signed, and even fewer 
joint ventures have been operating for any length of time, 
what follows is an attempt to explain the Soviet policy 
without much data to validate it. If the Soviet experts plan 
to let the joint ventures produce for the domestic market and 
thereby providing a substitute for hard currency imports,
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the decision to reserve top positions to themselves may not 
be illogical. Few Western businessmen are sufficiently 
aware of the bottlenecks in the internal economy to 
know which strings to pull in order to overcome them. On 
the other hand, because the joint venture is to be entirely 
independent, beyond the scope of the state planning organs, 
it may find a large scale involvement in the domestic market 
close to impossible. No plans will include the input 
requirements, neither will the planning authorities have 
made provisions for the transport, storage or selling of the 
output in the Soviet market. It is not difficult to foresee 
the problems resulting from this "exclusive position". . 11 
has been stated repeatedly, that a joint venture's viability 
will be decided by its performance on the market, eg. 
profits or losses. This policy is in line with Western 
management techniques, but quite a novelty for the Soviet
side. ...
The degree of autonomy given to a joint venture may 
at first seem unlimited. However, there are some 
restrictions that may turn out to be decisive for Western 
response. A joint venture producing for export will be given 
a general export and import licence from the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade. If the situation emerges where a joint venture 
is competing with a Soviet enterprise on the foreign market, 
the Ministry may impose obstacles. So far this kind of 
conflict has been avoided, and there may not be a great
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likelihood that it will occur as it seems that the Soviet 
authorities are mostly interested in joint ventures that may 
cover gaps in their own export. The possibility of 
conflicting interests is greater in the case when a joint 
venture is producing for the Soviet market. How the output 
will be classified has not been stated explicitly, but as 
joint ventures producing for the Soviet market will be 
operating through the Foreign Trade Organisation network, 
it seems most likely that the output will be treated as 
imports.The Foreign Trade Organisation will be responsible 
for the prices. Ivan D. Ivanov explains it thus:
"...the contractual prices used for operation 
within the Soviet Union might be different from the 
wholesale and retail prices within the country. This is a 
way for the joint venture to compete in the Soviet market 
with our domestic industries."3 
What he does not say, is that a bureaucratic price—setting 
may make it unprofitable for a joint venture to compete, on 
the other hand, this protective measure for Soviet industry 
may be required to avoid dumping of Western goods.
7.3. Taxation and Financial Questions
After the initial phase with its hopes and 
perspectives had calmed down, Western attention soon focused
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on the lack of regulations on the financial aspects. After a 
while the Soviet side admitted that the present state of 
legislation was inadequate. Aleksander Maslov, Deputy
Chairman of the Board of the Bank for Foreign Trade of the
USSR, tried to mitigate the problems by stating that "many 
provisions that will govern the procedures of joint ventures 
have not yet been f inal ised.,,t? At the time of writing, I 
cannot see that the promised legislation has been passed.
The raw materials and the energy required for the 
production will be bought in the Soviet Union. In this way,
one has avoided the creation of "Trojan horses" where the
joint venture is made dependent.on deliveries from the 
domestic company of the Western partner. Purchases of any 
kind in the Soviet Union must be made through the Foreign 
Trade Organisation in rubles. Hard currency will be exchanged 
according to the official exchange rate. As mentioned above, 
the security of supplies can be questionable. If the joint 
venture could have payed in hard currency for commodities 
purchased in the Soviet Union, delays or low quality would 
probably not occur. However, if this was permitted, the 
situation of the domestic economy would deteriorate because 
the shortages would increase. Let me add that using the old 
foreign trade bureaucracy as a gate-keeper between the joint 
venture and the rest of the domestic economy, is another 
example of how the bureaucracy distorts the intentions of the 
joint venture policy. Trading through the Foreign Trade
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Organisation means that the diffusion of new techniques and 
ideas is at best seriously delayed, and at worst effectively 
blocked. A joint venture would consequently be little more 
than an island.
According to Soviet statements, a joint venture 
will pay for the use of facilities in accordance with the 
current rates levied on domestic enterprises. One 
interesting problem related to taxation concerns the 
question of land. According to Marxist principles, nobody 
but the user owns the land, and it can therefore not be made 
subject to taxation. The evaluation of land, or rather the 
absence of. it, has long been recognised as a problem by 
Soviet economists. So far it has not been solved.
Taxation of the use of Soviet buildings, equipment 
and wages caused much debate within the Soviet political 
elite. The Ministry of Finace demanded that the joint 
venture should contribute to the state income to the greatest 
extent possible levying maximum tax wherever possible. The 
opponent to this line was the newly created Foreign Economic 
Commission, a body created to oversee the implementation of 
Gorbachev1s reforms in foreign trade. A compromise was 
reached, only profits that were put back into trade are to be 
taxed. The alternative option is to put the profits into a 
taxfree reserve fund. The intentions are that this fund will 
reach 25 per cent of the initial investments after a certain 
period giving the venture a financial basis for expansion.
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honey put into modernization and marketing will not be taxed. 
The remaining profits will be subject to 30 per cent tax.
Tax will also be levied on the wages paJed to the employees,
K
irrespective of nationality, at a flat rate of 15 per cent, 
f/Wages payed in hard currency will not be exempt. The Soviet
K
Union has taxation agreements with most Western countries so 
that double taxation is avoided, another option that might 
tempt some is to have the wages pa^ed into a bank account in 
a third country. However, these problems belong to the 
future, every joint venture is given a two year grace period, 
and this period is not finished yet.
The severest disincentive from the point of view of 
the Western partner, are the regulations concerning the 
repatriation of profits. Only the surplus remaining after 
the costs of imports (equipment, machinery, etc.) have been 
deducted from the export earnings can be taken out of the 
Soviet Union. Still, the size of the surplus is likely to 
dimimiish after payments have been made to the reserve fund, 
the welfare fund for the work force, and research funds. The 
money left after these items have been covered, will in 
the case of rubles be exchanged at the official exchange 
rate. Two of the joint venture agreements concluded so far 
have cleverly avoided the entanglements of the exchange rate. 
The West German fashion magazine "Burda" will be finaced by 
advertisements for Western commodities, p a ^ d  in hard 
currencies. Hotel Berlin in Moscow which will be run jointly
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by Intourist and Finnair, will charge its guests in Western 
currenc i e s .
Obviously very few joint ventures can avoid the 
problem in a similar way as "Burda" and "Hotel Berlin". One 
attempt to overcome the confusion surrounding the 
repatriation of profits was made by Vladimir Kamentsev, head 
of the State Committee for Foreign Trade.10 He claimed 
it was a wrong to believe it will be impossible
to repatriate any surplus in rubles gained by selling in the
Soviet market. According to Mr. Kamentsev, the permission to 
repatriate profits will be taken on the basis of net profits
within the limits set by the joint venture's holdings in hard
currency. The ruble holdings pose- a major problem, according 
to the statements the! must be exchanged according to the
I
official exchange rate before transfer abroad, as Gosbank's 
_ rates are heavily inflated, joint ventures are likely to
opt for payments in hard currency. In cases where the joint 
venture's production for the Soviet market is a substitute 
for hard currency imports, it would seem r^sonable that the 
Foreign Trade Organisation would pay a certain amount in hard 
currency. Paying in hard currency will create difficulties 
for the Soviet partner insofar as the policy of over­
valuing the ruble is continued. Although, various moves 
to create a "convertible ruble" have been discussed, this 
problem remains unsolved.
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7.A. Termination and Dissolution of a Joint Venture
A joint venture will be terminated at the end of 
the period agreed in the contract between the partners. This 
is common practice in most joint venture agreements, although 
the length of duration may vary considerab1y . The partners 
may agree to dissolve the joint venture before the period 
ends if there has been a deficit during several years and 
the prospects of improving the ventures's performance look 
meagre. Another reason for dissolution may emerge if one of 
the partners is unable to fulfil his obiigations, for 
instance if the Western partner is bankrupt or on the verge 
of financial collapse it may wish to withdraw its foreign 
investments. However, this paragraph may easily be used as a 
threat by the Western investor if the Soviet partner does not 
comply with the agreement. Delays, bad quality or” lacking 
supplies may make it impossible for the Western partner to 
fulfil the initial intentions.
In the case of serious disagreements between the 
partners, three options exist for the settling of grievances. 
The most common is probably to opt for a settlement without 
the involvement of any legal procedure, most contracts 
include a description of how this can be done. A second 
option is to involve the Soviet Foreign Trade Arbitration 
Commission set up by the USSR Chamber of Commerce and
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Industry. This option has been used in the past when 
settlements have not been achieved otherwise. According to - - 
the former Professor of Law at Moscow State University, 
Olympiad S. Ioffe, the procedures have been just and fair.
The only cases of preferential treatment have been to the 
advantage of the Western interest, even in cases where Soviet 
regulations could have led to the opposite result. This has 
been done deliberately in order to strengthen Soviet prestige 
among foreign businessmen.11 The third option, which has 
been frequently used in the past, has been to settle disputes 
in the Swedish Court of Arbitration. Swedish neutrality, in 
addition to the country's long experience in Soviet trade 
have been taken as guarantees of fair treatment.12 But 
this option is only possible if it is explicitly stated in 
the contract that the principle of "locus regit actum" does 
not apply. Whether this option will be influenced by the 
many joint venture agreements concluded between Soviet and 
Swedish enterprises, is not possible to say yet.
It is common practice that joint venture agreements 
have a "rebus sic stantibus" clause, meaning that the 
relationship is dissolved in the case of events outside the 
scope of control of the partners. This clause has been invoked 
if changes in taxation or customs rates have influenced the 
competitiveness of a joint venture. To calm the fears of this 
happening, Soviet officials have stated that no joint venture 
will be "administratively liquidated". But because the
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meaning of this concept is not quite clear, the pledge from 
the Soviet side has not been given much attention in the .. , 
West. Two interpretations are possible, "administrative 
liquidation" can either mean nationalisation over nij^th^ an 
unlikely option with the present Soviet leadership, or that 
administrative bottlenecks will influence the performance 
of a joint venture negatively. This is the real danger, and 
Western response to the Soviet invitation would have been 
greater if Soviet bureaucracy was more efficient. The 
Foreign Economic Commission has been set up to guide 
potential partners through the bureaucratic procedures. As 
we shall later see, setting up a new administrative body to 
solve old problems is not a novelty in the Soviet Union, but 
for Western business men, this may easily add to the present 
confus ion.
When a joint venture is dissolved, the Western 
partner may repatriate his share of the venture's capital.
In some East European countries, this right is limited to the 
hard currency gained by the joint venture through export. 
Thus, the machinery and equipment will not be returned to the 
West. In this way, the domestic partner is able to continue 
the production on his own. If the commodity produced is 
covered by a registered international trademark, the 
possibility to export will be closed. The Western partner 
will receive compensation for the loss.
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7.5. Western Response to the Soviet Joint Venture Proposal
Various factors have been decisive for the Western 
response. The general deficiencies inherent in the 
present legislation which have already been discussed, 
make up a main disincentive. The Soviet trade officials 
seem to be aware of that, and as this will be a process of 
learning, much may still be rectified. The degree of 
influence offered to the Western partner is one important 
factor. Other CMEA countries like Hungary, Bulgaria, and 
Poland, although initially introducing a strict policy 
similar to the Soviet, soon discovered that this was a serious 
impediment. Today, the legislation in these three countries 
has given the partners free hands to decide the composition 
of management. In fact, few countries insist on having their
own citizens in top positions. Therefore, it is not quite -----
true when Soviet trade representatives claim that their laws 
are "a replica of international legislation".1S
Quite another argument which has been mentioned by 
Western observers concerns the Soviet economic
infrestructure. It is not sufficiently sophisticated to meet 
the demands of international business. Although the joint 
ventures will be left to decide upon their internal 
accountancy practices themselves, their economic relations with 
the outside world will go through Gosbank or Vneshtorgbank.
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It is remarkable how little attention has been given to 
financial matters in the Soviet debate on joint ventures, 
attention has been focused upon management questions, 
relationship with Soviet economy etc. The ability to grasp 
the problems that are likely to emerge when the initial phase 
of a joint venture is ended seems to be absent.
It is beyond doubt that a joint venture with the 
Soviet Union requires more from the outside partner than 
joint ventures with other countries. This may well be the 
reason behind the dominance of West German, Finnish, Swedish, 
Japanese and Austrian firms in the agreements concluded so 
far. knowledge of the bottlenecks and procedures in 
East-West trade is essential for a profitable outcome, and 
enterprises in these countries have long traditions in 
communicating and negotiating with the Soviet officials. The 
importance of understanding the opposites behaviour should 
not be discarded.. A Norwegian trade official once put 
the problem to me like this: "We know by now that the Russians
think differently from us, the problem is just to know how 
they think I"
The Co-Ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export 
Control, COCOM, will play an important role in the development 
of joint venture agreements with the Soviet Union. From its 
headquarters in Paris, its responsibility is to supervise 
and check exports to the CMEA countries preventing any 
techno logy_or know-how with potential strategic importance
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from being exported. The efficiency of this embargo is not a 
matter for discussion here, what is important from our point 
of view is the possible implications of COCOM sanctions 
against an enterprise. Because the COCOM rules are not 
sufficiently explicit, there will always be border-line cases 
of what may be exported and which commodities that are 
banned. This insecurity may discourage a Western enterprise 
from entering into direct co-operation with a Soviet 
counterpart by means of a joint venture as well as having 
repercussions on other enterprises trading with the Soviet 
Union. COCOM's accusations against the Norwegian state-owned 
company Kongsberg Vaapenfabrikk in 1986, and the ensuing 
trial, had a negative influence upon other Norwegian firms' 
aspirations of trading with the Soviet Union.
What kind of joint ventures are to be accepted 
by the Soviet side is not clear. To my knowledge, no joint 
venture proposals put forward from a Western enterprise have 
been refused by the Soviet side, it is therefore difficult to 
establish the limitations of the Soviet "open arms" policy. 
However, there is nothing to suggest that everything will be 
accepted uncritical1y . This can be illustrated by the 
negotiations between Rank Xerox and Soviet foreign trade 
officials. The British company wanted to set up a joint 
venture in the Soviet Union assembling components produced in 
Britain in order to sell the finished products on the Soviet 
market. Rank Xerox refused to give the venture access to the
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world market. Knowing that this would not be well received 
in Moscow, they offered to sell the know-how required to make 
a special kind of copy paper which the Soviet Union could 
sell on the world market. Mr. Yu. Dragonov, head of the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade's Department for Joint Ventures, 
objected to the offer for two reasons. First of all, the 
ivestments needed to produce the copy paper were estimated to 
be around 500 million rubles, secondly, because the technique 
and equipment were judged by Soviet experts to be 
outdated.1<f At the time of writing, no contract has been 
signed.
In June 1987, two joint venture contracts were 
signed between Finnish and Estonian partners. The Finnish 
enterprise Sadolin Holmblad will set up an enterprise 
producing wood preservatives and paint, the Estonian partner 
will provide the chemicals required. This was not 
unexpected, the chemical sector has been pointed out by 
Western observers as an area where the Soviet Union can 
attract Western interests easily. The other joint venture 
agreement is interesting because of the size of the estimated 
output, the Finnish Kati Myuyunti will set up an automated 
production line for the manufacture of women's clothes. 
According to the contract, around 600 000 articles will 
be sent out to Soviet shops yearly. According to the Tass 
statement, consumer demands will provide the joint venture 
with its main guidelines.155
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The most glossy result of the joint venture 
legislation is the translation and distribution of the 
magazine "Burda". Yet, it is not quite as illustrious in 
terms of a model joint venture. The amount of capital 
invested is relatively small, around $16,5 million, and the 
degree of direct cooperation between the partners is very 
1 i m i ted .1<£>
7.6. Future Prospects for Joint Ventures
Joint venture legislations in the centrally planned 
economies show great variety in terms of what obligations 
must be fulfilled by the Western partner. Common to all 
of them seem to be a general lack of detailed specifications. 
Instead of providing a potential investor with clear guide­
lines, there is ample scope for doubts and confusion.
A similar conclusion must be drawn when looking at the Soviet 
legislation and official statements. This should not be a 
deterrent per se. The decision to allow joint ventures with 
the West, the USSR was the last European CMEA member to do 
so, was taken at considerable political costs. Much prestige 
is vested in the policy, and one may expect that joint 
ventures, once they are concluded, may be given a preferential, 
treatment from the Soviet trade establishment.
If the joint ventures entail sizeable hard currency
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profits as a result of export, or supply the domest ic market 
with previously imported goods, the Soviet line may become 
increasingly pragmatic. The restrictions on Western 
participation in management and on the repatriation of 
profits may be eased, or completely lifted. If that 
happened, what appears today to be the major disincentive 
from a Western point of view, would be removed.
It is to early today to estimate the economic 
significance of joint ventures for the Soviet economy. It 
will take years before all the wheels are running and the 
production has achieved an optimal level. Much depends on 
the degree of penetration into the domestic economy that will 
be allowed. Judging from material available from Hungary 
and Jugoslavia, countries with a very liberal joint venture 
legislation and longer experience than other CMEA-countries, 
joint venture's contribution to the economy measured in the 
percentage of national income is negligeable.17 At the 
micro-economic level, from the point of view of the 
enterprise manager, much the same evaluation has been 
expressed. Mr. Henning Aretz of the West German East Trade 
Committee, put it quite negatively: "We welcome Soviet
readiness to establish joint ventures, but can foresee no 
great future for them".1S
Some Western experts have asked whether joint 
venture legislation means anything new at all? Could not 
much the same agreement have been concluded under the label
El 1
'industrial co-operation'? Intensive industrial co-operation 
in the past took on a form hardly distinguishable from the . 
present joint venture agreements, the most prominent example 
being Soviet-Finnish co-operation in paper and pulp 
production and in atomic energy. Even though there may be 
reasons to claim that the present legislation merely 
legalises practices already featuring in Soviet-West 
economic relations, it would not be sufficient to explain 
the enthusiasm and debate displayed around the topic.
It is more logical to regarcd it as a natural result of recent
modernisation drive. Therefore, the joint venture proposal 
should not be judged isolated from the rest of the economic 
reforms. Joint ventures between Soviet and Western partners 
on Soviet soil, is the consequence of Soviet integration in the 
world economy, rather than an infringement upon communist 
principles.
development, as an part of the General Secretary's
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8. Restructuring the Foreign Trade Bureaucracy
8.1. Introduction
The influence of the state bureaucracy on the
policy-making process in the Soviet Union is considerable. 
The implementation of a political decision will be 
decisively influenced by the attitude of the bureaucrats. 
When Western scholars and observers pose the question "can 
the Soviet system be reformed", the issue narrows down to 
whether the state bureaucracy can be made more efficient 
and responsive.
debate has focused on the state administration. According 
to the leading spokeswoman on the socio-economic aspects 
of the reforms, Dr. T. Zaslavskaya, the fate of 
Gorbachev's programme does not so much depend on objective 
factors like skills, and availability of resources to carry 
out the reforms. The main obstacle consists of all the 
middle-ranking bureaucrats who are all too satisfied with the
"The reorganization of production relations promises a 
substantial narrowing and simplification in 
responsibilities for workers in departmental ministries 
and their organs. However, it is pregnant with just as 
significant reduction in their rights, in their economic
Not unexpectedly much of the Soviet reform
desire any changes.
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influence and also in the number of their apparatuses: the 
liquidation of many departments, administrations, trusts, 
branches etc. that have grown like mushrooms in recent 
decades. Naturally, such a prospect does not suit the 
workers, who at present occupy numerous "cosy niches" with 
ill-defined responsibilities, but thoroughly agreeable 
salaries."1 •j
Although written as early as fn 1983, Dr. Zaslavskaya's
V '
diagnosis of the problem was repeated by Gorbachev in his 
formal report to the 27th Congress of the Communist Party in 
1986:
"Every re-adjustment of the economic mechanisms begins 
with a re-adjustment of old stereo-types of thought and 
actions with a clear understanding of new tasks. This 
refers primarily to the activity of our economic 
personnel, to the functionaries of the central links of 
administration. Most of them have a clear idea of the 
party's initiative and seek and find a way of carrying 
them out... All the more so do we have to part way with 
those who hope that everything will settle down and return 
to old lines. That will not happend, comradesl"e 
As Gorbachev’s accession is not the result of institutional 
collapse or complete political anomaly, he has taken over a 
bureaucratic fran^ork that has not only survived the 
economic crisis of the seventies, but even been strengthened 
as a result of lacking restructuring. The political inertia
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of the Brezhnev leadership created a vacuum that was rapidly 
filled by an already strong bureaucracy. Gorbachev is 
therefore forced to use the bureaucracy for the 
implementation of his reforms, even in the cases where they 
are directly opposed to the interests of the bureaucrats.
His calls for a greater degree of autonomy at 
enterprise level is a direct attack on the power of the 
planning bureaucracies. Over the years, the five year plans 
and the central control of the economic development of the 
country has been taken by many as the very raison d'etre of 
the Soviet system.
A strategy applied by'the new leadership to combat 
bureaucratic reluctance to the changes, has been to appeal 
directly to the population for support. The idea behind this 
move has been to evoke the nascent public opinion to 
criticise the bureaucracy, and force it to adapt a more 
responsive approach to the requirements of the people at large. 
The success of this policy is dubious. There are few mechanisms 
available for the population to launch their complaints. As 
before, there is every possibility to complain against the 
treatment received by a certain member of the state 
administration. Although the muckraking and campaign against 
corruption and negligence is more extensive today than 
previously, there are few efficient measures that can be used 
by a citizen to force a reluctant bureaucrat to change. Voices 
have been raised with demands to change the legal basis for
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the decision-making process.3 According to present Soviet 
legislation, a bureaucrat can only be sued on the basis 
of decisions he has taken. It is close to impossible to sue 
someone for professional negligence. Another problem 
that must be taken into account, concerns the effects of this 
campaign on the members of the bureaucracy. It is highly 
likely that they feel ostracised and consequentially show no 
desire to display the eagerness required to change the 
system.
In the case of the foreign trade bureaucracy, the 
task is even more difficult. As a result of the long-term 
policy of insulating the domestic economy against the 
vagaries of the world markets, the foreign trade bureaucracy 
has been isolated from the end-users: the enterprise or the 
individual consumers. Most of the links with the domestic 
economy go through the planning organs or state committees 
and ministries. Whereas the role of the public may be 
influential in other sectors of the economy, there is hardly 
any public to appeal to in the case of foreign trade. On 
the one hand the Western customers simply decline to engage in 
any commercial relations if they are dissatisfied, on the 
other the Soviet customer has no incentive either to import 
high technology equipment which will result in higher plan 
targets, or to supply commodities that have to meet higher 
requirements when targeted for the foreign markets. The 
strenghthening of the State Quality Control (GOSPRIEMKA) is
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one of the tools applied to increase the level of 
Soviet industrial output to Western standards. Some have 
argued that even this, fairly traditional attempt of 
rectifying errors is unsuccessful as the control itself is 
only carried out on the final stage, when the product is 
ready for packing and transport. If GOSPRIEMKA was to be 
successful, it should be a continuous process, involved at 
every stage of the manufacturing.^
Restructuring, or reforming the foreign trade 
sector will therefore largely be a revolution from above. 
This strategy poses certain problems which should be 
discussed'in detail.
8.5. The Basis, Targets and Limitations of the Reforms in 
the Foreign Trade Bureaucracy
In the chapter on the bureaucracy and the 
decision-making process, the problems of co-ordination of the 
various sectors and the integration of the different aspects 
of the country's foreign economic activity were analysed.
The inevitable conclusion was that the foreign trade 
bureaucracy is incapable of swift decision-making and 
therlfore unable to meet the requirements of international
fv
trade. In addition, the presence of the party, either in the 
form of party members at every level, or as external control
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organs, would distort the outcome at the cost of what would 
have been economically profitable. In a similar way like 
in industry, where the construction of a brand-new factory often 
is preferred to the modernisation of an old one, reforms in 
the foreign trade sector has frequently led to the growth of an 
increasing number of units, each set to solve the emerging 
problems. As a result, even more bodies must be consulted 
before a conclusion is reached and the time spent 
increases correspondingly.
If any reform initiatives are to have a permanent 
beneficial impact, a correct identification of the problem is 
of vital importance. Most of Soviet debate were
limited to a very general and relatively abstract discussion of 
the problems during the seventies. There are two notable 
exceptions, V. P. Gruzinov's analysis of the management of 
foreign trade, and A. V. Engibarov's analysis of the reasons 
for the poor Soviet export performance.5 The quotations^from 
Dr. Zaslavskaya's report earlier, albeit meant as a more 
general observation of the problem, goes much further than 
the unpolemic conclusions by Engibarov and Gruzinov.
Fortunately, Dr. Zaslavskaya is not alone, others have come 
forward with piercing analysis.6 Although no study of the 
foreign trade bureaucracy per se has been published since 
Gorbachev's assumption of power, the general academic and 
political debate, has played an important role in the reforms 
implemented since 1985.
820
Common for most of the proposals to reform the 
system, has been an acknowledgement of the need to alter two- - 
aspects of the economic mechanisms:
- the extensive centra 1isation of decision-making power 
must be broken, and delegated to lower levels. This requires 
a radical change in the information structure of the
economy, with the establishment of horizontal communication
f\
channels. Hitherto, the principles of central planning and 
authority have favoured vertical channels of communication 
and information in the bureaucrcay. If the intentions to 
make the state administration more flexible, the 
communication structure must be constructed according to what 
is most efficient from a trade viewpoint. - -
- closely linked to the argument above, is the view that 
the insulation of the Soviet economy from the developments on 
the world markets is fundamentally harmful. Only the 
consumer of imported goods can judge what is adequate for his 
requirements, in the same way can no-one but the producer of 
export commodities implement the necessary changes to 
maintain or increase his share of the foreign markets. To 
depend on the recommendations, or more frequently orders from 
a foreign trade association is cumbersome and often 
inadequate.
A revolution from above usually leads to the 
establishment of new, supervisory bodies to ensure that the 
extant bureaucracy complies with the directions issued by the
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politicians. The current reforms are no exception. As will 
be seen in the next section, this has resulted in a large 
degree of overlapping responsibilities and conflicting 
interests. Already at this early stage of the reforms, 
the multitude of bodies supposedly there to facilitate the 
expansion of trade with the West has created confusions as 
there does not seem to be any unit with the exclusive power 
to conduct negotiations and sign a transaction. Needless 
to say, the obstacles increase parallel with the complexity 
of the transact ions. A problem in this relation is to 
create conditions where the systematic avoidance of risky 
transactions and the transfer of complicated decisions to 
a superiors level is prevented. One way of doing this may be 
through legislative changes, as suggested previously .
Another, more complicated but nevertheless more promising
1
approach is to reduce the scope and power of the
decision-maker. Implicit in this, is that the bureaucracy------
ideally should not occupy more than an advisory position in 
the transactions of trade. The inherent tendency towards 
stability, security and predictability are not compatible with 
the characteristics of trade. Far from suggesting a rapid 
introduction of a completely free market, not only would this 
be utopian as the effects would be devastating, it is more 
relevant to see how the reforms attempt to permit a greater 
degree of scope for the market forces as well as trying to make 
the bureaucracy more compatible with the requirements of
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international trade.
Previous reform attempts have not altered the 
principle of state monopoly of foreign trade. The recent 
extension of the right to trade on foreign markets to a small 
number of enterprises in principle does not touch upon 
this legacy.
In 1965, efforts were undertaken to strengthen 
the ties between the foreign trade sector and industry.7 
However, these measures resulted in a stronger branch 
differentiation and made cross-sectional co-operation 
virtually impossible. The links between the foreign trade 
bureaucracy and the domestic industry were vested in a number 
of newly established Foreign Trade Organisations These 
associations were to hold a key positions in the conducts of 
the Soviet Union's foreign economic activities. After the 
reforms in the late seventies, their power was consolidated 
and their number had increased. Any reforms which aim for— a—  
radical improvement of the foreign trade must therefore 
attempt to transform the role of these organisations.
A further problem is caused by the relatively small 
share of the foreign trade in relation to the national 
economy. Although various definitions of the relationship 
between the two has bee given and this has caused much debate 
among scholars, the importance of foreign trade to the Soviet 
economy differs vastly from the reliance on foreign markets 
in smaller CMEA countries. Due to this fact, there is no
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imminent pressure to reform the foreign trade system as the 
economy will be able to muddle through at much the same level 
it does today. When compared with Hungarian debate, it is 
clear that the country's increasing problems on foreign 
markets play a much larger role in the drive for new reforms 
than in the Soviet Union. The cost.of not participating is 
in the short-term comparatively smaller for the Soviet Union. 
Stability is valued much higher by the foreign trade 
bureaucrats than the loss of a potentially profitable deal, 
with the result that the trade today is at a sub-optimal 
level. This is openly acknowledged by the present 
leadership and constitutes the reason for the desire to 
engage in a level of trade corresponding to the economic 
potentials and material needs of the Soviet Union.
We will now turn to a more detailed analysis of the 
changes in the foreign trade bureaucracy, discussing the 
establishment of new organs influencing the dec isions-making 
process, as well as the reorganization of the existing units.
Reforming the Bureaucracy
The general lack of integration between the 
requirements of the domestic econonomy and the foreign 
economic activities of the USSR, was widely discussed at the 
27th CPSU Congress:
£ 24
"Participation in the international division of labour is 
becoming an important factor for developing the Soviet 
economy- However, the scales, structure and forms of our 
trade, scientific and production ties built up over 
the years now contradict the requirements of the 
intensification of the economy and acceleration of 
scientific and technical progress- This is 
especially noticeable on the background of deep changes 
in international economic relations due to the scientific 
and technical revolution-"®
To supervise the implementation of the reform plans of the 
political leaders and the co-ordination of all the various 
foreign economic activities of- the USSR, the State Foreign 
Economic Commission has been set up. Clearly, the task 
given to this body is considerable. Under the pre-85 system, 
the supervisory role_was vested with the Council of 
Ministers and the State Committee for Foreign Economic 
Links.
The Commission includes senior civil servants from 
a number of ministries engaged in foreign trade, the 
chairman has been given the rank of Deputy Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers. It is perhaps too soon to assess the 
influence this body will have or to what extent it will be 
able to fulfill its tasks, embrasing four different 
areas according to Ivan D. Ivanov, Deputy Chairman of the 
Commission:
EE5
"...1) strategic decision-making,
£) collaborating on national foreign economic policy,
3) supervision of the planning procedure, and 
A) enactment of the appropriate legislation within the 
limits of its competence.--.*'^
Inevitably, there is a certain sense of deja v u , creating a 
committee for a problem that should have been solved if the 
extant structure was functionally adequate, has been a 
common strategy in the past. Toda y, there are too 
many organs with a supervisory function. However, to claim 
that this will be the outcome of the Commission may be a 
premature judgement. The body is to be subordinate to the 
Council of Ministers,- and therefore enhances the- supervisory 
and integrating role that was intended for the Council. As 
was amply illustrated in the wake of the 1978 reforms, 
a delegation of power to the bureaucracy may be used in the 
latters interest. Apparently, the legislative power vested 
in the Commission may be used to prevent a repetition of this 
development.
There is one particular problem that has been 
pointed out in Soviet debate on foreign trade, that is the 
scarcity of trade experience and know-how of the functioning 
of a market. Any expansion of the right to trade to other 
bodies than the Ministry of Foreign Trade will have to 
overcome this obstacle. This may be one of the major tasks 
of the Commission to solve. It is unlikely that the Ministry
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of Foreign Trade will lend its knowledge and experience to 
other bodies, as this will effeetive1y .undermine the 
Ministry's monopoly.
To assess the role of the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
according to the reform plans is very difficult and somewhat 
confusing as the statements may differ considerably according 
to the speaker's institutional affinity. There are no 
indications that the reforms and restructuring of the foreign 
trade sector have ceased, thus the role of the Ministry may 
yet be the object of changes. In an interview on the effects 
of the reform, the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, 
Vladislav L. Malkevich did not give any impression o f - radical 
changes at all, when he asserted that:
"The Ministry of Foreign trade has been and continues to 
be one of the most important parts in the foreign economic 
complex of the Soviet Union and will remain so in the 
future...The Ministry of Foreign Trade will retain its 
functions in trading, through its FTQs, in many types of 
machinery and equipment, important raw-materials and 
foodstuffs as well as in a number of goods of national 
importance. Besides those individual and amalgamated 
factories with the right to enter foreign markets will be 
able to import and export products on the basis of 
contractual relations with ... with the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade. A Considerable part of the total trade 
turnover..«wi11 go through the Ministry of Foreign
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Trade."10
Bearing in mind the composition of Soviet foreign trade with
Western Europe, the last sentence becomes almost an
understatement. Practically everything will be traded as 
previously, maybe only consumer goods will remain outside the 
scope of its foreign trade associations. Apparently, even in 
the cases where there has been a delegation of the right to 
engage in trade, the lack of experience will force the 
activities to be channelled thorugh the Ministry. Not only 
will this prove as inefficient and costly as under the old 
system, but the fact that the principle of full cost 
-accounting has made it lucrative for the FTOs to impose 
charges on their services will increase the costs for.any 
enterprise that may ponder on the prospects of foreign trade.
There does not seem to be any changes in the
monopoly situation of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.
Although its formal rights may have been curbed, its powers 
are unabated. This is clearly contrary to the intentions of 
the reforms, and Malkevich's statement contrasts strongly 
with the optimism of Ivanov who declared that the expansion 
of foreign trade rights was the "bedrock of reforms" and that 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade was "invited to join this new 
commercial market."11
One might be tempted to alter Mr. Ivanov's 
statement and say that it is not the expansion of rights 
that are the bedrock of reform, but how the rights of the
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FTOs have been altered. According to a decree published in 
March 1987, their financial status has been changed.12 As 
mentioned above, full cost accounting still remains the 
fundamental principle, but under the new regulations they are 
to be self-sufficient in hard currency. It should be added 
that the official statement uses the word valuta, which may 
cover both convertible and non-convertible currencies. If 
an FTO wishes to expand its activity, further funds may be 
borrowed at a low interest rate from the Vneshtorgbank, the 
bank for foreign trade. However, despite this, one remains 
with two fundamental questions, what can the FTO do with its 
earnings, and what happends if it does not make any profits 
at all?
Seemingly, the intention was that any surplus 
holdings o f ^  currency may be used for additional 
purchases on Western markets. It is difficult to see how 
this can be undertaken when there has not been made any 
provisions for such a move in the plan. To a certain extent, 
this depends on the character of the plan, a point which will 
be discussed below. But it is problematic to see what the 
FTOs can do with a spontaneously purchased amount of goods.
What makes the sudden granting of financial 
independence to the FTOs problematic, is the great potential 
for contradictions between by the financial prudency pursued 
by the state banks and the FTOs' seemingly unrestricted right 
to spend any surplus. Not only does this betray a certain
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degree of naivity in the reforms, it reveals the basic 
contradiction between the granting of autonomy while still 
retaining central control. If the interference of 
the state banks equals the previous restrictions, there will 
be no incentive for the FTOs to expand their trade.
As has been discussed previously, the Foreign .Trade 
Organisations are representatives of branch interests whereas 
the ultimate responsibility for their performance is vested 
in the Ministry for Foreign Trade. The State Committee 
for Foreign Economic Relations (not the Commission) 
has been given the task to check on their performance.
Quite how this supervisory role is to be divided 
between the Ministry and the Committee has not been 
explained. May it suffice here to repeat, that having two 
mutually independent bodies watching a third is a fertile 
ground for institutional conflicts. In the confusion this 
will create the association may find it easier to pursue 
their old functions and not pay heed to contradictory 
directions from the Committee and the Ministry.
The State Committee for Foreign Economic 
Relat i ons is given an advisory role, functioning as an 
intermediary organ providing foreign business-interests with 
information and help to find a suitable Soviet partner. The 
Committee is also responsible for drawing up forecasts and 
surveys in the fields of metallurgy, energy and geology, all 
being of particular interest to foreign business. The
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Committee monitors developments on the Western markets.
This lack of knowledge about the vagaries of Western markets.. . 
has for long been a weak point in Soviet trade with Western 
Europe. As will be discussed later, some measures have been 
proposed to provide the foreign trade sector with long-term 
prognosis and short-term forecasts.
As a result of the diffusion of responsibility 
and decision-making power, the need for the large central 
bureaucracies has disappeared. In addition, the task of 
curbing the influence of the foreign trade apparatus can only 
be effectively carried out if the number of employees is 
reduced. The staff subordinated to the Committee has been cut 
by 30 per cent, cuts at a similar scale have been announced 
for the Ministry of Foreign Trade as w e l l . 13
Although one of the targets of the reforms was to 
facilitate the negotiation process between the foreign 
partner and the Soviet enterprise, the present changes has 
introduced a multitude of advisory bodies. For someone who 
has been engaged in long-term trade connections with the 
Soviet Union, the old system might seem more preferable. In 
addition to the Commission and the foreign trade 
associations, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry is 
given the task to supervise the trade contacts between the 
West and the Soviet Union. Its main responsibility will 
be, as in the past, the arrangement of exhibitions and 
fairs for Soviet industry at home and abroad. According to
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the Chairman, Evgenii Petranov, the Chamber will concentrate 
its efforts in the field of machinery and equipment. As 
these are commodities that will be given high priority under 
the new reforms, the Chamber will p r o b a b l y .play a much more 
prominent role than in the past. Ye. Petranov states 
that the most important aspect of the Chamber's 
function rests on the fact that:
"over 70 Soviet industrial enterprises that now have 
the right to operate independently in foreign 
markets are members of the USSR Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry."1^
The number given here covers all the enterprises 
which have been granted the right to trade abroad. Although 
the Chamber ostensibly is there to aid them in their foreign 
operations, its central position suggests also that it may 
have a screening function. Thus, we may have to conclude that 
despite the assertion that the granting of foreign trade 
rights to individual enterprises is a break with the monopoly 
previously enjoyed by the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the 
monopoly has de facto been transferred elsewhere. At the 
same time, the enterprise have been given the financial 
responsibility for the preformance of their output on the 
Western markets.
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B.A. Three Key Factors: Plan. Price and Expertise
As we have seen in the past, structural changes 
have been without much impact on the general performance of 
the Soviet foreign trade sector, because the basic 
mechanisms have remained unaltered. The scope of action, 
and the scope of autonomy in a Soviet enterprise may have 
been slightly expanded, only to be retracted by the 
central bureaucracy as soon as a reform-wave has ended.
The ultimate decisions has always been taken by the central 
bureaucracy. Reforms are therefore little more than 
structural changes in the state administration. This has 
been convincingly argued by Soviet analysts,13 and pointed 
out by this author. On the background of this, the reforms 
undertaken within the bureaucracy will undoubtedly be of some 
relevance and facilitate trade to some extent, although 
there are ample grounds for conflict and confusion not only 
among the decision-makers but for the foreigner who might be 
interested in entering into a co-operation or trade 
agreement with a Soviet enterprise.
One may be forced to draw a somewhat sombre 
conclusion based on the observations above. That might be 
premature, so far we have limited the discussion to the 
"superstructure", the plan has not been analysed. There 
are several reasons for this, the reforms have started by 
changing what is visible. This might easily turn out to be a
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fatal strategy, as one cannot expect an enterprise or a 
bureaucratic body to function according to the intentions of 
the reforms as long as the fundamental mechanisms remain 
unaltered. It should perhaps be added that it is far more easy 
to change people, responsibilities and targets, than the
that reveal a will to change the fundamental mechanisms of 
the Soviet economy. In particular has the debate focused on 
the role of the plan, the function of prices, and the access 
to adequate and relevant information. Unfor tunate1y , it 
should be added that these are all topical issues, and that 
because of the short time the reforms have been active, 
there is no material available to estimate their impact on 
the performance of Soviet foreign trade.
control over foreign trade, Ivan D. Ivanov announced that:
"It will be less del iberate.u 1<£>. Whereas the exact 
meaning of this statement is difficult to define, one may 
assume that measures have been undertaken to move away from 
the directive nature of the plan towards a more indicative 
role. This assumption is confirmed elsewhere by 
Ivanov.1’7 He states that the previously applied strategy 
of allocating any surplus products for export will cease.
This has proved both costly and inefficient as it would often 
have been more economical to have used the surplus in the
system itself.
There are however, certain aspects of the reforms
Concerning the plan, the main instrument of state
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domestic industry. The restrictions on imports will be 
removed, as the decisions to purchase abroad will be taken by 
the enterprise managers on the basis of the enterprise hard 
^-currency fond. As has been stated earlier, demand for 
foreign imports by far excedes the central funding allocated 
for that purpose. This problem will therefore partly be 
solved under the ausp ices of the expanded foreign trade 
rights. However, the central authorities role in foreign 
trade will not be cut back as much as one might be tempted to 
think natural due to the reforms. The previous policy of 
preventing foreign purchases whenever domestic industry can 
supply what is needed will be continued for those 
enterprises that have not been given the foreign trade 
rights:
“...requests (excluding goods and services that may 
be used at their own discretion) will be examined more 
carefully bearing in mind the availability of domestic 
products and comparable value and quality."1®
The extent of this liberalisation can only be measured if we 
know the number of enterprises and organisations with hard 
currency rights. Although this is a frequently 
misunderstood point in Western debate, this category is 
apparently larger than the number of 70 enterprises,
20 ministries and 10 interbranch scientific organisations 
with foreign trade rights.1<5> The large majority 
of Soviet enterprises will still be at the mercy of
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the State Commi 11ee of Sc ience and Technology when they
apply for imports. Thus, one must conclude that unless the
significantly improved, the impact of imported modernisation 
will remain marginal.
enterprises will be encouraged by the potential hard currency 
profits to produce more and better commodities for the 
foreign markets. According to Ivanov, resources for 
factories producing for exports, will be given top 
priority when the allocation of raw-materia1s and other input 
materials is planned. This hardly solves the fundamental 
problem caused by the rigidity of the plan. If the Soviet 
Union is to participate more actively in world trade, the 
enterprise must be able to respond more flexibly to the 
developments on the world markets, either by seizing an 
opportunity the moment it emerges or stop producing whenever 
a commodity loses its competitiveness. Today, input 
materials are scarce and cannot be purchased unless they have 
been made available by the planners. Any enterprise manager 
that stops production will be left with an excess holding of 
material, all of which is illegal to resell either to the 
producer or to another company. Under Soviet law, hoarding 
materials is a criminal act, and the manager will be liable 
to fines or imprisonment. One is therefore forced to 
conclude, that there is little incentive for a Soviet
mechanisms of innovation and diffusion are
□n the export side, the idea is that the
enterprise to enter into the foreign markets because the 
domestic setting does not permit him to react flexibly. It .is 
highly likely however, that the enterprises with the full 
trading rights already are involved in foreign trade and that 
the reforms will enable them to participate more fully.
In 1979, a decision was taken to reform the 
industrial wholesale price system. New price lists were set 
up, and two years later they becanr^ effect ive . The motives 
behind the reform initiatives were laudable, economising was 
to be encouraged and the quality of output to be increased.
The new prices were calculated to reflect costs more 
correctly than the old system.
Then, as now, it was regarded as a major task to 
promote the introduction of new machinery. Technological 
progress and the intensification of the Soviet economy is 
impossible if the resistance towards innovation is not 
broken. Various models were applied to facilitate a change 
of attitude on behalf of the management, and to give an 
impetus to the integration of more cost-efficient techniques 
of production.
During the seventies, the most dominant pricing 
method was effectiveness pr i c e s . According to this 
principle, the products are given a price high enough to 
encourage producers, and sufficiently low to attract buyers. 
The “effectiveness" derives from the gains achieved by 
substituting an old product for a new, the resultant profit
will be shared between the producer and the purchaser.20 
Mostly new products belonging to the top quality categories 
are made available for effectiveness prices. Despite this, 
the effectiveness pricing has had a very limited impact. Not 
only has there been numerous complaints against the standards 
set by the GOSSTANDART as there seems to be a fair 
amount of arbitrariness in their categorisation, but more 
important because even products given top certificates of 
quality fall short of international standards.
The emphasis on a priori knowledge of the 
productivity and pro fitabi1ity is the main cause for the 
inapplicability of this price model. A possible solution 
to this problem would perhaps be to give the enterprises the 
right to set the prices and restrict the directive 
powers GOSKOMTSEN, the state pricing authority. But 
this could only function in a context with competition among 
the producers, and not in a situation marked by 
endemic shortages as today. A reform of the price- 
system will therefore have to procede step-wise towards 
greater flexibility. There are encouraging signs that this 
is the strategy applied at present. Nikolay Ya. Petrakov, 
Chairman of GOSKOMTSEN, states that the current reforms are 
in favour of a transfer of power on price-issues to 
micro-economic level, while at the same time retaining a fair 
measure of central control:
"...the planned price system performs the important role
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of reconciling national economic and enterprise 
interests... First, prices as economic normatives 
determined directly by the plan, must preclude, (make 
unprofitable or economically disadvantageous) socially 
unjustifiable expenditures for production. Second, prices 
should provide a profit sufficient for the further 
development of production at planned rates of growth, and 
the formation of material incentive funds according to 
plan normatives. Such price structure creates a genuine 
economic base for the conversion of enterprises and 
associations to samc^jjl/kopayemost and 
...self-financing."ei 
How succesful this will be depends to a great extent on the 
character of the plan. Petrakov is regrettably vague on 
the interrelatedness between price and plan.
It is inevitable that the attempts to 
create closer links betwen the Soviet economy and the 
world market must result in a levelling out of domestic 
and international prices. As discussed previously, the FTOs 
price the exports according to the prevailing price levels 
aborad, and resell imports to domestic customers at a price 
which is heavily subsidised by the state. Despite the 
expansion of trading rights and the right to hold hard 
currency, most foreign trade activities will be conducted as 
earlier, and a less rigid price system will be a natural move 
in the near future.
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An aspect of the reforms rarely mentioned in the 
Western debate, but frequently focused upon by Soviet 
scholars, is the dangerous lack of adequate skills suited to 
international trade. Engibarov hinted at this deficiency by 
describing the problems of marketing.22 Lowering the price 
was seemingly the only technique applied to attract new 
customers and widen the market share. The debate today goes 
further, underlining not only the importance of a more 
sophisticated approach to advertising and selling, but points 
out the importance of a thorough knowledge of the 
fluctuations on the foreign markets. In an article in 
Vneshnyaya torqovlya, P. Z a v ’yalov states that:
"One of the decisive factors for the success on foreign 
markets, especially concerning scientific goods, is the 
regular outlining, and ability to implement a policy for 
the export of the commodities. Working out a strategy 
opening up foreign markets for new commodities should 
become an important part of the export policy of 
industrial enterprises, foreign trade associoations and 
f irms."S3
Zav'yalov recommends the establishment of a nation-wide 
information network offering its services to any enterprise 
interested in foreign trade. Related to this, a new role 
should be given to the foreign trade missions attached to the 
Soviet embassies:
"...the main target of these must consist in the
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preparation of analytical materials on foreign markets, 
forecasts, concrete "recommendations and suggestions to 
individual enterprises, export co-operations and foreign 
trade organisations."2^
The ability to implement the intentions inherent in 
the reforms depends on the skills of the managerial staff 
and the employees of the state bureaucracy. Apart from 
individual articles in the press and scholarly journals, 
there are few signs of any official intitiatives to apply 
western-style managerial skills as a part of the general 
training of new managers or civil servants. According to the 
curriculum"of the Academy for Foreign Trade for 1986/87, the 
courses on "the organisation of foreign economic links" and 
"analysis of the foreign economic activities of the 
enterprise" are given less teaching hours than "contemporary 
problems of marxist-leninist philosophy" and "current . 
problems of scientific communism".23 It should be added 
however, that there has been a certain diffusion of marketing 
skills through the reduction and re-employment of staff from 
the central bureaucracy. In addition, the Chamber for 
Commerce and Industry has set up of training and consultation 
office as part of its task to facilitate foreign trade.
The plan, the price mechanisms, and the skills to 
use the newly given autonomy are interdependent. It will 
take some time before we can fully comprehend the scope of 
the reforms and the impact they have had on the USSR's
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foreign trade profile. The entire pattern of interaction 
between the state and the productive sphere will be changed 
radically. Unless the reforms benefit the enterprise 
managers, it will be impossible for the politicians to curb 
the power of the bureaucracy through declarations alone. At 
this early phase it is impossible to say whether Gorbachev 1s 
"revolution of the minds" has made the managerial staff 
receptive to the ideas of profit, competition, responsibility 
and possible bankruptcy. If the answer is negative, and 
enterprise managers join ranks with the bureaucracy, any 
reform attempt will fail.
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9. Conclusion
The most radical aspect of the reforms in Soviet 
foreign trade with Western Europe is the departure from the 
insistence on a planned nature of the economic relations.
This move has been reflected most clearly in the expansion of 
foreign trade rights, the establishment of joint ventures and 
the attempts to engage in closer co-operation with the Common 
Market and GATT. As we have seen, the present leadership has 
adopted a policy aimed not solely at strengthening 
traditional export commodities, but has attempted to open up 
the foreign markets for a much larger share of the domestic 
economy. Many commentators have focused on this development 
as the most visible sign of Gorbachev's strategy of using 
foreign trade consciously as a growth factor, and not only to
cover up deficiencies or solve the bottlenecks of the
domestic economy. Yet, I would like to conclude that this is
only a part of the truth. If the foreign profile of the
country is to be improved, the prerequisite is internal 
change. It is crucial that the domestic structure, be it the 
bureaucratic hierarchy or enterprise management, is able to 
respond to and be influenced by the changes in the world 
markets. As was shown in the first section, reforms were 
undertaken during the seventies, but without attempting to 
consider the problems of foreign trade as part of a greater
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whole. The principle of isolating the domestic economy from 
external developments was not altered. This has been changed 
since 1985. The measures that have been undertaken in the 
past two years have aimed towards a greater degree of 
integration with the world economy.
The current reforms are not restricted to the state
/
bur eaucrfcy, but have been reflected at enterprise level.
The Law on the State Enterprise which was passed in June 1987 
provides for a radical expansion^managerial autonomy. 1 
In addition, the participation of the work force is regarded 
as a crucial element in the democratisation process. When 
recalling that the average size of a Soviet enterprise is far 
larger than its Western counterpart, I have certain problems 
comprehending how this will be carried out in practice. 
Nevertheless, it would be a major victory for the reformers 
if the entrenched attitude of "they pretend they pay, so we 
pretend we work" is broken. This would be a far more 
valuable contribution to the improvement of the Soviet 
foreign trade relations than any short-term increase in the 
export of machinery and import of consumer goods.
The akward and lengthy negotiating process which 
arises from Soviet trade practices were analysed in the first 
section of the thesis. The expansion of foreign trade rights 
will probably change this feature, and greatly facilitate 
trade relations with more middle-sized and small Western 
enterprises. As mentioned, counter-trade practices lack
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prestige. If the insistence of payment in kind became a thing 
of the past, the USSR would be able to claim a posistion as 
an equal trading partner of the West with more credibility 
than today. It should be added that this development would 
make a future GATT-membership more likely.
The bureaucratic obstacles still identifiable 
despite the reforms, may distort the political initiatives 
considerab1y . There is a precedent for this. In 1965, 
reforms were passed, which aimed at giving managers more 
freedom to choose what to produce as well as expanding
I
their autonomy i n manrpager ial questions. The resi stance of 
the state administration, combined with a lack of 
understanding for the contents of the reforms on behalf of 
the managers, forced the political leadership to retract the 
reforms before they had been fully implemented.2
Yet certain important factors make a similar 
negative development less likely under the present 
conditions. Internally, the debate on the necessity for 
economic reforms has raised popular awareness of the 
impending crisis and stagnation if nothing is done.
Enterprise managers have been given the possibility to give 
their opinion in the media, and thus had ample opportunity to 
exert pressure on the reform proposals. In addition, the Law 
on the State Enterprise provides them with legal protection 
against attempts to curb their newly gained autonomy from 
the outside, e.g. bureaucrats or local politicians.
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The plans to expand the share of unplanned sectors,
li­
as well as opening up for who 1 esa 1 e j|of industrial consumer 
goods outside the scope of the central plan, will entail a 
certain degree of competition among the domestic producers. 
The ability to cope with competition at home will be 
an important lesson for future success on Western markets.
If the development in the Soviet economy will introduce 
phenomena like bankruptcy and freedom to hire and fire staff, 
the barriers between a planned economy and a market system 
will become smaller.3
A problem closely linked to the issue of 
managerial freedom concerns the question of ownership, a 
question that takes us back to the introductory chapter on 
the systemic differences between the Soviet Union and Western 
Europe. Although the powers of the state bureauci/cy have 
been restricted, it remains to be seen if the state ownership 
of the means of production have been transferred de facto to 
the enterprise. Commenting on the reform process, a leading 
expert on Soviet law, Harold J. Berman claims that:
"The genius of it was that it preserved the 
Marxist-Leninist conception of legal ownership as part 
of the ideological superstructure built upon the base 
of economic ownership. The theory of rights of 
operative administration was, and is, to be sure, a 
major concession to the requirements of economic 
efficiency...,,<e*
a^ s
The externa1 d imek ions of Sov i et foreign trade has 
been expressed in a vigorous economic diplomacy. To a certain 
degree, this link between foreign policy and foreign economic 
relations is a novelty. Under the leadership of Brezhnev, 
throughout the seventies and early eighties, there were few 
international events or political crisis in Western Europe 
that triggered Soviet threats to use trade as a political 
weapon. Despite the occasional war of words, trade was not 
cut off at any point with the aim to force concessions from 
Western Europe. Since 1985, there have been several attempts 
to use trade more construetive1y by linking an improvement in 
trade relations to (tHe^ aj lessening of political tensions. In 
this respect, the ideals of the functionalists have been 
revived. It is perhaps relevant at this point, when the 
disarmament process seems to yield tangible results, to recall 
the quotation in the introductory chapter taken from Mitrany: 
"binding together those interests which are common, 
where they are common and to the extent to which they are 
common...1 ike other forms of union it (functionalism) 
links together a number - any number — of political units, 
but for one purpose at a time...one might put it, that 
(it) is a limited liability association between 
political units."5
I
Trade is one of the most obvious issues ijere both Western ^
Europe and the Soviet Union have common interests. It is not 
an exaggeration to claim that the present Soviet leadership
849
enjoys unprecedented popularity in Western Europe. This 
politicial credibility has spill-over effects on trade and 
the prospects for an expansion of economic intercourse are 
positive at least in a short-term perspective. Whether we 
are at the begininng of a lasting expansion of economic and 
industrial relations depends on the profitability. One may 
once again turn to the warning issued by Henry Kissinger at 
the beginning of the seventies that without profit, trade 
would dwindle.^
I will not venture to present any guesswork on the
I
future of Soviet-West European trade, above the conclusion 
that the preconditions for (Van) improvement in the relations 
are present. Most important is the understanding displayed 
by the Gorbachev leadership that the pre-1985 trends in trade 
and economic development could not be continued any longer.
Not only did the reliance on a single commodity create
serious instability in Soviet hard currency income, but it . 
contributed to an entrenchment of the country's economic
backwardness. To the question I have tried to answer on the
pages above, to what extent is the Soviet economy and foreign 
trade bureaucracy adapted to the requirements of 
international trade, there is no clear cut answer.
Rather I am tempted to conclude that it is still a long way 
to go before the Soviet Union can compete successfully in 
Western Europe, but the situation today is radically better 
than just a few years ago.
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The power of the bureaucracy is still considerable, 
a fact that will have adverse affe/cts on any modernisations • 
attempts. The multitude of organs has not been decreased, on 
the contrary(have) new bodies with overlapping
f
respon sibi1ities^been created. The inherent tendency to avoid 
innovative forms of transactions which entail considerable 
risks, as well as the transfer of difficult decisions to 
superior levels, have not been broken. Unless the expansion 
of trading rights is further enhanced to cover new sectors of 
industry, there are substantial reasons to fear that the 
problems of the past will continue under the guise of new 
committees, commissions and supervisory councils.
I believe it is too simple to claim that the 
problems of Soviet foreign trade are due to the general lack 
of sophisticated high quality goods. The absence of 
extensive and uninhibited channels of communication between 
the domestic and foreign economy is the prime reason for this 
backwardness. The formation of a communication network 
passing on the information required for an adaption of 
production to the requirements of foreign customers will not 
only be an efficient attack on the monopoly of the Foreign 
Trade Organisations, but give the enterprises incentives to 
use their newly granted rights.
The basic issue remains, as was stated in the 
introduction, the systemic differences between a planned and 
a market economy. To engage in international trade is
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impossible without a domestic economy capable of reacting 
swiftly to changes. The conduct of trade and the transfer 
of knowledge do not, and cannot follow a rigid plan. Much 
therefore depends on the long-term effects the recent changes 
and future reforms will have on the economic mechanisms of 
the Soviet economy. In 1982, two West German scholars 
concluded that:
"Ah organisational form, comprising both the requirements 
which increasingly emphasise the innovative, high—cost and 
therefore risky forms of foreign trade transactions, with 
the demand for the supremacy from the party and the state, 
is so far not found."'7
Based on the analysis we have presented here, we 
may conclude, although with considerable caution, that 
measures of a radical character have been undertaken to 
facilitate international trade, at the cost of the state and 
the p a r t y .
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